Mandate consultations with the Steering Committee: Summary of responses

Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation Steering Committee Meeting
14 – 15 July 2016
New York

This document summarises responses by Steering Committee members to a questionnaire on the mandate and working arrangements of the Global Partnership. 15 Steering Committee members submitted responses to this questionnaire by 10 June 2016. Responses to multiple choice answers are illustrated through graphs highlighting feedback per constituency. These inputs will provide Steering Committee members a better understanding of each other’s expectations and positions on specific aspects of the mandate and working arrangements.

This document is shared with Steering Committee members for information and discussion.

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Background
This document summarises responses by Steering Committee members to a questionnaire on the mandate and working arrangements of the Global Partnership. It serves as input for further discussion among stakeholders and at the 10th meeting of the Steering Committee.

The 9th Steering Committee in Malawi concluded that the mandate and working arrangements of the Global Partnership must be adapted to the 2030 Agenda. The Joint Support Team was requested to conduct this exercise to contribute to a light and inclusive needs assessment ahead of discussions on the renewal of the Global Partnership mandate at the 10th Meeting of the Steering Committee.

“Headline” messages

- Diverging views on the mandate renewal process requests for its clarification and a conclusive agreement at the 10th SC meeting in New York.
- There is broad agreement among respondents that the mandate renewal should build on the original mandate adopted in 2012 and be driven by an open and inclusive consultative process.
- There were calls for a refined Theory of Change to underpin the mandate discussion, as well as for taking into account the findings of the working and advisory groups.
- Building on its strengths and comparative advantages, the Global Partnership should help to advance effective development co-operation across the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. It should support and ensure accountability of development effectiveness.
- The core effectiveness principles and delivering on all existing commitments from Paris to Busan remain the locus of the Partnership. They are universal and applicable to all actors.
- The functions of the Global Partnership – political momentum, monitoring, implementation and knowledge sharing – remain valid, but need to be adapted to the demands of the 2030 Agenda and customised to become more meaningful for different actors.
- The monitoring framework must be strengthened before expanding into other areas. There was support for keeping a two-year cycle. Specific proposals for indicators and incentives were made.
- Efforts should focus on implementation, but with a view to sharing knowledge and providing guidance to all relevant stakeholders, at all levels.
- HLM2 must define an ambitious agenda and the outcome document should provide clarity on the governance structure and working arrangements, to be agreed by all stakeholders. Specific new proposals were made for consideration.
- Meetings may best be sequenced in a way that they address the “missing middle”, facilitate more technical discussion among communities of interest and guarantee regular, high level opportunities for review and accountability, aligned to, but not duplicating other efforts.
- Based on conclusions related to the scope, function and roles of the Global Partnership, co-chairing, steering committee and JST arrangements can be further discussed.
Participation

The questionnaire was circulated to of the Steering Committee. 15 responses were received from:

| Partner and provider country governments (4) and their regional organisations (4) | Egypt, El Salvador, Japan, United States, European Union, AU/NEPAD, OFID/Arab Donor Coordination Group, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat |
| Other stakeholders (7) | IPU, AWEPA, UCLG, CDPE, ITUC, Foundations, World Bank |

Members responded in their capacity as members of the Steering Committee, advising based on their experience as members. The European Union and the World Bank indicated in their response that they consulted within their respective constituencies. NEPAD responded with a preliminary submission based on consultations with the African Working Group on Development Effectiveness. It will conduct further consultations to shape a final position of African countries by September 2016.

Detailed summary of feedback

The summary consolidates responses by question and by stakeholder group. Qualitative responses have been compressed to the extent possible and will follow the overview graphs.

I. SCOPE, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

a. Scope of the Global Partnership (Q1)

Question 1 invited respondents to react to this statement:

There was broad agreement during the Steering Committee meeting in Lilongwe that the value added of the GPEDC lies in its ability to provide dedicated space for all stakeholders to advance the effectiveness of their development co-operation. The vision for the GPEDC proposed was to serve as a “Global multi-stakeholder partnership that drives greater effectiveness, quality and impact of all types of development co-operation to help all actors realise the 2030 Agenda.”

