UGANDA’S DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP REVIEW
A COUNTRY PILOT OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms &amp; Abbreviations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 1: GPEDC country pilots</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country context</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions, roles, structures and policies</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 2: The effect of the end of Budget Support on partnership</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial flows</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GPEDC monitoring indicators</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessing development cooperation and partnership</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good practice example - Growth Conference</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Practice Example: Economic Management Group (EMG)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 3: Streamlining, incentives and transparency</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 4: Division of labour</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good practice example: Ebola HIV/AIDS response</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good practice example: JLOS SWG</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusiveness</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 5: Private Sector</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good practice example – CRRF</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good practice example - UNEPI</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good practice example - USAID Government to Government assessment</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 6: Aid Data</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annexes</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 1: Development Finance data sources</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 2: OECD DAC reporters supporting Uganda in 2016</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Acronyms & Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAAA</td>
<td>Addis Ababa Action Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>Aid Management Platform</td>
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<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Development Finance Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFIs</td>
<td>Development Finance Institutions</td>
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<td>DoL</td>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
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<td>DPGs</td>
<td>Technical/ Sector Development Partners Groups</td>
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<td>DPs</td>
<td>Development Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DWGs</td>
<td>Donor Working Groups</td>
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<td>EMG</td>
<td>Economic Management Group</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Transparency System</td>
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<td>GAVI</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations</td>
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<td>GF</td>
<td>Global Fund</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GoU</td>
<td>Government of Uganda</td>
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<td>GPAR</td>
<td>Government Annual Performance Report</td>
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<td>GPEDC</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation</td>
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<td>HLAM</td>
<td>High Level Action Matrix</td>
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<td>HQs</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ICSC</td>
<td>Implementation Coordination Steering Committee</td>
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<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>JAF</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>JBSF</td>
<td>Joint Budget Support Framework</td>
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<td>JLOS</td>
<td>Justice, Law and Order Sector</td>
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<td>LDPG</td>
<td>Local Development Partners Group</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MoFPED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTDS</td>
<td>Medium Term Debt Management Strategy</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Acronyms & Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Planning Authority</td>
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<td>NPF</td>
<td>National Partnership Forum</td>
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<td>HLAM</td>
<td>High Level Action Matrix</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OOF</td>
<td>Other Official Flows</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Policy Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>PDG</td>
<td>Partners for Democracy and Governance</td>
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<td>PEMCOM</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Management Committee</td>
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<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Finance Management</td>
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<td>PIRT</td>
<td>Presidential Investors Round Table</td>
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<td>PPF</td>
<td>Partnership and Policy Framework</td>
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<td>PSDS</td>
<td>Private Sector Development Strategy</td>
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<td>PSFU</td>
<td>Private Sector Foundation Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SDPGs</td>
<td>Sector Development Partner Groups</td>
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<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small or Medium Enterprises</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>South-South Cooperation</td>
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<td>SWGs</td>
<td>Sector Working Groups</td>
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<td>TICC</td>
<td>Technical Implementation Coordination Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToRs</td>
<td>Terms of References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWGs</td>
<td>Technical Working Groups</td>
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<td>UCS</td>
<td>Use of Country System</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country team</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEPI</td>
<td>Uganda National Expanded Program on Immunization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNNGOF</td>
<td>Uganda National NGO Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

Preparation of this report was led by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), under the leadership of Juvenal Muhumuza, Assistant Commissioner in the Department of Development Assistance and Regional Cooperation, and overall strategic guidance of Maris Wanyera, the Director Debt and Cash Management. It was prepared with the financial support of the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ) within the framework of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), and technical support of UNDP Uganda. The report was drafted by Matthew Geddes (Lead Consultant) and Sheila Kigozi (national consultant) with technical oversight including Mariam Kiggundu and Joan Kabakama from MoFPED, Yemesreich Assefa Workie, Tony Muhumuza, Yuko Suzuki, Simon Peter Nsereko from UNDP, and administrative support by Josephine Faith Nansubuga from UNDP. It was edited by Erin Lyons, UNV Online volunteer. Special appreciation to officials from the Government, Development Partner community, Civil Society and private sector that took part in the interviews and validation meeting that significantly shaped the report.
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) carried out pilots in 10 countries aimed at promoting lessons learning, knowledge exchange and implementing effective development cooperation. The objective of the country pilot, GPEDC was to support increased effectiveness at country level and to demonstrate the positive impact of effective development cooperation on the achievement of national, regional and global development goals. Uganda is one of the countries piloted and this study was overseen by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development with support from Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This report takes stock of Uganda’s Partnership through the GPEDC’s principles of; Country ownership, accountability, effectiveness and inclusiveness. The report therefore makes a number of recommendations on each of the four thematic principles as follows:

**Effectiveness:** The Current Partnership and cooperation arrangements including the National Partnership forum (NPF) are not well structured to address multi-stakeholder responses to counter existing challenges. There is therefore need for a multi-pronged stakeholder approach to review the current NPF arrangements to address emerging partnership challenges.

**Accountability:** The existing accountability mechanisms/tools (GPAR, Budgeting Processes, NDP process etc. have not been able to compel stakeholders to account to each other especially after the collapse of the budget support arrangements. DP’s, CSO’s and the Central Government therefore need to come up with a fresh mechanism to enforce commitments and account to each other.

**Inclusiveness:** Financiers/DPs and implementation actors have changed on one hand, while the coordination structures have not adjusted to address these changes. Government together with other relevant stakeholders need to come up with a new mechanism of ensuring the new players participate in established dialogue mechanisms for better results. The new players include China, India, GAVI, Global Fund, International NGO’s, SME,s and other vertical funds.

**Ownership:** Many DAC Partners are increasingly using implementation modalities that avoid working directly with the central Government. Under the circumstances, it’s difficult for both Government and the DPs to jointly own the results of programmes implemented outside Government systems which goes against the Paris Principles. Stakeholders therefore need to come up with a new mechanism that facilitates working together and joint prioritization which will ensure joint ownership of results.

The above findings have come at a crucial time when Government is formulating the Development Cooperation Policy which will guide on how Development Partners and Government can work together to foster development and inclusive growth. Therefore, findings from the report will contribute greatly to the formulation of this policy. I would like to take this opportunity to appreciate the efforts invested in carrying out this country plot and look forward to implementation of the recommendations.

For God and my Country.

Keith Muhakanizi
Permanent Secretary/Secretary to the Treasury
Foreword

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015, provides a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future. At its heart are the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are an urgent call for action by all countries - developed and developing - in a global partnership.

In 2016, Governments approved Nairobi Outcome Document to shape how existing and new development actors can partner to implement the 2030 Agenda and realize the SDGs. They also reaffirmed their development cooperation commitments embodied in among others, the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (2011), which established the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPDEC) - a multi-stakeholder platform intended to advance effectiveness of efforts by development actors towards attainment of the SDGs.

Within the framework of GPEDC, Uganda was selected to be among the ten countries to undertake a pilot to demonstrate the impact of effective development co-operation. The Government of Uganda, in partnership with UNDP, commissioned this report with the belief that, shared responsibility delivers shared promises. Societies that espouse high standards of cohesion among actors tend to register significant strides in realizing their development goals. The Report provides useful findings that can be the bases to re-enkindling a shared vision among development actors in Uganda’s journey to transition to a middle-income status and for the realization of SDGs.

Conceptualisation of this report was influenced by three main thrusts, namely: 1) Uganda’s impetus to realise Vision 2040, and the significant challenge posed by the 2030 Agenda, calls for an honest reflection on the requisite partnerships in the country; 2) the dynamism of the partnership landscape has a bearing on the changing shape of development cooperation in the country; and 3) Uganda’s leadership of the GPEDC platform implies that the country must set an example on the way Government engages with partners to deliver on development results.

It is worth noting that, preparation of this report was informed by an impressive wide stakeholder consultative process and honest deliberations with the Government and several development partners. I am confident that the findings and recommendations proposed will trigger meaningful deliberations and actions to shape the future of development cooperation in Uganda.

I affirm UNDP’s commitment to work with Government and all stakeholders in advancing the partnership agenda. I acknowledge the leadership of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, the support of the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ), the GPEDC Secretariat and UNDP’s Bureau for Programme and Policy Support (BPPS) that have made this work possible. I believe that the report will add value to the ongoing discourse on partnerships and achieving inclusive transformational development.

Elsie Attafuah
Resident Representative
UNDP Uganda
Executive Summary

To remain relevant and effective, development partnerships need to be constantly updated as the country context and stakeholders need change. This GPEDC Country Pilot study is an opportunity to take stock of Uganda’s Partnership using the GPEDC criteria of Effectiveness, Accountability, Inclusivity and Ownership. It is based on the views of stakeholders interviewed between December 2018 and March 2019.

The development financing context in Uganda is a mixed picture:

- External project financing is currently half the size of government revenue and supports most non-recurrent expenditure. Three quarters comes from OECD DAC donors and the vertical funds they support. Neither the volume nor sector priorities from DAC donors have changed significantly in the last 10 years.
- What has changed is that less of this support is implemented in a way that involves central GoU ministries. Projects are increasingly delivered via a combination of vertical funds, NGOs, the private sector and directly to Local Governments, especially refugee support.
- A more recent change is the rising share of loans and equity investment from DAC donors.
- The remaining quarter is supplied by China, India (also mainly loans), with Arab donors and Private Foundations representing a small (7%) share.
- An anticipated change yet to arrive is that of Climate Finance and South-South Cooperation (excluding India and China, which) only represent around 1% of flows.

These changes are affecting the effectiveness of the cooperation and partnership structures and have made collaboration between actors more difficult. When aid does not use GoU systems, Sector Working Groups (SWGs) become less important, and GoU/donors have less incentive to cooperate. When more financing actors are outside the main stakeholder forum (the NPF) than inside it, its conclusions have less impact. When there are more types of stakeholder, it becomes harder to find common ground, accountability and leadership. Ugandans (and all stakeholders) will benefit when the cooperation and partnership structures can be updated to reflect the new reality.

The GPEDC Monitoring Indicators track many of these impacts and present a mixed picture, but one that is getting worse over time. Uganda performs better on some indicators than neighbouring countries, and worse on others. Donors in Uganda make different choices and score very differently. Furthermore, donors are also moving in different directions. Some are increasing their use of country systems, while others are reducing these. There is an opportunity to improve the indicators where Uganda is furthest behind its neighbours, and to move all donors to the best performing standard. The challenge is to restart a consensual process to drive this agenda forwards, as none currently exists.

Several examples of good practice have been identified in this study. These include:

- Growth conferences – tackling strategic issues across stakeholders
- Ebola, HIV/AIDS response – rapid coordinated response
- JLOS SWG – effective coordination
- CRRF – coordination across multiple stakeholders
- UNEPI program – use of government systems
- USAID G2G policy – mutual accountability

Although none of them are perfect, these examples show that even in difficult situations, i.e. emergencies, following corruption scandals, across many stakeholders, and areas with historically low engagement, with the right policy choices by GoU and donors, impressive results can be achieved and this can be applicable to other areas in Uganda, and to other countries.
Based on this context, the stakeholders interviewed preferred to focus on a few high-priority issues, selecting one for each GPEDC area.

**Effectiveness:** The partnership and cooperation structures currently struggle to address strategic issues, which require a coordinated multi-stakeholder response. None of the current fora can attract all stakeholders, at the decision-maker level, with enough resources and time for evidence-based decisions, as well as monitor and enforce implementation.

Stakeholders in Uganda need to decide whether to adjust, NPF to meet this need, whether to follow the growth conference model and set up a separate annual event, or whether to improve the way these issues are handled in the middle and lower level groups.

**Accountability:** Stakeholders struggle to use existing tools to hold each other to account. The existing tools are not well aligned with the powers of the main GoU agencies and are not applied to most, via, external financing. There are the many separate tools: operating under different frameworks (GPAR, Budget, NDP, SDG Framework, Humanitarian Clusters, CRRF, Steering Groups), and the previous tools through which DAC donors and GoU held each other to account during the budget support period were not effectively replaced when that ended.

Stakeholders in Uganda need to decide the best approach for the NDP III to adjust. The tools, forums and responsibilities for ensuring accountability need to be freshly defined and the appropriate capacity to enforce them identified. Stakeholders need to decide whether to do this by adjusting the responsibilities and capacity of the existing fora, whether adding a new grouping would be more effective, and how best to integrate them all with the NDP III process. Key reports (Partnership monitoring, NDP monitoring) need to be produced again and actions taken up.

**Inclusiveness:** As the financing and implementing actors have changed, the coordination structures have not kept up. Many types of stakeholders rarely participate, and so decisions taken are not binding, and/or do not benefit from their expertise. On the financing side, including just four more organisations (China, India, GAVI and the Global Fund) would increase cover to over 90% of financing. However, significant gaps remain for Local Government, INGOs, Vertical Funds (including climate funds) and bilateral agencies without a country office (especially DFIs), MMSEs, and non-DAC donors. Some fora (e.g. SWGs) do better than others, but the rules are inconsistently applied. The groups with focus on single stakeholder groups (LDPG, NGO Forum, PSFU, etc.) and, therefore, duplicate discussions are held, with exchanges across the different stakeholder rarely taking place.