It was also agreed to focus the proposed new mandate on three areas, building on the mandate endorsed in 2012: (i) strengthening political momentum, monitoring and implementation of all types of development co-operation; (ii) supported by knowledge sharing, learning and innovation and (iii) making specific offers to the High Level Political Forum (HLPF), Financing for Development (FFD) Follow-up Forum and the UN Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF), especially on SDG 17.
Several providers raised the need to ensure that the Global Partnership offers concrete and tangible contributions to advance effective development co-operation across the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. It should not limit itself to SDG 17. The Global Partnership should help ensure that all actors understand and apply development effectiveness principles and turn commitments into action. The voluntary nature and flexibility of the Partnership, the fact that it operates outside political blocks and the importance of implementation could be better emphasised. Specific offers should be further clarified and duplication with DCF needs to be addressed in the mandate.

Several partner countries and other stakeholders stressed a need for continued accountability to realise agreed commitments from Paris to Busan at the political level. Egypt emphasised synchronisation at global level and proposes a roadmap or action plan based on this survey. Pacific Islands underscored the ability to recognise the diversity of efforts and maintaining a constituency-based composition of the Steering Committee. Civil society emphasised the focus on implementation, as well as the multi-stakeholder nature of the Global Partnership and the uniqueness of non-executive stakeholders being part of the governance structure. Trade unions underscored the monitoring function in this regard and were concerned with overemphasis on sharing findings at global level. Local governments stressed the need for concrete reporting links at global level, and called for greater attention to realising effective development co-operation in-country and at local level. El Salvador also stressed the need to improve the presentation of results of the work by the Global Partnership to make them be better understood by citizens.
b. Differentiation of commitments (Q2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Graph 2. Agreement with a differentiated set of commitments for engaged stakeholders</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes 3 1 1 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>No 2 2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No indication 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional remarks

Respondents in favour of differentiated commitments emphasised: a need to make such commitments with stakeholders more explicit and some of them binding; and focus on their implementation; without making the monitoring process more complex; serving as overarching framework for different stakeholder assemblies.

Respondents who disagreed also highlighted: all actors should deliver against the same set of commitments, avoiding an “á la carte” approach where actors can pick and choose; accountability is a core principle and function of the Partnership; widening to a more differentiated set of commitments could distract from its core focus; different actors have different responsibilities that are related to commitments.

NEPAD also emphasised that the same principles and commitments should be applicable to all.
Adding remarks

Some respondents suggested other elements for functions and tasks: to educate development actors on the importance of development effectiveness principles; to serve as a platform for stakeholders across countries for mutual learning; to make a contribution to SDG 16 and specifically work on an enabling environment for civil society; identify deficiencies and provide action plans for implementation.

A few respondents also highlighted the interdependence of the proposed functions and their linkages with the 2030 Agenda. Some stressed a need to focus, in all functions, on fulfilling core aid and development commitments and ensuring complementary with UN processes. The United States considered providing strategic guidance and analysis as well as supporting learning and knowledge exchange as important, but secondary to the core objectives of monitoring and supporting political momentum for the implementation of effective development cooperation commitments.
d. The Second High Level Meeting (Q4)

**Graph 4: HLM2 most important outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Description</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome document that reflects ambitious commitments by all relevant actors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward-looking agenda for development effectiveness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed mandate for GPEDC that is visionary and positions it firmly</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Clarity on working arrangements for GPEDC going forward</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **Partner country governments and regional organisations**
- **Provider country governments and regional organisations**
- **Parliaments**
- **Local Governments**
- **Civil Society and Trade Unions**
- **Foundations**
- **Multilateral Development Banks**

**Additional remarks**

NEPAD defined an outcome document with clear, common and ambitious commitments, confirmed by all actors, transparent governance and working arrangements as well as accountability measures of the Global Partnership and its Co-Chairs, Steering Committee and JST as HLM2 success.

NEPAD also strongly recommends a revision of the HLM2 agenda to reflect a more open GPEDC governance renewal process.
e. Monitoring (Questions 5-9)

Graph 5: The monitoring framework should also assess the effectiveness of...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-concessional official financing, including guarantees &amp; non-concessional/blended lending</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South Cooperation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Change / Climate Finance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate social responsibility and philanthropic cooperation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development co-operation provided by non-state actors (e.g. NGOs)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical cooperation and capacity building</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional remarks**

Opinions about which financial flows to track with a revised monitoring framework were mixed. Several responses proposed a cautious approach for expansion, getting the current framework right first and revising it only based on the commitments agreed in the Nairobi outcome document. Some were also supportive of a more in-depth analysis of the framework. Any changes should be selective and not duplicate the follow-up and review process of the 2030 Agenda. NEPAD highlighted that broadening the focus of monitoring to other types of development cooperation would demand a formal engagement with those specific providers. Climate change finance was said to be rigorously monitored already and CSR and philanthropic cooperation should not be lumped together.