Stakeholders in Uganda need to agree on a common (and higher) standard of inclusiveness for all fora, in order find ways to include the missing groups, and set up a system of delegated representatives with decision-making power to maintain effectiveness at all levels.

**Ownership:** GoU has severe difficulties ensuring Ugandan ownership over many coordination and partnership structures as DAC donors increasingly use modalities that avoid working with the central government. GoU leverage is reduced as DAC donors no longer feel bound by their previous commitments under the aid/development effectiveness agenda and a growing share of flows from actors who were never part of this movement. Rebuilding the trust and willingness to compromise needed to achieve the benefits set out by the GPEDC will be a long-term commitment, as stakeholders recognise the reforms made by the GoU and rediscover the benefits of cooperative working.

Stakeholders need to decide how to build a new coalition to drive this change, i.e. to evaluate the options (as suggested in this report), prioritise them, champion the benefits and then push through the changes. The first step is to identify these champions and then restart the aid/development effectiveness and use of the Country Systems processes in Uganda. A replacement or update to the Partnership Policy and Framework is needed to formalise all the changes selected by stakeholders based on this report.
In 2017, the IMF reported⁴ that “Uganda has experienced a threefold increase in per capita GDP over the past generation and has reduced extreme poverty to one-third of the population, surpassing the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015.” However, between 2012 and 2017 this fell to under 1% per year and, while Uganda returned to 6% annual GDP growth in 2017/18, household expenditure is rising, and millions of Ugandans still live in poverty. Moreover, the proportion has recently risen with two Ugandans falling back into poverty for every three coming out: middle income by the 2020 target is currently out of reach.

To address these issues, as embodied in the Second National Development Plan (NDP II)⁶, Uganda Vision 2040⁷ and the 2030 SDG Agenda⁸, Uganda requires substantial development finance⁹. In the medium term, this is likely to be provided by a complex mix of domestic revenue, international financial support—both traditional ODA and beyond—in addition to that provided by the private sector and civil society. However, the current externally financed infrastructure-based approach is already leading to high and rapidly increasing levels of debt⁷⁰.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)¹¹ is an international platform working to ensure that contributions from all partners are as effectively coordinated as possible to achieving national goals and the SDGs. This report is a GPEDC Country Pilot (see Box 1 overleaf), designed to provide evidence on successful country-level approaches, and key blockages to progress the GPEDC goals of:

- Ownership of development priorities by developing countries themselves
- A focus on results
- Inclusive development partnerships
- Transparency and mutual accountability among partners

In addition to sharing evidence about what is and is not working, this report also provides some practical suggestions for Uganda to make progress on this agenda over the short and medium term.

The Study was overseen by the Ministry of Finance and Planning and Economic Development, with funding provided by Germany (via GIZ) and managed financially and technically by the UNDP. Desk-based research on the GPEDC indicators and development finance flows was carried out in January 2019, with stakeholder interviews taking place in December 2018 and February 2019. The stakeholders were identified through discussion with MoFPED, UNDP, and the Local Development Partners’ Group (LDPG), and sought representatives from the following categories:

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² See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=UG
⁸ This is not unique to Uganda – the IMF estimates that the average UDC will require 14% of GDP in additional external financing: https://www.imf.org/~/me-
dia/Files/Topics/SDG/alg-costing-un.aspx
¹⁰ http://effectivecooperation.org/
¹¹ https://www.finance.go.ug/
• Government of Uganda (MoFPED), Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), National Planning Authority (NPA), line ministries/agencies, and local government.

• Donor agencies (DAC\(^{13}\)/Non-DAC, Bilateral/Multilateral, Development Banks/Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), traditional supporters of Aid Effectiveness/and those that are not, those with in-country offices/no in-country office, those working through the GoU/working with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)/private implementers, and covering a range of sectors including social sector, infrastructure and private sector support

• International Foundations and International NGOs (INGOs) with their own/core funding

• Local NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

• Representatives of the private sector (as implementers and beneficiaries)

The report is structured as follows. The Ugandan Country Context chapter that follows provides an externally generated overview of the financial flows Uganda receives, and an analysis of the GPEDC Development Effectiveness Monitoring Indicators\(^{14}\).

After that, the main chapter is an assessment of Partnership Architecture - the structures and practices through which development financing in Uganda is coordinated between actors. The analysis is based on stakeholder interviews and is grouped into four areas (loosely following the GPEDC categories):

• Effectiveness (Management for Results)

• Accountability (Transparency and mutual accountability among partners)

• Inclusivity (Inclusive Development Partnerships)

• Ownership (Ownership)

Each area also contains:

• An ‘opportunity for progress’, a practical recommendation for Ugandan stakeholders to consider implementing in the very near future.

• Boxes for the good practices in that area are different from the norm, and having positive effects, in terms of the effectiveness of development cooperation.

• Boxes for several further issues to cover but which are well covered in other recent reports, or do not fit easily into the other areas, notably: Division of Labour, Sector Working Groups, the private sector, and aid data collection.

\(^{13}\) http://www.oecd.org/dac/developmentassistancecommittee dac.htm

\(^{14}\) http://effectivecooperation.org/monitoring-country-progress/what-is-global-partnership-monitoring/


The GPEDC is “a multi-stakeholder platform to advance the effectiveness of development efforts by all actors, to deliver results that are long-lasting and contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)”. It is hosted by the UNDP and the OECD, is funded by OECD DAC donors, and chaired by government representatives from aid providing/receiving countries.

The GPEDC is the latest in a line of aid effectiveness platforms starting with the Paris Declaration in 2005, via the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, and currently seeks to progress modified versions of the Effective Cooperation Principles agreed to in the Busan Partnership Agreement in 2011. More recently, the GPEDC has sought to maintain momentum through incorporating similar principles into the 2015 Addis Action Agenda and the 2016 Nairobi Outcome Document.

The concept of aid (now development) effectiveness enshrined in these agreements focuses on a series of concepts currently defined as:

- Ownership of development priorities by developing countries themselves
- A focus on results
- Inclusive development partnerships
- Transparency and mutual accountability among partners

The Paris Declaration also launched a series of indicators through which to evaluate progress (by both suppliers of aid, and by aid recipient countries) towards the agreement’s goals. These have been modified over time and the latest version (as of the 2018 monitoring round) can be found in the GPEDC Monitoring Framework.

The aid/development effectiveness agenda, as defined by these agreements, declarations, and partnerships has consistently faced a need to progress beyond the political declarations made and signed by almost all aid-providing and aid-receiving countries. GPEDC Country Pilots are an initiative designed to do this and, in 2018, Uganda (as a co-chair of the GPEDC Leadership Committee) volunteered to be one of 10 GPEDC country pilots. The evidence generated will inform the creation of a Global Compendium of Good Practices related to country-level implementation of the effectiveness principles. While the specific focus and design of the pilots varies from country to country, depending on the country context, the Pilot Approach (Annex 3) and the Launch Workshop (Annex 4) include both a long list of potential issues to cover, and describe the objective of the pilots:

- To demonstrate the positive impact of effective development co-operation
- To document best practices, and collect and analyse evidence on the country-level implementation of the effectiveness principles
- To document common challenges, including the availability and use of data on development co-operation at the country level, building partnerships with the full range of development stakeholders, and managing increasingly diverse development co-operation flows

Further specific issues to cover, for the Ugandan Country Pilot, are included in the study ToR (Annex 1), and the Uganda Pilot Concept Note (Annex 2).

15 http://effectivecooperation.org/about/about-the-partnership/
16 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm
20 http://effectivecooperation.org/monitoring-country-progress/what-is-global-partnership-monitoring/
21 http://effectivecooperation.org/about/leadership/
This section provides an overview of the institutions, roles, structures and policies that make up the partnership and cooperation structure, identifies trends in the current external financial flows and reviews the 2016 and 2018 GPEDC Monitoring Survey data.

Institutions, roles, structures and policies

The political economy and recent evolution of the partnership and coordination structures is closely tied to three approximate periods, the Budget Support period (1998-2012), the NDP I period (2010/11-2014/15) and the current NDP II period (2014/15-2019/20). Vision 2040, the current long-term plan was launched in 2013. For more, refer to the details of the 2013 NDP 1 Midterm Review on Development Partnerships and the 2018 DEVAL report on the withdrawal from budget support in Uganda.

The three main institutions related to coordinating external finance are OPM, MoFPED and the NPA.

OPM is responsible for overall government coordination and Monitoring and Evaluation, which translates into “the coordination of the implementation of the NDP” and the assessment of the performance of the government via the Government Annual Performance Report, the GAPR (which formally includes a specific section of externally financed projects).

For the 2007/08 the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) and the linked Joint Assessment Framework (JAF) of actions and indicators, the principal focus for high-level policy dialogue was joint meetings between the GoU and budget support donors (around 10). GoU was represented by both the Implementation Co-ordination Steering Committee (in which permanent secretaries meet to oversee government performance) and the Ministerial level Policy Co-ordination Committee, which is chaired by the Prime Minister. While very restricted in attendance, other external funding sources were more limited than currently, and the discussions also covered issues of interest to the wider group of stakeholders.

The process of withdrawing from budget support, also caused the collapse of the associated partnership and cooperation tools, and the trust, mutual respect, and incentives to compromise and cooperate that makes partnerships work (See Box 2).

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27 A response to a series of corruption scandals, but also linked to political differences and changing donor preferences for aid delivery.
BOX 2: THE EFFECT OF THE END OF BUDGET SUPPORT ON PARTNERSHIP

The process of exiting the Budget Support period had a very negative effect on partnership and coordination in Uganda (summarised from GDI, 2018):

- “There is less government involvement in donors’ programmes and less donor involvement in government decisions due to a collapse in dialogue structures, especially the high-level political dialogue”
- “Ending GBS weakened the harmonization among donors, even though coordination forums for public financial management and the LDGP still exist”
- “The exit from GBS led to a reduction in domestic accountability, due to the absence of external control and performance assessment.”

In 2013, OPM developed the Partnership Policy28, swiftly followed in 2014 by the Framework for the Partnership Dialogue29 to provide a new framework for relationships between government and donors during the implementation of the NDP II. In its absence, strategic relationships had collapsed, leaving sector working groups and the associated technical processes (linked to the budget) as the primary fora that brought stakeholders together. The Partnership Policy identified the Policy Coordination Committee, the Implementation Coordination Steering Committee and the Technical Implementation Coordination Committee as bi-annual, quarterly and monthly meetings designed as a replacement for the JBSF, but expanded to cover issues from strategic priorities, to aid effectiveness and GPAR. However, within a year, the Framework for the Partnership Dialogue had introduced the National Partnership Forum (NPF) as the highest level of consultation with fewer links to GoU processes and less frequent meetings, but that covered similar topics. On paper, the NPF is supported by the Technical NPF and the Partnership Policy Taskforce.

The Partnership Policy also officially replaced the 2003 Partnership Principles from the Poverty Eradication Action Plan with a new set of principles for effective cooperation, but as with the Busan, Addis and Nairobi follow-ons to the Paris Declaration, despite formal commitments from donor HQs and GoU support, it did not receive widespread donor support in Uganda.

OPM is also responsible for overseeing the 16 Sector Working Groups30, as well as refugee coordination (most recently via the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework – the CRRF)31 and now SDG coordination via SDGs Coordination framework32. Finally, OPM also assigns UN country strategies and manages the Presidential Investors Round Table, a GoU and private sector forum.

MoFPED’s statutory contribution to the partnership and coordination structures has been less influenced by changing GoU-partner relations, as it focuses on the budget process and the projects in the budget, both mainly defined by a series of laws, primarily the Budget Act 200133, which requires MoFPED to collect aid data, the Public Financial management Act 201534 - affecting GoU systems, the Public Debt Management Framework (2013) and Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy (MTDS) 2015/16-2019/2035 and the Public Private Partnership (PPP) policy and 2015 PPP Act36.

MoFPED is the primary port of call for many external actors, as it signs off on donor-country strategies and organises annual Portfolio Reviews with each development partner. As a formal contribution to the Partnership Policy, MoFPED chairs the Development Committee (also attended by OPM and NPA), which is responsible for negotiating and signing project financial agreements (for on-budget projects) and ensuring their compliance with Partnership Policy, NDP, sector strategies and budgets. Strongly linked to this is the MoFPED duty to collect and share data on financial flows.

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(via the annual Loans, Grants and Guarantees report, and the Aid Management Platform). Alongside Parliament, the Ministry of Justice, the Accountant General and the Bank of Uganda, MoFPED is responsible for assessing and reporting on the national debt. MoFPED’s role in managing the budget process, generating medium-term financing strategies, receiving and assessing Line Ministry and sector budgets (including the contributions of the Sector Working Groups) gives MoFPED significant power in its relationships with most of the other actors.

NPA’s role is to generate the NDPs and to assess the compatibility of donor country strategies and externally financed projects with the NDP and, where acceptable, to issue certificates of compliance.

In addition to the GoU institutions, there are several single-stakeholder fora and membership organisations and a huge variety of issue or sector specific technical working groups. SWGs are Government chaired groups, which include representatives from Line Ministries and Agencies, donors, NGOs and the private sector. They are responsible for coordinating support with each sector. In recent years, they have been supplemented by SDG Working Groups, NDP Working Groups and Humanitarian Working Groups. The Framework for the Partnership Dialogue formalised an expanded role for the Local Donor Partners Group37 (formerly a group primarily focussed on the PFM reforms accompanying Budget Support), which oversees its own set of Donor Working Groups (DWGs), mirroring each SWG, plus further thematic groups. The LDPG caters to DAC donors and the associated multilateral and vertical funds38.

In addition to the Presidential Investors Round Table (PIRT)39, a group for large investors to dialogue with the GoU, several membership organisations play a representative role. These include the Private Sector Foundation (PSFU)40 and the NGO Forum41, which additionally respond to the NGO Act 201642 and NGO Regulation 201743.

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### Financial flows

Since the end of budget support, there have been significant changes to the external financial flows that Uganda is receiving. Some new funders have become active, some have remained static and others have not yet provided significant volume. At the same time, how these flows are delivered is changing. The partnership and coordination structures will need to adapt themselves to stay relevant and effective in relation to the changing flows. Coordination between GoU and the providers of these external financing flows is likely to remain essential for Uganda’s development for many years.

Table 1 below provides broad estimates of current development financing to Uganda, Table 2 compares them to domestic revenue and Table 3 shows some commonly discussed comparator flows. Details of the data sources are provided in Annex 5. Comparison data can also be seen in the Annual MoFPED Report on Loans, Grants and Guarantees44.

### Table 1: Recent data on Development Financing (ODA and OOF) to Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flow</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD millions)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDPG members46</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Fund/GAVI</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philanthropy/Private Giving</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab donors</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other official donors (Bilateral and Multilateral)</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Funds</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South Cooperation (excl. China/India)</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,481</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Annex 5

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37 [https://www.ldpg.or.ug/](https://www.ldpg.or.ug/)
38 LDPG is managed by an elected Quartet of four members who jointly agree on the chair and co-chairs.
40 [https://www.psfuganda.org/](https://www.psfuganda.org/)
41 [https://www.ngoforum.or.ug](https://www.ngoforum.or.ug)
42 [https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/act/2016/1](https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/act/2016/1)
45 [https://www.ldpg.or.ug/ldpd-members/](https://www.ldpg.or.ug/ldpd-members/)
Table 1 shows that:

- There are many actors. The OECD DAC recorded 59 bilateral and multilateral donors in 2016 and 15 Philanthropy organisations. IATI data has reports of aid transactions in Uganda in 2018 from 180 donors and implementers. China, India and many other South-South Cooperation (SSC) actors are in addition to this.

- 61% of 2018 financing is represented by LDPG in the Partnership Architecture; however, this analysis assumes a single donor agency for each donor country, which is often not the case. For example, many countries have Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) representing a substantial proportion of financial flows (especially those delivered to the private sector), but who are not represented in the Partnership Architecture. Examples of DFIs present in Uganda include the CDC, Norfund, PROPARCO, FMO, KfW, PIDG, Guarantco and the EAIF, and these do not include LDPG, so a more realistic estimate is probably 50%.

- Just four organisations, the two large vertical funds—the Global Fund for Aids Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)—and two countries—China (and, soon India) represent almost all of the remaining financing.

- The remaining groups (Non LDPG donors, SSC, climate change funds, Arab donors and philanthropy/private giving) represent just 8% of the financing flows.

Tables 2 and 3 show that external development financing flows represent approximately 60% of the volume of domestic revenue, are four times larger than commercial flows or tourism receipts and are double the value of remittances. Flows from OECD DAC reporting countries (including Climate Funds, GAVI and the GF, as these are primarily financed by OECD DAC reporters) represent approximately three-quarters of all the external development financing flows and a volume that is 43% of domestic revenue.

**Table 2: External development finance and domestic revenue in Uganda**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flow</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD millions)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Project Flows</td>
<td>2016/17</td>
<td>2,481</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Revenue</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>4,133</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6,614</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Annex 5

**Table 3: Comparator Financial Flows**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flow</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial (Equity-Debt-FDI)</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://data.devinit.org/country/uganda](http://data.devinit.org/country/uganda), other sources referenced in Annex 5

The following charts break down the data in Table 1 to provide further context. Note that where they show ODA that is reported to the OECD DAC, this represents around 70-75% of the total aid flows reported in Table 1 and, therefore, it is not the full picture.

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46 See annex 6 for a list.
Chart 1a shows that DAC donor ODA (incorporating LDPG members, non-members, GAVI/GF, Climate Funds and several Arab Donors) is static in terms of volume, increasing only 1.23% per year over the last 10 years.

Charts 1b and 1c show the long-term trend of a slow decline in the importance of OAED DAC ODA to Uganda. The 3-year average of OECD DAC ODA per capita has fallen on a per-capita basis every year since 2009, except for the last one (2016), and has fallen as a share of Uganda’s Gross National Income (GNI) between 2009 and 2014 with a small recovery since 2015.
Chart 1c: Net ODA reported to the OECD DAC as a share of GNI – 3-year averages


Chart 2 shows that, within the OECD DAC donor group, there is also not significant change. Looking at the trend for the top 15 largest providers in 2015, there are relatively few changes in position or volume over the period.

Chart 2: Top 16 DAC donors ODA between 2005 and 2015 – 3-year averages


In comparison to this, flows from China have been rapidly increasing in recent years. Philanthropic flows are also increasing. They contributed USD 177 million in funding between 2002 and 2013 (USD 15 million a year), but in 2017 contributed USD 92 million in a single year. In the future, these flows are expected to represent a much larger share of the financing available to Uganda and the partnership and coordination structures will need to adjust further.

Chart 3 shows that the channels of aid delivery are changing for DAC donors. The Public Sector is still reported as the largest delivery channel, but is steadily declining. All other delivery methods are rising, with delivery through the private sector first appearing in 2014. More recently, some donors have begun to move back towards budget support modalities.

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49 See data in Annex 5. Flows from India appear poised to increase rapidly starting in late 2018.
51 See the EU Justice and Accountability sector reform contract and the pipeline World Bank Domestic Revenue Mobilization project: http://projects.worldbank.
Chart 3: Changing channels of delivery for DAC aid


Chart 3 only applies to DAC donor ODA and, therefore, much greater use of the private sector can be expected if OOF is included. The picture is also likely to be misleading as a large road project, which is delivered by the private sector, but procured by MoFED may be recorded as ‘Public Sector’, as would delivery directly via line ministries or local governments. The key point is that as the modalities move away from the public sector, this often means far less (or different) government involvement in aid allocation and spending processes and, therefore, reduced points where centralised coordination can take place, making it difficult for the GoU to assess alignment and take ownership, as well as providing less donor leverage over central government policies.

Working against this dynamic is recording aid in the budget, which is far more comprehensive for loans than grants (loans make up the majority of on-budget funding); therefore, as the share of loans is growing, so is the share of financing recorded in the budget.

Chart 4: DAC donor loan and grant split


The split for DAC donors between ODA and OOF, and between loans, grants and equity investment is also changing in Uganda. Chart 4 shows that loans are increasing at the expense of grants, and that OOF and equity investment was...
relatively stable between 2005 and 2016. However, noting that the Y axis starts at 75%, grants have fallen from 98% of DAC flows, to 93% and so despite the trends, there is very little change in the past 10 years, with loans, OOF and equity investment representing a maximum of 7% of DAC donor flows. What change there is, is being driven by non-DAC donors, ODI (2016) states that “Official development finance beyond ODA accounted for just 6.3% of total development finance to Uganda between 2002 and 2013, amounting to $1.4bn. Since 2013, there has been a step change. In 2014-2015, the Ugandan Parliament approved $2bn of non-ODA loans, primarily from China. These made up 67% of total new external financing commitments for the year, including grants. Non-ODA loans are expected to constitute 70% of new government borrowing until 2025/26, amounting to $7.4bn in value. Borrowing from China, Exim Bank is expected to account for almost 80% of non-ODA loans until 2025”. In terms of the Partnership Architecture, this means that not only is integrating effective debt management a key priority, but also integrating China beyond bilateral discussions.

Chart 5: OECD DAC Sector Priorities


The sectors supported by DAC donors have been relatively static for the last 10 years. Chart 5 shows that the major movement has been an increase in Population/Reproductive support, mainly at the expense of Governance support. It is important to understand how this compares with changing GoU and MDG/SDG priorities over the same period, and the discussions that took place to determine how GoU and donors discussed their allocations, to understand the degree of alignment. The approaches taken within sectors may also have changed and are not visible here. For example, a shift to or away from infrastructure-based approaches within a sector.

The increasing share of aid to global public goods is often discussed in Uganda. Table 3 shows data on two common ones, Climate Finance and Refugees/Humanitarian Aid.

Table 3: Climate Finance and Humanitarian Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flow</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD millions)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total DAC financing</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/w Climate Finance</td>
<td>2010-17 average</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total project financing</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,481</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/w Refugees/ humanitarian</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The estimate of 8% of DAC financing which is reported as principally targeting Climate (adaptation and mitigation) represents a significant sum. However, aside from the USD 7 million delivered through the Climate Funds, this

54 Examples include Yield Uganda, an agricultural investment fund supported by the EU and IfAD [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-home-page/19134/au-launches-46-billion-agro-equity-impact-fund-uganda_en], a hydroelectric dam supported by Norway [https://www.norfund.no/investment-details/wini-ep-company-ltd/article10628-1042.html]. A list of UK [CDC] supported Ugandan companies can be seen here: https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/our-investments/search-results?inv-country%5B%5D=Uganda&inv-sector%5B%5D=#investment-search-results/
56 See Annex 5 for details of data sources. Percentages are shares of the total in the line directly above.
mainly represents projects that are otherwise captured under sectors like Agriculture, Energy and Water, and are funded by existing bilateral and multilateral donors. Including projects where Climate issues are a significant element/objective would probably add a further USD 150 million to this figure. Both have a significant growth trend, both more than doubling over the last 10 years.

The ongoing crises in DRC and South Sudan have led to significant humanitarian aid to Uganda. In 2018, the UNOCHA FTS system indicates that this was USD 310 million, mainly from existing donors (62% from the US, EU and UK), and flowed mainly to UN Organisations (80% to WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF). The INGO had the greatest share, receiving 2.5%. The majority (62%) was spent on Food Aid. If the situation in South Sudan improves, this aid flow is likely to decline substantially, and with it, the small growth in OECD DAC aid in the last 3 years.

While the global public good share is rising noticeably, to date it has only reached 20% of DAC ODA, and is likely less when factoring in non-DAC ODA and OOF. In terms of the Partnership Architecture, this does suggest that ensuring that climate and humanitarian actors are fully engaged is an important step.

In summary:

1. Aid flows to Uganda are increasing in terms of volume but this is driven by China and India, with small contributions from Arab donors and philanthropy, but not by OECD DAC donors, additional climate finance or SSC. ODA from OECD DAC reporters is relatively static in volume, and (except for the last 3 years) has been shrinking as a share of GNI and decreasing per capita. The donors, which make it up, have not changed significantly, nor has the sectors that it targets. Planning for the NDP III should not rely on increased aid, especially if trying to stay within debt limits and limiting loans to productive sectors.

2. There are many actors not currently involved in the partnership and coordination structure, and these comprise a mix of new donors e.g. SSC, old non-DAC donors e.g. China and Arab donors, vertical funds, and OECD DAC DFIs. Including China, India, GAVI and the Global Fund into the partnership and coordination structures and making sure that OECD DAC DFIs were represented at LDPG would take the volume covered over 90%, up from the current 50% represented by LDPG. Repairing the incentives for engaging with GoU and other stakeholders will be necessary if mutual accountability is going to be restored.

3. Aid to Uganda is moving away from grants, with a small, but growing amount delivered as loans and equity investments. Each year fewer OECD DAC projects are using central government systems for implementation, meaning new mechanisms need to be established attract and ensure alignment and coordination across a much wider range of implementing partners than 10 years ago.
The GPEDC Monitoring Survey collects data provided voluntarily from donors and partner countries every two years, based on a set of indicators substantially revised from, but originating in the 2004 Survey on Harmonisation and Alignment of Donor Practices[^58]. After each monitoring round, the GPEDC produces brief reports focusing on the performance of Uganda as a whole (GoU and donors together).