Graph 6: For which of the current indicators would you like to see continued monitoring

**Legend**
- Partner country governments and regional organisations
- Provider country governments and regional organisations
- Parliaments
- Local Governments
- Civil Society and Trade Unions
- Foundations
- Multilateral Development Banks
Additional remarks

Respondents in favour of keeping all indicators (includes NEPAD) stressed that there may be a need to revise them to reflect advances in each area and ensure linkages to the 2030 Agenda, possibly regrouping them around core principles and adding alternative indicators.

Among those that agree to keep a partial set of indicators (indicators 1, 2, 5 and 7-10 were mentioned most frequently), there was a feeling that the current indicators are complex and difficult to use and communicate and that, despite continued importance of Busan principles, not all indicators may remain relevant in future.

Additional proposals for areas that could be monitored were made (*in no particular order*):

- Bringing back indicators from the Paris Monitoring that are no longer monitored
- Donor performance in areas that are not currently measured\(^1\)
- Democratic ownership
- Fragmentation/harmonisation
- Technical co-operation and capacity building
- Impact of private sector interventions (supported by public funds) in development
- Public-Private Partnerships
- Sustainability of development cooperation interventions
- Development cooperation’s contribution to equal opportunities
- Existence of social dialogue platforms at national level
- South-South cooperation or principles of South-South partnerships
- Resource mobilisation, effectiveness, accountability and engagement at sub-national level
- Potential for increasing indebtedness
- Leaving no one behind
- Use of imported labour
- Inclusiveness of agreeing on national development priorities
- Quality of parliamentary scrutiny
- Engagement of parliament in the budget process
- Level of ODA for strengthening of parliaments
- Progress against aid/partnership policy\(^2\)
- Domestic resource mobilisation
- Promotion of jobs and better opportunities for young people
- Contribution to mitigate climate change.

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\(^1\) See CPDE response to the consultation on the monitoring framework.

\(^2\) **Note:** This is a target in Indicator 7 on mutual accountability.
Additional remarks

Civil society, trade unions and parliament voiced concern about an overemphasis on the voluntary nature of the partnership and about limited engagement of non-state actors in the process. Trade unions called for stronger encouragement for all stakeholders to participate. Parliaments also voiced concern about the principle “government-led”, noting that this may ignore parliaments.

El Salvador stressed that monitoring should be mandatory for all members of the Global Partnership. Parliaments stressed that there should be ways to include data from countries that have not agreed to participate in country-level analysis.

Other principles suggested include:

- Be guided by relevance of indicators for all stakeholders, in particular recipients
- Ensure simplicity and measurability of indicators
- Enhance responsiveness of providers
- Avoid a “pick and choose” or “á la carte” approach
- Make monitoring process (collection and validation of data) more effective
- Prioritise data quality over collecting all data

To ensure that the monitoring process is demand-driven, respondents identified these incentives:

- Revive the partner country caucus and strengthen/create national dialogue platforms on progress, led by partner country governments with different stakeholders, at all levels3. This can ensure data quality and comparability, promote inclusiveness and demand-driven approach, anchor monitoring politically at country level and ensure alignment with international processes.
- Align or embed monitoring in national M&E efforts to minimise burden and raise profile
- Make process more transparent and report results which reflect realities on the ground
- Clarify how monitoring supports each actor and their specific information needs, and include private sector and civil society in particular.

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3 One respondent suggested including this proposal in the HLM2 outcome document.
f. Implementation (Q10)

Additional remarks

Several providers emphasised that stakeholders on the ground should drive implementation at country level. The Global Partnership should focus on developing guidelines and promoting knowledge sharing on best practices, as well as provide capacity support for monitoring. The United States did not want to prejudge the recommendations of the Working Group on Country-Level Implementation.

Egypt stressed a need to equally promote the commitments of providers to the effectiveness principles and encouraged the production of country chapters in coordination with reporting countries.

Civil society raised that greater political support is needed to ensure that all stakeholders, in particular providers, deliver on agreed commitments at country level.

Pacific islands suggested closer engagement on the principles and commitments with regional platforms like the Forum Compact for Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific.

II. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

a. General reflections

Additional remarks

NEPAD and the European Union suggested that the Nairobi outcome document should generate clarity on the overall governance structure and working arrangements of the Global Partnership. Trade unions emphasised the need for a clearer work plan for the Partnership with objectives based on commitments, providing opportunities and spaces for different actors to engage.
b. High Level/Senior Level Meetings

Despite strong support for alignment to the FFD and SDG follow-up and holding HLMs every four years six months prior to the HLPF under the UN General Assembly, a number of respondents raised strong concerns about stretching the time span between HLMs too wide, as this would undermine political momentum and the accountability function of the Global Partnership. NEPAD and civil society stressed the need to maintain the current HLM cycle. The European Union proposed a two-year cycle, alternating with the Development Cooperation Forum, with full High Level Meetings every four years and a senior level meeting two years after a High Level Meeting. It proposed to keep a two-year monitoring cycle in this scenario. Trade unions proposed, similarly, to hold HLMs every four years, meetings similar to the WP-EFF every two years, and regular technical exchanges and Steering Committee meetings in between. Local governments proposed to have the HLM at the same time as the HLPF and DCF. A number of respondents highlighted the need to focus HLM agendas on fewer issues with greater political relevance.

Additional remarks

The current mandate stipulates an 18-24 months period.
c. Annual technical exchanges

Several respondents indicated that annual technical level exchanges can bring the Global Partnership closer to the constituencies, in particular if paired with regional efforts, and help to concentrate on realisation of Busan principles in practical terms. The United States proposed that they could coincide with the kick-off of the monitoring round and the release of the results of that round the following year. NEPAD raised the challenge of cost implications, Global Partnership not being an implementation mechanism for the 2030 Agenda, and suggested keeping the current Annual Busan Global Partnership Forum as well as to clarify the purpose of any additional annual technical exchanges.

The European Union and others felt that the Annual Busan Global Partnership Forum already achieves several of the objectives of annual technical level exchanges, alongside with GPI workshops, and it may be worth combining them. Hosting of annual exchanges could be alternated. The European Union also raised that other workshops and seminars with more specific themes can bring more specialised communities of practice together to discuss more detailed ideas. Trade unions asked whether such specialised dialogues are indeed not what the GPIs should be doing.

The United States suggested to evaluate how best to provide input into the global follow-up and review process once it is fully articulated and endorsed. Parliaments saw FFD as the main “landing place” as it will feed into the HLPF. Civil society was keen to focus technical discussions on substantive priorities of the Global Partnership, not that of other forums. Egypt raised the need to link annual exchanges to regional and international fora for different stakeholders elevate sustainability and youth engagement as another strategic purpose.
d. Chairing arrangements

Periodicity of co-chairing mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you in favor of a four-year mandate for co-chairs?</th>
<th>(\text{Number of responses (International organizations and national governments)})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

Additional remarks

A number of responses indicated that committing to a four-year mandate as co-chair, in case the HLM cycle were to be increased to four years, is practically very difficult. Civil society suggests that renewal of mandate of co-chairs could be considered. The World Bank suggested separating the co-chair cycle from the HLM cycle in order to establish a staggered process and ensure continuity.

Composition and succession of co-chairing arrangements

Many responses stressed the need to better reflect the diversity of stakeholders in the chairing arrangements and a need for further consultation. NEPAD encouraged an open discussion on the governance renewal process at the next High Level Meeting and proposed to have its own Co-Chair, linked to other developing countries through other mechanisms. It raised the challenge of clustering all developing countries under a single co-chair, and proposed co-chairs that are linked to a specific and single constituency. It also supports co-chair renewal every two years.

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Graph 11. In case of adjustment to 4-year HLM cycle, should Co-Chairs be in office for a full cycle?

Graph 12. Most appropriate Chairing Arrangement
years. Civil society indicated that it would like to submit a nomination for a fourth, non-executive co-chair, to be chosen on a rotational basis among civil society, foundations, local governments and parliamentarians.

The United States suggested discussing the proposal for rolling co-chairs (1-2 co-chairs changing every 1-2 years). The World Bank suggested a Troika model where in a 3-year period each member is incoming vice-chair in the first year, chair in the second year and retiring vice-chair in the third year, advising the new chair. If the HLM host was different from the three co-chairs, the host could become special 4th vice chair a year prior to HLM. For transition, one current co-chair could continue as retiring vice-chair while two new members should be elected for two and three years respectively.

Local governments suggested that either in the current 3-co-chair scenario or a 4-co-chair scenario one co-chair should be either from civil society, foundation, trade union or regional government. With a four year cycle, local governments stressed that other ways of engagement with the Steering Committee should be found. Foundations suggested merging the option of having three co-chairs with one Ambassadorial role with the fourth non-executive stakeholder co-chair.