When interpreting the scores below, it is important to note that donor reporting is voluntary[^59] and based only on projects launched in the reporting year. Non-reporting, and atypical projects in a given year substantially affect scores, leading to un-representative results at the country level, often with a high degree of reporter bias (those who perform best are more likely to report). In addition, many of the government reported indicators are based on individual assessments, which the GPEDC does not have the resources to confirm.

The following section summarises the results of the most recently completed GPEDC Monitoring Survey (2016[^60]). At the time of writing this report, the 2018 GPEDC Monitoring Survey was underway[^61] and, where possible, this has been used to extend the summary below. The GPEDC Monitoring surveys report that:

- In 2016, Uganda had long-term (Vision 2040) and medium-term (NDP II) plans, which localised 69%[^62] of the SDGs and which donors are becoming more aligned with, due to the Partnership Policy, and the Joint Assistance Strategy[^63]. The 2016 Report found that Cooperative management took place through SWGs, SWAPs, Pooled Funds, joint missions, Joint Budget Support Framework[^64], analytical works and advice. The report also records that Government ownership was via the MoFPED Aid Liaison Department and the AMP (the online aid database). The entry of data was supported by the Donor Economists Group.

- In 2016, Uganda reported having a single results framework with donors to assess budget support, and 92% of aid project objectives are aligned with the NDP (85% in 2018); however, only 46% (0% in 2018) of aid used the national monitoring framework, and only 35% (0% in 2018) used national monitoring systems and/or data. 96% of aid projects (47% in 2018) were evaluated by government, but only 47% of these evaluations are done jointly with donors— with significant variation between donors. Since the Joint Assistance Framework ended in 2014, the results framework referred to in 2018 is the one integrated into the NDP.

- The share of aid on-budget has fallen from 96% in 2011, to 55% in 2015. 100% of new World Bank and UK aid projects are reported as being on-budget in 2016. The 2018 Survey reports that transparent information is available for only 11% of aid.

- In 2016 64% of aid used GoU execution, 68% followed with GoU financial reporting approaches, 71% used GoU audit procedures and 70% used GoU

[^58]: [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/journal_dev-v6-sup1-en](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/journal_dev-v6-sup1-en)
[^59]: Although all donors can report, no non-DAC donor has ever done so in Uganda. This implies that non-DAC donors and funders are choosing not to engage with aid effectiveness in this manner.
[^61]: A GPEDC template dated the 26th of March was shared by UNDP.
[^62]: Stakeholders disputed this figure and questions whether this represented actual alignment.
[^64]: Not accurate, since this Framework ended in 2004.
procurement. Both audit and procurement were improvements over 2014. The 2018 survey reports that 88% of new projects use country systems.

- In 2016, the survey recorded that CSOs and the private sector are supposed to be regularly consulted during policy formulation, implementation and monitoring, but this is applied on an ad-hoc basis. Work continued to broaden participation. The 2018 survey reports that there is negligible engagement of civil society in the development of effectiveness and the quality of a public-private dialogue is weak.

- The 2016 survey reports that Uganda had mainstreamed gender budgeting, gender-specific indicators informed budget allocation, there were regular gender impact assessments of expenditure, and gender equality-focused material was shared. All Ministries and Agencies required a certificate of gender budgeting compliance before approval of their budgets. The 2018 survey also records Uganda as fully meeting all gender requirements.

- In 2016, 90% of aid (only 60% in 2018) was disbursed in the year it was scheduled, and 94% (25% in 2018) was predictable for the next 3 years, since donors all submit three-year forward spending plans.

- In 2016, the survey reported that the Partnership Policy defined national priorities (with targets), which were assessed, and the results shared. The Joint Budget Support Framework and the Joint Assessment Framework allowed donors and government to hold each other accountable for their performance. In 2018, a policy framework and a multi-stakeholder partnership is reported, but it is unclear if country-level targets for mutual accountability or joint assessment exist.

There are a lot more data available than is shown in the monitoring reports. The GPEDC currently maintain an online dashboard, which contains data from four previous monitoring surveys for Uganda: 2005, 2007, 2010 and 2016. Using this data, several additional aspects are shown below to highlight key issues for the Partnership Architecture to consider.

The Monitoring Report does not indicate how Uganda compares to other countries. Chart 6 provides an example.

Chart 6: Uganda and East African Countries 2016 GPEDC scores on Results Frameworks

![Chart 6](chart6.png)

Source: GPEDC Dashboard

Chart 6 shows that Uganda is among the top performers for some indicators, and among the bottom performers for other indicators. The use of comparator countries allows the numeric scores to be contextualised. Uganda’s performance is mixed (an important point in its own right), and it is important to understand why. For example, are Ugandan national data significantly worse than in other East African countries—and does this explain the low donor usage of national data? In contrast, more aid in Uganda uses the national results framework than in other East African countries, suggesting that the NDP Monitoring Framework is performing well— are there lessons that can be applied elsewhere?
For some indicators e.g. the share of aid using GoU audit and procurement procedures, donors and GoU are making progress. In other areas e.g. the share that is on-budget, they have experienced large setbacks. For other indicators, there is not a lot of movement.

Many of the indicators measure donor choices (donor responses to the country context in Uganda). Chart 7 gives an example of where donors make very different choices.

Chart 7: Use of GoU systems (execution, reporting, procurement, audit) in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organisation (WHO)</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GPEDC Dashboard

Chart 7 is heavily influenced by the data that have been reported, but despite that it is clear that some donors score better than others in Uganda. The reasons why some donors can use a high proportion of GoU systems, but not all donors, need exploring.

The performance of different donors also changes over time, as demonstrated in Charts 8 and 9. However, comparing the two, not all donors exhibit the same pattern. Understanding why donors are responding very differently to the changing country context will be important.

Chart 8: UK use of GoU systems 2005-2016

Source: GPEDC Dashboard
Finally, the data shows that donors behave differently in other countries. Using the indicator on the provision of three years of forward spending data, Charts 10 and 11 show that for some donors, e.g. Sweden, Uganda is where they perform best (100% three year forward spending provision in 2016), whereas for others, e.g. the Netherlands, it is where they perform worst. Understanding what led to this difference is key to Ugandan stakeholders identifying the best way forwards.

**Chart 9: World Bank use of GoU systems 2005-2016**

Source: GPEDC Dashboard

**Chart 10: Swedish provision of three years of forward spending data (2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GPEDC Dashboard
Based on this data several themes emerge:

- There are several areas where the current trend is towards worse GPEDC scores, both since 2011 and, when comparing 2016 and 2018 scores, for example aid-on-budget and predictability.
- Some scores are consistently high (gender) whereas others (CSO and private sector involvement) are consistently low.
- Different donors behave (and score) very differently. Some donors supply data, while others do not. Some of those who do not supply data in Uganda do supply it in other countries. Some donors are currently increasing their use of GoU systems, while others are using them less.
- Many of the scores are directly driven by donor modality choices during their project (and/or country strategy) design phases, often driven by the donor headquarters as much as the country office.
- The scores that result from these exercises do not lead to change on their own, but they can be used as the starting point for a discussion. In 2019, there does not appear to be a process or a forum in Uganda that provides this function.
- Underlying both the trends, and the capacity of the partnership to address them, is the political economy of aid provision to Uganda. Understanding, and designing solutions that align with this, is key to making progress in the future.
- The 2016 monitoring report indicates that in 2016, the Partnership Policy was the key document which outlines how donors and government (and other stakeholders) related to each other to ensure effective aid delivery. In 2019 (and probably also in 2016) many aspects of the Partnership Policy were not implemented, several of the institutional structures no longer function, and several key aspects are missing.  

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For some non-exhaustive examples, aspects not currently implanted include: Section 3.8.3 requires all donors to report commitments and disbursements for all on and off-budget projects, including current-year quarterly, and 3 years forward spending projections, and Section 3.2.3 requires them to be on-plan. Section 3.4.3 requires DPs to request a waiver in writing when they deliver projects outside of government systems and have plans to increase the use of government systems, as well as issue written statements explaining the need for each PIU. There should be no missions in May and June and all analytic work should involve GoU. There is an extensive section on policy coherence that is not part of current dialogues in this form. Sections 3.8.1/2 and 4.3i, commit GoU to present an annual report on the implementation of the Partnership Policy to Parliament, every three years facilitate an independent evaluation of the Partnership Policy, and the performance of GoU and each donor is to be reviewed twice annually at PCC-DP meetings and the results made public. Another area for improvement would be better differentiation between financer types and, therefore, better integration of the private sector, SSC and triangular cooperation as the private sector roles are currently combined with CSOs, and all donors are managed together as one supposedly cohesive group. All non LDPG members are likely to also need their own fora at the same level as LDPG.
• It is worth noting that Uganda was one of the earliest countries to adopt this agenda\(^\text{67}\) – and, therefore also a sign of the huge changes, that the Ugandan Partnership is no longer able to address these issues constructively.

• The GPEDC Monitoring Indicators represent one set of aid/development effectiveness issues. There will be focus areas outside these indicators on issues that are important to stakeholders in Uganda.

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The previous section identified significant changes taking place in Uganda’s development financing landscape. There are new actors, changing donor choices in terms of delivery channels, and modalities and changing sector foci.

Based on this changing picture, this section assesses whether the current cooperation approach is still a good fit for Uganda’s needs. It is structured around the four main GPEDC principles and analyses one major issue under each, identifies some good practices and makes a practical suggestion. The four areas are:

- Effectiveness
- Accountability
- Inclusivity
- Ownership

**Effectiveness**

**Issue:** To continue developing rapidly, Uganda needs to address several strategic (i.e. large-scale, cross-sector) issues, for example, demographics, jobs, debt and refugees. Effective solutions will require a coordinated multi-stakeholder response. Many stakeholders financing Uganda’s development would also like to influence the choices that Uganda is making on these issues.

**Key question:** Are strategic issues being identified and discussed by stakeholders, leading to programmatic or policy changes, based on evidence, which are then followed-up on?

**Current status:** At the top level:

- The NPF is comparatively new and has covered some strategic issues in the past e.g. growth and refugees, but NPF only meets once a year and for a single day, which is insufficient to make progress on complex national issues. While it is making progress with inclusion and building trust, it does not have a reputation amongst stakeholders as a forum for either technical or strategic discussions and is also not known for decision making and it does not have a strong mechanism for follow-up, due to insufficient authority to either make decisions, or to compel GoU or other actors to act accordingly. The technical NPF does manage to have more detailed discussions, but these are rare, short and lack NPF’s authority.

- NPF also discusses issues that are raised through the GPAR process, which itself feeds on the Joint Sector Reviews. These issues are often strategic, but are mainly focussed on specific sector or delivery issues.

- Stakeholders reported that the (Donor-Government and Donor-Donor) political level fora e.g. the Ambassador-level Partners for Democracy and Governance group (PDG) or EU Article 8 meetings address many of these issues; however, few records for those meetings are available, and they tend to involve a small set of like-minded OECD DAC donors and are thereby neither representative of most stakeholders, or sufficiently integrated into the coordination architecture.

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68 The first meeting was held in 2014 and it was designed to respond to the gap in coordination caused by the end of budget support. Stakeholders report that 5 years later it is still in the ‘rebuilding trust’ stage and working towards hosting strategic policy dialogue.

69 There is also little evidence of the other high-level partnership meetings described in the Partnership Policy and Framework e.g. the biannual Policy Coordination Committee meetings with donors (which could have held these discussions) taking place.
• NPA have hosted seven annual National Development Policy Forums\textsuperscript{70} to support Vision 2040. These are outside the Partnership Policy, but include all the key stakeholders and address strategic issues.

• State House discusses strategic issues, but remains outside the official coordination architecture, and often holds bilateral discussions.

At the mid-level:

• LDPG meets monthly, for a few hours, and covers strategic, technical and administrative issues; so it does not dedicate enough time to complex discussions. LDPG is primarily a forum for sharing information and viewpoints and, in some cases, outlining a common position (e.g., budget process feedback or payment rates for government staff). These joint statements are shared, but are not binding on members and, so the LDPG does not have an enforcement mechanism when it does follow up. LDPG has limited resources available to commission analyses.

• The Private Sector Foundation and Presidential Investors Forum do cover some of these issues, but tend to focus strictly on the business-related aspects and as they are not integrated into the coordination structures, their discussions and conclusions do not feed into a comprehensive picture and there is little representation from small- and medium-sized businesses that are the majority in Uganda. The NGO Forum does cover strategic (and is one of the few also still covering aid effectiveness) issues, but these are not integrated into a comprehensive discussion and it is not representative of all NGOs (nor INGOs).

• The SDG coordination structures are functional, but have insufficient resources and do not link any strategic decisions to other parts of the partnership architecture.

• The CRRF is reported to be an effective framework (see Good Practice Example below) but only covers strategic issues that relate to refugees.

The use of evidence and analysis during these discussions is variable and may not be available to all stakeholders. At times, there are Uganda-specific analytics, but at other times, the evidence may not directly address the key issue, or may not be specific to Uganda. When evidence does not align with stakeholder incentives to change, it is often ignored.

Even where there have been discussions of strategic issues, the various fora struggle to make binding decisions and to monitor the implementation of any decisions. For NPF, monitoring would be at least a year later, so it is not suitable. Mid-level forums, such as the LDPG, SWGs, PSF or the NGO Forum are primarily discussion groups—not for decision making fora—and generally cannot bind the actions of their members. As a result, what monitoring of results there is, is without ‘teeth’.

In summary, forums that discuss strategic issues should be assessed as follows, with the answers reflecting an assessment of the ability of the Partnership to handle these issues currently:

• Is there a place where strategic issues (e.g. demographics, jobs, growth, poverty refugees) are discussed? These issues are briefly discussed at all levels, but none of these fora dedicate enough time (several days) to turn these discussions into actions or has enough political will to go beyond information sharing.

• Are all the relevant stakeholders involved? None of the current fora bring together all of the relevant stakeholders in one place or can bind their members to a common position to take forward to a meeting of representatives from different stakeholder groups.

• Are those discussions evidence-based? The use of evidence and analysis during these discussions is variable and may not be available to all stakeholders. At times, there are Uganda-specific analytics, but at other times, the evidence may not directly address the key issue, or may not be specific to Uganda. When evidence does not align with stakeholder incentives to change, it is often ignored.

• Is there effective follow-up and monitoring of results? None of these fora can hold their members accountable for group decisions (which are correspondingly rare) and so there is little follow-up.

\textsuperscript{70} http://www.npa.go.ug/national-development-policy-forum/

\textsuperscript{71} Specifically, those that are not mirrors of SWGs, e.g. DEG, HIV/AIDS and Nutrition, Northern Uganda group, etc.

\textsuperscript{72} See the recent review of SWGs: https://www.ldpg.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SWG_OPM-Coordination-Assessment_3-May17.pdf
**GOOD PRACTICE EXAMPLE - GROWTH CONFERENCE**

The annual Growth Conferences\(^1\) are seen by stakeholders as displaying good practice in addressing a strategic issue:

- They include a wide range of stakeholders – bringing together GoU (including MoFPED, ministries and agencies, local governments), DAC donors, the private sector, CSOs and international researchers. GoU chairs the conference.
- They focus on a national and cross-cutting priority, specific to Uganda, e.g. recently these have included oil, and tourism. They present evidence and have a direct link to policy.
- They allow enough time for both technical discussions and sessions on agreeing on action points, since the conferences are multi-day.
- They have sufficient resources and capacity to organise and manage the events.

Areas where there is room for improvement include narrowing down the focus of each conference and increasing the amount of preparation. Stakeholders are not bound by the action points negotiated and, therefore, follow-up is minimal.

Uganda does not have, and urgently needs, a way to identify, discuss, decide and follow up on at least one major strategic issue each year. Three options (of which more than one could be taken forward) are:

**Option 1:** Strengthening and expanding NPF and its supporting fora (Technical NPF, Partnership Policy Working Group) to have the time and capacity to host an annual strategic issue discussion.

- NPF would need to meet for longer, and more times a year to have time for strategic issues alongside its other responsibilities.
- NPF would need to change its format to allow an open discussion, and to move beyond pre-prepared statements.
- NPF would need to widen its representation to include representatives (empowered to negotiate on behalf of all stakeholder types\(^2\)).
- NPF would need to establish an enforcement mechanism and bind parties to the action points agreed upon.
- NPF would need more capacity to handle the multiple days and stages of technical discussions, preparation of evidence and bringing together of negotiations.
- Multi-stakeholders dialogues have proved weak in the past and this would need resolving.

**Option 2:** Discussions on strategic issues should stay at the mid- and lower-level groups, with efforts focusing on coordinating and linking up their discussions to produce a cross-stakeholder national consensus.

- Lower-level groups (SWGs/DWGs, and single-stakeholder forums e.g. LDPG, PSFU, NGO Forum, CRRF Steering Committee, SDG Framework) could host discussions of strategic issues.
- A framework under the NPF for selecting the key issues that all groups would discuss, and to share evidence would be needed.
- Lower-level groups would need to form positions that bound and represented all of their members, before sending representatives to negotiate with other groups (at NPF).
- Lower level groups have the advantage that they reach a wider range of actors.

**Option 3:** Have a separate annual strategic issue conference, building on the strong points of the Growth Conference format and integrating the NPA managed Vision 2040 National Development Policy Forums into the coordination and partnership architecture.

- The conference should be managed as part of the coordination and partnership structures and, therefore, involve all stakeholder types.
- NPF would select the strategic issue to be considered, and once reached, the conclusions should be brought to the NPF for approval.

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\(^1\) These are now led by the International Growth Centre: [https://www.theigc.org/event/uganda-national-budget-conference-economic-growthorum-fy-201920/](https://www.theigc.org/event/uganda-national-budget-conference-economic-growthorum-fy-201920/)

\(^2\) Government (OPM, MoFPED, NPA, Parliament, MDAs (and SWGs), Local Government, Donors (covering all groups, including SSC and humanitarian), the private sector, (I)NGOs, and CSOs. Efforts also need to be made to allow actors that do not participate in these fora to contribute—at a minimum by having placeholders in the agenda for significant financing partners to either fill or be noted that they prefer to observe and not contribute directly.
c) The conference would need to run for several days each year, with technical representatives from each stakeholder meeting several times beforehand to narrow down the options in advance.

d) Past multi-stakeholder dialogues have proven to be weak and, therefore, work will be needed to convince stakeholders that this time will be different.

e) Experience from the Growth Conference is that a secretariat is required to oversee both the preparation (analysis and organisation) and the monitoring that this role could build NPAs standing within the coordination and partnership architecture.

**Option 4:** Focus on the strategic issues, as raised through the Joint Sector Reviews and the GPAR process.

a) NPF should align more strongly with the GPAR and Joint Sector Review processes by timing NPF meetings to occur during the annual GPAR process.

b) NPF needs to use the GPAR and Joint Sector Reviews to identify national strategic issues (those that apply across multiple sectors and stakeholders and, not only about delivery).

c) A process needs to be found through which NPF decisions and thinking on these strategic issues can be relayed back to the GoU led GPAR process and be monitored.

Whichever option(s) are chosen, some general improvements can be implemented:

- All stakeholders must attend in a decision-making capacity.
- Some of the discussions (probably at the final level) should be open to the media to build national consensus.
- There will need to be organised follow-up—the action points should identify indicators, a data collection methodology, a baseline score, targets and a timeframe. The monitoring report should be tabled at NPF.
- To ensure evidence-based discussions, from a common understanding, there may need to be funding to produce specific analysis targeting the issue.

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**GOOD PRACTICE EXAMPLE: ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT GROUP (EMG)**

The effectiveness section above focuses on the ability of the cooperation and partnership structures to identify, prioritise and discuss large, cross-cutting strategic issues. Effectiveness also includes the ability of the partnership and cooperation structures to effectively interact with the strategic processes and discussions that are taking place in Uganda.

During the Budget Support period, the JBSF and JAF allowed donors to engage with GoU processes, such as the budget, and key reforms. When the relationship between MoFPED and donors broke down, this role was not replaced in the NPF (nor by the High Level Action Matrix of PFM reforms), and many of the other strategic donor-GoU meetings identified in the Partnership Policy (e.g. the PCC, the ICSC, the TICC) did not continue. The role of MoFPED (and the processes it manages) in the partnership and coordination structures was significantly diminished.

EMG is a meeting that was developed by the Donor Economists Group to re-establish links between donors and MoFPED, initially at a technical level and with a very limited group of country economists. It was identified by stakeholders as good practice to focus on strategic priorities, ensuring coordination between donors, to maintain a dialogue between donors and government, and requiring members to attend in a decision-making capacity.

EMG was criticised for its duplication of content with the PFM SWG and the Public Expenditure Management Committee (PEMCOM) committee, and for not meeting regularly (only at budget or Growth Conference time). This is linked to the criticism of EMG for not including a wider group of stakeholders. The strong desire by donor Heads of Agencies and LDPG to make use this new tool for dialogue with GoU (and expand the conversation away from core MoFPED issues) has led to reduced incentives for MoFPED to participate, as the co-ownership of the agenda has waned.
Accountability

Issue: Successful partnership relies on the ability of the different levels of fora, the different groups of stakeholders and the members within each group to hold each other to account. This way, issues raised at lower levels are solved higher up, agreed actions are monitored and implemented and all stakeholders are actively consulted.

During the budget support period, partnership and accountability was between GoU and a sub-set of DAC donors. Since then, the number and variety of stakeholders, the accountability tools and incentives have changed significantly. The Partnership Policy and then NPF were established to fill the vacuum left by the end of the JSBF and accompanying incentives. NPF has focused on rebuilding trust and normalising relations. Its recent efforts to be more inclusive (now 30-40 donors, plus NGO representatives) are urgent, given the growing role of non-DAC-donor financing. LDGP, PSFU and the NGO Forum have filled parts of the remaining void and are active stakeholder groups. The UNHCR Refugee Response Plan, CRRF National Action Plan, and SDG frameworks fill gaps in their respective areas. The SWGs have been a constant presence, but a recent report has highlighted the efforts needed to strengthen their contribution.

Table 4 shows the huge range of accountability tools operating in Uganda and also the degree to which they all focus on separate actors, goals and processes, rather than on working together.

Key question: How can stakeholders develop accountability systems, fora, approaches and processes that fit the power and incentive structures of the current relationship, and allow the whole range of stakeholders to be mutually accountable for Uganda’s development?

Current status:

Partnership accountability

- There is no current process in Uganda to assess and track the performance of the coordination and partnership structures. This is discussed further under the section on Ownership below.
- The NPF, SWGs and single-stakeholder groups are not accountable to each other for their workplans and deliverables.
  - NPF and its members are not currently held accountable for the implementation of the Partnership Policy/Framework, aid/development effectiveness, and the other aspects that are under its remit. Agreed actions are the responsibility of the individual GoU institutions or donors.
  - SWGs officially report to OPM, but this is not shared with the rest of the stakeholders to allow them to also hold SWGs to account. SWGs are effectively accountable to MoFPED for the submission budget inputs but this does not extend to accountability for other SWG responsibilities/workstreams.
  - LDGP, PSFU, the NGO Forum, CRRF and the SDG monitoring framework are only accountable to their members, not to the Partnership as a whole. They do not submit reports to NPF and their sub-groups do not report to the wider partnership.
  - The segregated nature of the different single stakeholder forums means that stakeholders mainly engage with either GoU or their peers and have very few chances to hold or be held to account by other stakeholder types. Given that stakeholders often hold similar opinions to others in their group, this significantly decreases overall accountability.

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76 Formerly, this was managed by the Policy Coordination Committee, with the PCC—DPs meet twice a year, and produce an annual report public evaluating each donor’s performance, and performance of the Partnership Policy, in general.
GoU Accountability

- DAC donors (through the LDPG’s role in writing the agenda and outcomes) hold the GoU to account for implementing some technical measures through the Joint Framework for Results, but not for other types of issues.
- NPF is not able to enforce decisions on other parts of government and there is not a significant effort to monitor the progress and limited follow-up, despite attendance by up to 25 State and Cabinet ministers.
- OPM holds the rest of GoU to account via the GPAR, but this has several shortcomings:
  a) NPF does not discuss the GPAR in sync with the rest of GoU
  b) GPAR assesses government performance and, since relatively little aid is now on-budget, there is a significant gap in terms of most aid projects.
- Despite progress, the GPAR is not working well enough to monitor the implementation of the NDP or the SDGs, and is not set-up to receive significant external input.
- The annual NDP assessment, the National Development Review Report, which could help to fill this gap, has not been regularly produced since 2014 and, therefore, there is no tool to evaluate and follow-up on NDP progress.
- Financing actors are often able to hold the GoU units that work in areas they are directly financing accountable for implementation, sometimes of policies, and occasionally of results, but this is on a project or programme basis.