Roles and responsibilities of co-chairs

Additional remarks

Trade unions highlighted that co-chairs should act in an independent capacity, similar to the chairs of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. NEPAD proposed to review the roles and responsibilities in light of the role of the Steering Committee, which includes the co-chairs, and is reflective of the larger constituent group. It also supports co-chairs to be of non-executive type without veto right, or making decisions on behalf of the Steering Committee. It suggested that TORs should clarify the accountability responsibilities of co-chairs with their constituencies. Pacific Islands suggested rotation among constituencies (e.g. SIDS).
d. Steering Committee arrangements

**Graph 14: Agree with current roles/responsibilities of SC members**

- Yes: 2, 4, 1, 1, 2, 1
- No: 1
- No indication: 1

Additional remark

NEPAD stressed that the Steering Committee is the decision-making body of the Global Partnership.

**Graph 15. Steering Committee members should be guided by**

- Agreed Terms of References: 3, 3, 1, 1, 2, 1
- Hand-over notes from predecessors: 3, 1, 1

Additional remark

NEPAD proposed that the Steering Committee TORs should have clear linkages to those of the Co-Chairs and JST for accountability of both the co-chairs and the Steering Committee. They should be clear on each member’s duties relating to their constituencies.
**Graph 16. Agree with current SC composition**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner country governments and regional organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provider country governments and regional organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliaments</td>
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<td>Local Governments</td>
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<td>Civil Society and Trade Unions</td>
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<td>Foundations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral Development Banks</td>
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*Additional remarks*

NEPAD emphasized that the membership of each constituency needs to be clarified. The World Bank suggested that regular rotation of Steering Committee representatives within their constituency should be the norm. Egypt stressed the need for a more effective mechanism for the representation of stakeholders.

**Graph 17. Agree with current intervals of SCMs**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<td>Multilateral Development Banks</td>
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</table>

*Additional remarks*

Parliaments specifically proposed that one annual meeting may be enough and consultation between meetings can take place in written form, suggesting a meeting in conjunction with the FFD Forum in New York. Egypt suggested that SC meetings should be held back-to-back with annual specialised policy dialogues.

**Strategic content and output of Steering Committee meetings**

Several responses indicated support for making Steering Committee meetings more strategic, geared towards decision-making and providing guidance for country-level actors. They should focus on fewer issues, with a limited number of supporting documents. The World Bank encouraged stronger lead from Co-Chairs in this regard. The United States, Egypt and foundations suggested exploring ways to consult between representatives ahead of SC meetings. These consultations could take place between the formal SC meetings and help improve the strategic content and output of the SC meetings themselves. Foundations also encouraged having focal points for different constituents in the Joint Support Team. Egypt also raised that the Steering Committee needs to facilitate the enabling environment for the effective engagement of different stake-
holders. Pacific Islands suggested that SC members should provide regular reporting and feedback to their constituencies and clarify how SC meeting hosting is being decided.

Civil society suggested to webcast Steering Committee meetings, anchor discussions around the four core effectiveness principles and set aside time to discuss unfinished business and specific challenges of civil society. NEPAD also stressed full transparency in agenda setting, clear conclusions and agreements, and a focus on accountability issues in implementing Busan commitments. The European Union suggested improving stakeholder outreach. NEPAD requested detailed summary of steering Committee consultations (please clarify). CPDE also suggested adding a one-page summary of the agenda and producing fewer documents.

e. Joint Support Team arrangements

A number of narrative responses indicated that the JST should focus also on collating evidence from all actors at all levels, labelling inputs as theirs and liaise with academic institutions. El Salvador suggested that the good theoretical analysis should be simplified to explain progress of the Partnership better and for JST to put greater effort in assisting at regional level to build momentum.

The United States wanted to see a hierarchy between the four functions and a budget, as well as the Theory of Change fully investigated and developed.

Some non-state actors and the World Bank suggested a need for greater transparency (and engagement of non-state actors in documentation) and that they would value a work programme and budget with timelines and milestones to allow adequate preparation of inputs.

The European Union also suggested a reality check on the split UNDP-OECD Joint Support Team and to explore the option of an independent support team that is directly accountable to co-chairs.

NEPAD would like to see arrangements put in place for a structured inclusion of African and other regional statisticians in data collection, analysis and reporting back.

END