Line ministry accountability

- Figure 1 shows the complicated nature of monitoring mechanisms at the line ministry level. It should be noted that this chart includes the JBSF and JAF, which no longer exist, but does not include the SWG, the DWG, SDG reporting and any CRRF groups/reporting. It suggests that Joint Sector Reviews are the current dominant assessment mechanism, and these do include a wider group of stakeholders to a given sector, but they lack the accountability powers of OPM, the budget-related enforcement of tools that report to MoFPED and have no formal role in the Partnership Policy.28

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Table 4: Summary of key accountability tools used in the partnership and coordination structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flow</th>
<th>Fora/Tool</th>
<th>Held to account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>GAPR</td>
<td>MDAs, LGs, on-budget aid project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDG Coordination Framework, traditional Humanitarian and CRRF structures</td>
<td>Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFPED</td>
<td>Budget performance reports</td>
<td>MDAs and LGs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development Committee</td>
<td>Donors projects/strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donor Portfolio Reviews</td>
<td>Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Certificate of compliance with the NDP</td>
<td>Budget incl. MDA and donor projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reviews of NDP (final and mid-term)</td>
<td>GoU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Ministries</td>
<td>Sector reviews, Cabinet budget perf. reviews</td>
<td>LGs, Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWGs</td>
<td>Donors, NGOs, Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Partners</td>
<td>LDPG</td>
<td>Other DPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWGs, sector reviews</td>
<td>Line Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>GoU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Bilateral meetings, and PSFU/PIRT lobbying</td>
<td>GoU/MDAs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWGs</td>
<td>MDAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>GoU and donors</td>
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<td>Direct liaison</td>
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<td>Citizens</td>
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<td>Local Governments</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Parliament</td>
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<td>Refugee actors</td>
<td>Refugee Coordination Model Clusters</td>
<td>UNHCR/OPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRRF</td>
<td>GoU, OPM, donors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by authors
MoFPED holds line ministries to account through its control of the budget process. NPA issues Certificates of compliance for the alignment between NDP priorities, sector work plans and budgets. These reports accompany the annual budgets that are submitted to Parliament, but NPA has no mechanism to enforce compliance.

**Figure 1: Monitoring Instruments at the Sector Level**

Donor accountability

- Financing stakeholders are formally held to account by GoU through Portfolio Reviews, the signoff processes for country strategies and the Aid Management Platform, all with MoFPED and without any report to NPF. There is no aid/development effectiveness review and NPF has not yet institutionalized its own donor accountability mechanism. A few high-capacity SWGs can hold donors to account, and formally donors should produce DFPs (Donor Financing Plans) at the SWG level, but for projects not involving GoU, there are very few levers for SWGs to hold donors to account.

Project/strategy accountability

- A degree of accountability for aspects of the Partnership Policy (and aid effectiveness, in general) could be achieved at the project (and donor country strategy) level through the Development Committee. It is chaired by MoFPED, and although OPM and NPA attend, it does not link strongly with the NDP, the objectives set out in the Partnership Policy or the rest of the coordination structures.

- The GoU only membership of the Development Committee means that the accountability is only one-way from donors to GoU and, therefore, there is little ownership by donors.

- Projects and strategies submitted to the Development Committee (and NPA) are already too far along the design path (and constrained by fixed modalities embedded in donor country strategies) for GoU to have much effect.

- The new MoFPED Grant and Loan negotiation guidelines make no reference to the Partnership Policy or SDGs, and barely mention the NDP.

- There is poor alignment of roles with the incentives of the three main GoU agencies i.e. MoFPED and OPM are responsible for signing projects and country strategies, but alignment is the responsibility of NPA. OPM is responsible for SWG oversight, but all the power and engagement rests with MoFPED, which controls them via the budget process (covered in more detail in the section on Ownership).

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79 The development of a “joint partnership coordination program” was mentioned as a new approach in this area, but no details were provided.

Private sector accountability

- PSFU79 (and sometimes individual companies) are involved in several SWGs, attend Public Expenditure Management Committee (PEMCOM) meetings and are often asked to provide input into GoU strategies. This represents some evidence of the private sector holding GoU to account (although not via NPF). There is a private sector working group, but this is not viewed as working well, and MoFPED has a Private Sector Development Strategy80, but this makes no mention of coordination in terms of the Partnership. Since no examples of GoU (or other stakeholders) that are able to hold the private sector to account were mentioned by stakeholders and, while the PSFU represents the views of its members, it cannot negotiate on their behalf. Many private companies are outside PSFU’s remit, including those receiving aid funds, and are only accountable to other stakeholders via their funding donor.

- There is also no systematic effort to assess the private sector contribution to development (or even the SDGs), despite the NDP II statistic of expecting 42% of financing to come from the private sector. This is linked to unclear responsibility between MoFPED (which normally leads on the private sector), NPA (which manage the NDP), and OPM (which manages coordination and oversees the SDG implementation architecture).

- OPM host the Presidential Investors’ Round Table, but this is not linked to the coordination structures and focusses only on a few of the largest investors.

Additional accountability frameworks

- Both the SDG monitoring framework81, and the CRRF have introduced their own separate lines of accountability and monitoring fora, partly linked to, and partly outside, the traditional coordination framework. They do not report to NDP, or the other partnership fora, so it is difficult to hold them to account for external.

Aid/development effectiveness accountability

- The Partnership Policy and Framework includes mutual targets to monitor aid/development effectiveness, but either the meetings that measure them no longer exist, or the aid/development effectiveness content does not make it onto the agenda. International efforts (such as the GPEDC) are not widely shared.

The unclear accountability is allowing actors to behave in line with their individual preferences. In both the case of the GoU and donors, driven by domestic (political) pressures at the expense of the benefits to the wider group of stakeholders, rather than being driven by joint development effectiveness concerns. Practical examples given by stakeholders include:

- Donors no longer have much leverage to influence government allocation of funds (or policy measures) beyond the specific projects that GoU implements on their behalf. Concerns that the Budget is not well aligned with the NDP are held by both Parliament and DAC donors, but without any forum to discuss it and hold them accountable, these led to just a few donor statements, but no partnership-based discussions with MoFPED.

- GoU is often not able to hold donors to account for their approaches (how they allocate or how they deliver aid), and the results they target and deliver. Although the relevant line ministry may be aware, there is no clear forum for them to raise it with a clear set of rules to hold donors accountable. Despite some isolated efforts, it is not common for donors not to supply data to MoFPED on projects in which the government is not an implementing partner e.g. those implemented by NGOs or the private sector, again it is unclear in what forum donors are held accountable for this, despite commitments across the various policies and fora ToRs.

To increase the levels of accountability, the requirements are for a solution that82:

1. Provides a forum that meets often enough and for long enough, in order to hold stakeholders accountable.
2. Can link the high-level discussions at the NPF, the discussions in the stakeholder groups and the discussions as the working-group level.
3. Can replace the lost supporting and technical roles (e.g. Technical NPF, Partnership Policy Taskforce, etc).
4. Allow stakeholders to be held to account by the partnership as a whole, not just on a bilateral basis.
5. Simplifies the lines of accountability, so that stakeholders have a single point of reporting, rather than reporting to different places for different aspects.

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79 PSFU membership is made up of approximately 240 groups, including over 170 business associations across sectors, 60 corporate sector agencies and 10 public sector agencies e.g. the Bureau of Standards and the Uganda Capital Markets Agency.
81 https://opm.go.ug/download/coordination-framework-for-the-sdguiwpdmdl=13449&ind=0
82 The key issue of the inclusiveness of these fora (while an essential part of accountability) is mainly covered in the next section. Solutions also need to respond to stakeholder views on the complexity of and lack of incentives to engage in the current structures.
6. Coordinates external partner engagement with the various monitoring systems and frameworks (GAPR, NDP, SDG, CRRF, etc.)

7. Reshapes the responsibilities of the OPM, MoFPED and NPA, so that their roles coincide with issues over which they have both the power and the incentive to engage.

8. Has enough technical capacity (not just secretarial) to present several key reports each year for consideration and action by the NPF. 
   a) An outcome document from the annual strategic issue conference
   b) An annual development effectiveness and use of country systems report (discussed further in section on Ownership below)
   c) A quarterly report on issues discussed at single-stakeholder groups and SWGs, where there is need for a high-level decision

9. Can bring together nominated representatives of all the single-type stakeholder forums (LDPG, SWGs PSFU, NGO Forum, CRRF) with representatives from all GOU levels, in one place, so that cooperation and discussion take place across stakeholder types and a consensus can form.

10. Can formalise the inclusion into the coordination structures of several currently borderline groups/ fora e.g. Local Government, INGOs and Private Foundations.

11. Introduce a model where the single-stakeholder groups hold their members to account.

12. Provides a body that can manage and oversee lower-level groups, influencing and monitoring their agendas, providing a single place for their reporting, and handling cross-cutting issues.

13. Has enough resources. The CRRF (which coordinates the humanitarian sub-set of the overall stakeholders, does not manage funding flows, and is responsible for implementing just one monitoring framework) has a secretariat with a staff of nine. The refugee coordination run by UNHCR and the OPM Department of Refugees also has many dedicated coordination staff and manages approximately a sixth of the overall aid budget.

Option 1: Strengthen and expand the existing fora to boost accountability

1. SWGs
   a) Need to be reduced in number and re-aligned with the NDP. They will, therefore, draw from multiple Line Ministries and Agencies and need renaming to NDP-WGs.
      i) Fewer larger groups will reduce the numbers of ineffective WGs, as well as reduce the number of meetings.
      ii) Less focus on specific projects for a specific line ministry, or dominance by a single ministry (and the budget submission of that ministry).
      iii) Coordination and planning to take place on an NDP basis and, therefore, Joint Sector Reviews to act as reviews of both government and donor activity for the relevant NDP area.
   b) Need to be strengthened and standardised/ coordinated agendas
      i) Clear deliverables for each WG with annual reporting to EMG/NPF.
      ii) Integrated into strategic issue discussions.
      iii) Responsibility for implementing actions following decisions made at NPF.
   c) Minimum requirements for number of meetings (quarterly), workplans, membership, and for data submission.
   d) Attendance by decision makers and provided with support for enforcing decisions.
   e) The SWGs review report highlights that the SWGs with higher capacity have financial support to employ staff, and with fewer WGs this may be more achievable.

2. Single-type-stakeholder forums (LDPG, NGO Forum)
   a) Need a formalised role/position in the Partnership Policy—all equal—with formalised annual reporting to NPF.
   b) Made transparent e.g. publish workplans and minutes
   c) Send representatives in decision-taking capacity to NPF.
   d) Expansion (either by expanding existing capacity or setting up new groups) to ensure coverage of all stakeholders.

83 In addition, OPM should present the GPAR and the SDG progress reports (and NPA should restart and submit the National Development Report). Together, these will fill and structure the NPF agenda to make it more balanced in terms of topics, and by removing the technical aspects, will allow NPF to retain focus on apex decision making.
3. Alternative coordination forums (CRRF and SDG Framework)
   a) Need to be integrated with NPF as their apex forum to reduce parallel coordination systems. Parallel Frameworks to be equivalent to LDPG in status, with same reporting requirements to NPF, and supply of representatives to NPF.
   b) Sub-working groups (e.g. DWGs) to be aligned with the NDP and from there combined with SWGs.

4. NPF
   a) To make all the constituent parts of the partnership and coordination structures accountable, NPF needs to re-establish the process where it considers annual reports from each process. Many of these are included in the Partnership Policy but a few new ones can be added to re-establish NPF as the apex decision-taking forum and make all the constituent processes accountable to NPF. The required reporting should include:
      i) GAPR (which is currently present,) but NPF needs to table it and meet the week after it is considered by GoU so that the NPF feedback is considered at the same time as other GoU feedback.
      ii) New annual strategic issue report
      iii) New Development Committee report
      iv) Old annual review of the coordination and partnership structures
      v) Old aid/development effectiveness, and New Use of Country Systems reports
      vi) New WG annual reports
      vii) New annual reports from single-type stakeholder groups
      viii) New annual reports from subsidiary frameworks i.e. SDGs and CRRF
      ix) Existing Loans, Grants and Guarantees report should also be tabled at NPF
   b) To achieve this workload, NPF would need to meet at least quarterly, if not every two months during busy periods.
   c) NPF would need increased time and capacity from its technical secretariat
   d) NPF would require a functioning Partnership Policy Task Force with representatives from all stakeholders to assist the secretariat.
   e) The NPF agenda should be agreed upon openly with contributions from SWGs and all single-type stakeholder groups (not just LDPG).
   f) NPF will need to incorporate much more time for open discussion.
   g) Follow-up capacity increased and agreed process for binding members to actions/decisions.
   h) Increased roles for MoFPED and NPA, e.g. issues that they should lead on, reports that they should formally table.
   i) Reduction in attendance by non-executive staff of MDAs – these staff should attend Technical NPF instead.

5. Technical NPF
   a) Needs to be formalised in the Partnership Policy/ Framework and needs a publicly available ToR, agenda and similar.
   b) Will need to ensure the same expanded inclusiveness as NPF, with technical level representatives from each forum.
   c) Will need to meet quarterly to prepare technical papers to be presented at NPF for decisions.

Option 2: In addition to the options above – delegate the NPF technical role

Option 1 implies a significant increase in the number and length of NPF meetings, and a significant increase in technical level content. Several stakeholders felt that this was unlikely, especially considering the high status of the current attendees.

As an alternative, NPF could delegate several of these roles, leaving NPF more clearly as the high-level political and performance assessment forum. NPF would meet two or three times a year, one meeting focussing on the GPAR, and the others approving the various reports submitted during the year.

To absorb the technical roles (many of which are key to ensuring accountability) a forum is needed that could combine the roles (and the meetings) that were previously catered by the JBSF/JAF, and now the Technical NPF. It would also make sense to streamline the various supporting roles, such as the Partnership Policy Task Force into the new delegated role. The delegated forum would:

- Bridge the gap between the detailed and sector-specific discussions at the SWGs and DWGs, and NPF. Take over the role of collating issues to be discussed at the NPF.
- Present a single point for all reporting and accountability, e.g. when SWGs report the responsibility of OPM for reporting is applied at the
same time as MoFPEDs, power to enforce compliance and NPAs interest in the plans submitted.

- Have enough time (meets at least quarterly) and resources (seconded or funded staff) to manage the accountability and transparency aspects, i.e. providing a place of reporting for all lower-level groups, oversees SWG agendas, follows up on agreed actions on behalf of the NPF, monitoring targets, and handling all the technical functions of the partnership and cooperation structures.

- Bring together representatives from all the single-stakeholder groups for cross-stakeholder discussions and reduce duplication, as issues that affect multiple stakeholders can be dealt with together in a national forum.

- Allow NPF and SWGs the freedom to concentrate their limited capacity on their existing roles and with lower requirements to expand transparency, as the delegated forum would provide this.

A suggestion made by several stakeholders to start by scaling back PFM, allocation and conditionality discussions at the end of the budget support period, and to continue under the Partnership Policy/Framework. Since the engagement of donors with GoU leadership, policy and strategy forums is reduced, MoFPED’s contribution to the main coordination and partnership fora has been steadily reduced.

One option for a way forward would be to expand and establish the EMG as one of the parts brought together to make this delegated forum. EMG already provides a technical forum for coordinating between donors and GoU and this would establish it as a formal part of the coordination and partnership structures to complement and better support the NPF.

By allowing NPF to formally delegate some of its responsibilities to EMG, it would provide a route to re-engage (and for other stakeholders, to re-engage with) MoFPED as an integral part of the partnership and coordination structures. This would formalise what many stakeholders are doing anyway and replace some of the roles lost with the end-of-budget support for which there is still significant demand. EMG could report to NPF, and MoFPED has sufficient units to provide a secretariat and manage the workload.

The new EMG could incorporate the PFM reform aspects of the Joint Framework for Results, replace the technical NPF, integrate the Donor Portfolio reviews and receive the reports of the Development Committee and provide a home for the Aid Effectiveness technical work. In all three cases, EMG would present a report to NPF each year. EMG would also be a better forum for donors to engage with the budget, rather than just reading statements at NPF. Given the links between SWGs and the Budget, they would also need strong formalised links to EMG.

To achieve this workload, EMG would probably need to meet every two months. Key questions to answer would concern whether EMG could handle technical issues beyond economic management, especially those that might not directly involve MoFPED, e.g. refugees. Similarly, part of EMG’s success to date has been its small size and good relationships—careful management would be needed to maintain it as the technical level forum, rather than being dominated by political discussions.
BOX 3: STREAMLINING, INCENTIVES AND TRANSPARENCY

Stakeholders are keen to see a significant reduction in the number of working groups:

- Uganda has over 60 low-level working groups, far more than similar countries. There are officially 16 SWGs with multiple sub-groups, each of which is mirrored with separate DWGs (again with sub-groups), there are ad-hoc thematic donor working groups, at least 10 Humanitarian working groups, at least 4 SDG working groups, plus separate NGO and private sector groups covering the same issues.

- To reduce these to around 15 main groups, all working groups (SWGs, DWGs, SDG, Humanitarian) should be streamlined according to the NDPII/III priority areas, so that there is only one overarching accountability framework, which combines groups that are talking about the same topic, and where all discussions feed into the same apex.

- Ad-hoc working groups could be limited to six (selected at NPF) and should be ended as soon as they stop being relevant. All these NDPWGs should be open to all stakeholders.

- Remaining groups should consider having meetings less often (but, then for longer) and replace some meetings with tele/video conference. Some of the best regarded SWGs meet quarterly.

Many stakeholders discussed the lack of incentives to attend and engage in the coordination fora. This applied to all levels, from SWGs/DWGs, to LDPG, and to the NPF. Better leadership improved agendas and a focus on decision making were highlighted as ways forward.

- The reforms identified in the recent OPM report on strengthening SWGs need implementation (and not just for SWGs, but – also for the single-stakeholder groups). In particular, the need to link meetings directly to key processes. If there are six meetings a year, perhaps three can be devoted to the planning and budget process (including project preparation, financing, and the budget itself), two focus on policy issues, and one on aid/development effectiveness. This needs monitoring and enforcing from above.

- Involving more stakeholders should make the remaining meetings more important to attend, more likely to have important information, and be the best point to influence other stakeholders.

- All meetings should share their agendas in advance and identify whether each item on their agenda is ‘information sharing after the fact’, ‘information sharing in advance’, ‘Consultation’ or ‘Negotiation/joint working’ so that stakeholders can decide whether their time attending was likely to be productive and also chose to participate remotely.

- The best regarded lower-level groups typically had funding for a basic secretariat (see JLOS Good Practice example), and this should be considered.

Stakeholders wanted the transparency of the fora increased:

- All groups should share their minutes and submit a standardised report detailing their activities to the reinstated technical level to be shared with all stakeholders. Groups not meeting this requirement should be not considered part of the Partnership. The reinstated technical level should regularly circulate details of all meetings, and monitor and enforce the expected deliverables, e.g. joint strategic plans, budget inputs, data for MoFPED, DoL exercises, contributions to annual strategic issues, representatives sent to the NDP etc.

Stakeholders felt that the political interactions were not transparent and needed better alignment with the coordination structures. Where possible, political meetings, such as Partners for Democracy and Governance, should transition to discussing national issues at the national fora, rather than duplicating the discussions in parallel. Their conclusions also needed to be recorded at the NPF, so that they can influence and receive feedback from stakeholders external to their group.

BOX 4: DIVISION OF LABOUR

There is not enough accountability for GoU and donors to implement a Division of Labour exercise, despite many years on the agenda of the LDPG and of OPM via the Partnership Policy.

For OPM and the Partnership Policy, there is no process that assesses whether stakeholders are meeting their Partnership Policy commitments to DoL, so it is not added to the NPF Agenda.

For the LDPG, the 2017 annual workplan indicates that there have been division of labour mapping exercises every two years to quantify the engagement of donors in sectors. Division of Labour (DoL) was an agenda item again in early 2018. However, but there is no evidence of any result. The last comprehensive DoL exercise was in 2008 and, anecdotally, was not published by the donors (who funded it) because they did not like the implications, in terms of a restriction in the number of sectors each donor could engage in, and the number of donors that can engage in each sector. This is not surprising (and, is common in other countries,) but remains inconsistent with both the headquarters and Uganda-level commitments of donors, and continued donor praise for similar work in other countries, e.g. Rwanda. This process also only covers—at best—60% of aid to Uganda, as non-LDPG members are not involved.

On the government side, few line ministries are likely to support a process through which the known results are that they would be dealing with fewer potential sources of funding, with imagined reductions in funding, a loss of ability to shop between funders, with less ability to have funders compete, a desire not to face a few very powerful funders, and less ability to give each ministry unit a small project.

On both sides, therefore, the short-term fears and costs to each organisation of implementing a DoL policy are blocking the potential gains. A large part of this is due to the fact that the costs/losses are easy to identify, but the gains (as they have not been tried) remain difficult to imagine. More importantly, the gains may be accrued in another part of the partnership. For example, the loss (in terms of good news coverage back home, or easy-to-hit results indicators) to one donor of no longer being able to have a project handing out bed nets, may be a gain for the donors, remaining in the sector and who now have greater economies of scale and, therefore, more efficient projects.

Unless donors can justify their actions back to their headquarters on the basis of gains to the partnership as a whole, then it is unlikely that a DoL policy will ever succeed. This was easier in the past, when all donor HQs followed Paris Declaration indicators slavishly, but is no longer the case.

In addition, the LDPG annual workplan rightly identifies that, for a DoL policy to be implemented, the key documents are the donor country strategy papers, which bind donor decisions. Any policy will, therefore, take at least as many years to implement as the time it will take for all donors to renew their country strategies. In the past, this has proven too long a period to maintain momentum and introduced ‘first-mover’ disadvantages, which need to be overcome.

There are three things that the next DoL exercise could try, in order to overcome the blockage on taking decisions:

1. Start with a discussion of what appropriate targets might be, and identify potential gains, as well as how sector funding will be maintained, before doing the quantitative exercise, so that a shared understanding of the benefits can be built and committed to before the actions are broken down to individual donors and become tangible.
2. Link the commitment to an existing process and bind the hands of the assessing agency. For example, writing the targets into the assessment made before signing country strategy papers with the OPM or the Development Committee, or withholding certificates of NDP compliance to donors working in more than the agreed number of sectors, potentially even introducing penalties (perhaps, in terms of the ability to chair working groups or similar) for partners that do not participate.
3. Involve GoU and non-LDPG stakeholders from the start and share the results publicly.
GOOD PRACTICE EXAMPLE: EBOLA HIV/AIDS RESPONSE

The Ebola/HIV aids response was held up as a good example of joint programming (having a Joint Action Plan), the use of country systems, and mutual accountability for results.

Stakeholders also praised the fast progress, achieved because of the use of ‘pre-approval’ by donors, wherein they agreed and set up budget lines with GoU in advance, thereby reducing bureaucracy while using country systems.

Another benefit identified was that donors were able to coordinate their support among themselves, but this had a negative aspect that the GoU felt they were not fully involved in this process, and only presented with the result once the donors had decided amongst themselves.

Applying the lessons more widely would involve:

- Donors working together to harmonise procedures and approaches when working with GoU.
- All stakeholders in a sector share one single strategic plan, first agreeing on the needs, and then jointly identifying the different roles, as well as joint monitoring of the implementation of the shared plan.

GOOD PRACTICE EXAMPLE: JLOS SWG

The Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS) SWG was identified by stakeholders as an example of good practice. The recent SWG report\(^87\) identifies several key aspects:

- Coordination involves all 18 MDAs with JLOS responsibilities and approaches other sectors, where relevant
- Government leads the main meetings effectively, and these are quarterly, not monthly
- There are annual and semi-annual progress reviews that focus on outcomes, not inputs
- Influence on the allocation of funding is achieved via joint agreement on priority investment projects
- Donor funding is often jointly delivered, ensuring collaboration
- There is a JLOS secretariat staffed by Ugandans to make coordination happen, but it is unclear whether the funding is sustainable, since it is linked to the joint donor programme.
- CSOs are regular participants, as are local governments.

Inclusiveness\(^86\)

**Issue:** The involvement of all stakeholders in some part of the coordination and partnership structures is necessary to ensure that the decisions taken at partnership fora are owned by and benefit from the knowledge of all stakeholders. However, many stakeholders are not involved in the partnership and cooperation structures participate in a way that does not connect to the other parts, reducing the effectiveness of the partnership.

**Key question:** How can the partnership adjust to make sure that it benefits from the views and cooperation of all stakeholders?

**Current status:** The different forums vary in their inclusiveness. In addition to representatives from the GoU and the LDPG, NPF recently added representatives from the NGO Forum, but struggles to consistently include non-DAC donors, vertical funds, humanitarian representatives, the private sector or local governments. Even when stakeholders attend NPF, they are often not asked to contribute to the agenda or actively engage in the discussion.

In contrast, SWGs are inclusive forums, including GoU, LDPG donors, vertical fund representatives, CSOs/NGOs and the private sector.

Uganda has a strong ecosystem of single stakeholder groups\(^87\), but not all stakeholders have a stakeholder group. DAC donors have the LDPG, the private sector has the PSFU and PIRT, NGOs have the NGO Forum, Local Government has the ULGA\(^88\).

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\(^{86}\) [https://www.ldpg.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SWG_OPM-Coordination-Assessment_3-May17 .pdf](https://www.ldpg.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SWG_OPM-Coordination-Assessment_3-May17 .pdf)

\(^{87}\) This is likely to be both as a result of and causing the comparatively small role played by NPF, compared to other countries.

\(^{88}\) [http://www.ulga.org/](http://www.ulga.org/)
The main stakeholder types without group-based representation at the NPF include:

- non-DAC donors, who currently work bilaterally, but with MoFPED and State House, not with OPM (that formally heads the coordination architecture).
- Donors without Ugandan offices, e.g. Arab donors, vertical funds (GAVI, Global Fund, and climate funds) and most large private foundations. It is unclear how many of these manage to engage through their implementing partners.
- INGOs who provide some funding and implement many projects (noting that the project funder is often involved in the partnership already)[91]
- Humanitarian actors (whose current engagement is often via UNHCR in the case of the INGOs delivering the projects, via the UN Country team for UN humanitarian agencies, or via the CRRF Steering Committee.
- Micro, Small- and Medium-Sized enterprises are not as well represented in the PSFU (and not at all in the PIRT), as they could be given their dominant numbers.

The lower levels of the partnership structures, e.g. working groups, and single stakeholder groups are mainly attending via the actors themselves. However, at higher levels such as NPF, most stakeholders do not attend themselves, but are represented by others nominated from their stakeholder group, as it is generally not feasible to have discussions with each individual actor present. This means that stakeholders without a group are not well represented at the higher levels of the partnership structures.

Even those stakeholders with groups are not always consistently integrated into the partnership structures.

- Local Governments are the service delivery level for many of the interventions funded. Despite this, Local Governments themselves, the Ministry of Local Government or the Uganda Local Governments Association are rarely involved in any of the partnership structures.
- LDPG representing DAC donors helps OPM set the agenda of NPF, but this is not extended to equivalent groups, such as the NGO Forum, the PSFU, etc.

As noted in the context section:

- External financing from LDGP donors is increasingly delivered by NGOs, the private sector and vertical funds
- There is a growing role for non-DAC donors
- Local Governments are increasingly the main GoU point of contact
- At present, there is a high share of humanitarian aid

When considered together, the current trend is for the cooperation and partnership fora (especially at the higher levels) to include fewer of the key stakeholders.

A second issue driving low inclusivity is the current dominance of the single-stakeholder forums and frameworks set-up outside the partnership structures. The total NPF and Technical NPF time spent on open discussion is under 4 hours per year[92], and while there are some better functioning SWGs, there are also many that do not function well. That leaves the single-type stakeholder forums, and the parallel frameworks as the dominant fora that stakeholders use to meet their needs. The problem is that these fora often only include a single stakeholder type, or they focus on a specific issue (while making no formal reference to the Partnership Policy[93]) and, therefore, they are not a real replacement for an inclusive multi-stakeholder partnership.

The result is that the basic tasks that the coordination and partnership fora need to achieve become incredibly difficult. Data collection is a good example.

1. When donors outsource project delivery to NGOs, and the private sector it is much harder for them to report the project information, since they are not dealing with the project on a daily basis, and also have fewer staff to do the actual reporting.
2. NGOs and the private sector mainly attend SWGs and Local Government meetings, but these are not currently integrated into the data collection efforts by MoFPED, which concentrates by requesting data from donors at the LDPG.
3. The Refugees architecture has very good data e.g. on aid projects, or social service provision in refugee areas, but this not often doesn't reach government systems and leads to stakeholders being asked to provide data multiple times which they are reluctant to do.
4. NPF (the one group where all stakeholders can be reached) meets for so little time that there is not an

[90] There is an INGO Directors Group, but this appears not to have any official status
[91] Stakeholder groups that represent many actors are also a way of filtering and narrowing down positions and giving those brought forward more strength.
[92] NPF meets once a year and in 2016 included a total of an hour and a quarter of discussion. In 2018, the technical NPF included one hour of open discussion in the year, down from two hours in 2017.
[93] Neither the CRRF the nor SDG Framework guiding documents make any reference to the Partnership Policy
opportunity, or the right timing in the year, to put data issues on the agenda.

The result is a vicious circle, as the lack of consistent inclusiveness across all the levels of fora leads to difficulties achieving basic tasks, leading to more parallel mechanisms, more withdrawal to single stakeholder forums, and less willingness of stakeholders to participate.

To make sure that all opinions are taken into account, to benefit from the widest possible range of knowledge and have a chance at reaching a fully representative consensus, the coordination and partnership structures needs to boost the engagement from:

- India, China and SSC partners
- Vertical Funds
- Humanitarian actors
- Private Foundations
- The small and large private sector
- CSOs
- INGOs
- Local Government
- A wider range of GoU Agencies

The following options should be considered:

**Option 1:** To counterbalance the single-type stakeholder forums, NPF needs to become more inclusive. Invitations to NPF could be sent to all actors, which would involve several hundred actors. NPF currently includes 30-40 DAC donors, plus NGO representatives. This is already too large for a forum that needs to be able to have discussions and make decisions, so expanding it even further does not make sense.

**Option 2:** To achieve similar goals to Option 1, while keeping NPF at a workable size, the existing 30-40 members (that are mainly LDGP members, and few of who speak at meetings) should be replaced by nominated representatives and then joined by nominated representatives from all the other stakeholder groups.

To be effective, this approach relies on:

- Each of the stakeholder-types without a group need to organise themselves and create one (see list of missing groups above), including nominating representatives to attend NPF on its behalf.
- Each of the single-type stakeholder groups must be assessed to see whether it effectively sites represent whole sector, if not, either it will to need to be expanded, or alternatives must be set-up.

> For donors this means that LDGP would need to expand\textsuperscript{94} to cover the representatives of the vertical funds, by including all the agencies, such as DFIs from each of the existing member countries, and by including Non-DAC donors, humanitarian agencies, private foundations and SSC providers. A new forum (sharing LDGPS ‘apex’ role) may be needed for donors who may not wish to join LDPG, given, for example, its requirements for members to commit to the Paris Declaration, or perhaps unease about whether their voice would be filtered out by the governing quartet.

> For the private sector, the PSFU’s inputs need to be supplemented by a role in the partnership for the Federation of SMEs\textsuperscript{95} and similar groupings, such as the Chamber of Commerce and manufacturer’s associations.

> NGOs represent one of the largest pools of capacity on development issues in Uganda, most of which does not benefit the coordination and partnership fora. To change this, the NGO Forum needs demonstrate that it represents all NGOs, not just those that pay membership fees, and a mechanism/role, plus support needs to be found for the NGO Board/Bureau to have the capacity to support all the other NGOs to align their support with the NDP and participate in national discussions.

> The INGO community needs to be represented, possibly through the currently informal INGO directors’ network

> For Humanitarian actors, they should participate in all fora and need to include humanitarian actors, which should not just be confined to the CRRF.

- A system of assessment and enforcement is likely to be required. A lack of inclusiveness should not be considered accidental. A formal directive (and enforcement) from NPF is required for all groups to be inclusive. A duty should be placed on the group secretariats to maintain a list of and invite all qualifying actors (whether they respond or not) each time, to share workplans in advance, and to share with all members (whether they attended or not) the meeting minutes shortly afterwards.

- Stakeholder groups (and their subsidiary WGs)

\textsuperscript{93} For example, Uganda Invest

\textsuperscript{94} Adding just four organisations (GAVI, GF, China, India) would allow LDGP to claim 93% coverage of external project financing flows.

\textsuperscript{95} http://fsmeuganda.org
Option 3: Alternative methods of contributing to NPF
An alternative method might include a set of virtual groups administered by the NPF secretariat, in combination with protocols in all meetings, giving time for written statements from absent members to be read, and a strict process of sending out all material in advance for comment.

Option 4: Increasing inclusiveness of lower-level fora
As an alternative (or in addition to) to focussing on the inclusiveness of the NPF, further work could be put into increasing the inclusiveness of the lower-level forums. Many SWGs, e.g. Humanitarian (Cluster) WGs are already amongst the most inclusive forums with low formal barriers to entry, so a change in the formal inclusiveness is unlikely to be effective.

Inviting missing stakeholders is only half of the battle. Many actors avoided the coordination fora because they did not feel they benefit from the meetings. While it should be made clear that the benefits from coordination are often indirect, and that the benefits for Uganda may not always instantly benefit the actor, there are still several steps that can be taken:

- The accountability and transparency measures above will help. Many stakeholders being interviewed were unaware of all the meetings available, and even if they did not attend, would like the option to review the minutes, or see the agenda to decide whether to attend.
- Many actors who avoided the coordination meetings were having many bilateral coordination meetings. This needs to be discouraged (perhaps through naming and shaming, or at least sharing a list of the bilateral meetings (aside from those that concern a single project) and circulating the minutes of bilateral meetings to all the other actors.
- Coordination meetings should also be more strongly linked to processes where there is an opportunity for stakeholders to be involved. For example, actual consultation on strategic plans (not just revealing them), negotiations over government policy (not just information), and allocation of financing resources (not just information after the decision) - in this way there is a greater incentive to attend, and more content that cannot be found elsewhere.

A specific effort is required to re-activate the Private Sector working group. Stakeholders reported that after a promising level of attendance, they struggled to get past the bureaucracy of setting up the group. The Private Sector working group is an essential counterbalance to the public sector focus of most SWGs and the Private Sector WG should be directed (perhaps by NPF) to address a rotating set of key sectors (e.g. water and agriculture), providing a focussed period of problem-solving, to supplement the regular engagement of SWGs with PSFU.

BOX 5: PRIVATE SECTOR

The recent GPEDC private sector report indicates several key aspects of the scope for including the private sector in the partnership and cooperation structures:

- The PIRT used to function well, the Private Sector Forum works well, but there is little targeted effort to engage micro, medium and small enterprises (the vast majority).
- There is now a ‘multi-stakeholder private sector working group’, but there is not much donor or government participation.
- Most projects involving the private sector tend not to involve GoU or CSOs, leading to little ownership outside the donor-private axis, although this is no different from NGO-delivered projects or humanitarian ones.
- Inclusiveness suffers from the lack of a clear lead government agency.
- The private sector had not much to gain from attending SWGs outside their specific private sector group. Other SWGs were unclear regarding the roles that the private sector could play, and with little areas of shared interest, SWGs wanted funding or CSR from the private sector, but without providing business cases, or offering policy or planning engagement.

Some private firms (often international) provide the finance that is bundled by the donor into a blended project, but the private firms themselves are invisible.
GOOD PRACTICE EXAMPLE – CRRF

The CRRF Secretariat is responsible for implementing the Global Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework\(^\text{95}\) in Uganda, (and which the Uganda situation heavily influenced) and was identified by stakeholders as a good example of: a) Coordination between GoU, humanitarian and development actors, including NGOs, INGOs, line ministries and local government and therefore more inclusive than usual, b) GoU showing ownership and holding meetings with direct linkages to government policy, and c) Increased transparency of resources, with substantial data sharing. Figure 2 below gives the example of the CRRF coordination structures.

Stakeholders reported several reasons for this improved level of coordination.

- Government of Uganda willingness and leadership of the process.
- UNHCR resources and experience in setting up multi-stakeholder structures
- Clear evidence-base that working collaboratively is the most effective way to manage a humanitarian crisis.
- A willingness by donor agencies to adjust their standard procedures based on using ‘emergency funding’ or crisis modalities which made them much more flexible, and therefore more able to reap the benefits of more inclusive partnership.
- Substantial political and funding support, including for a secretariat with nine full-time staff.

Figure 2: Ugandan Coordination structures from the CRRF perspective\(^\text{96}\).

However, Figure 2 also indicates that while the CRRF approach represents a considerable improvement on the wholly separate UNHCR/OPM led traditional refugee architecture because of its use of SWGs (especially where they have a specific Refugee Response Plan), the CRRF has also reduced commitment to the existing partnership structures by setting the up the CRRF Steering Group as an alternative apex coordination body to the NPF, which is reported to by the refugee specific sub-working groups under many SWGs. The CRRF Steering Group also lacks the stronger and direct mainstream coordination links to national frameworks such as the NDP, the SDGs, the budget and GPAR.

\(^{95}\) http://www.globalcrrf.org/
\(^{96}\) http://www.globalcrrf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/a60e187285683322e0f70daec94c448eececb932c3.pdf
Ownership

Issue: Ownership for the GPEDC refers to national ownership, primarily whether the partnership and cooperation structures give the GoU sufficient tools and incentives to manage external financial flows in line with national development priorities. Alignment is a key part of ownership and refers to the degree to which external financing is targeting the inputs, outputs and outcomes identified in the NDP.

Key question: How can the partnership and cooperation structures support the alignment of financing flows with GoU objectives and allow the GoU to drive the aid/development effectiveness and use of country-systems agendas?

Current status: According to GPEDC monitoring, over 90% of DAC donor flows (representing 60% of external flows) are aligned with the NDP. Given that a large share of the flows not captured by the OECD DAC data are loans (and, therefore, on GoU request), we can assume that Uganda has excellent alignment, but should also note that it is possible to criticise how easily almost any project can be found to be aligned with the NDP, as Uganda has many needs, and the NDP is extremely broad and lacks prioritisation.

Beyond alignment, there are four other coordination-related issues blocking better national ownership and, therefore, why GoU might not be in control of external financial flows, even when they are targeting GoU’s development objectives. Two have been discussed in the preceding sections:

1. A growing share of development financing is provided by funders who (for a variety of reasons) are not engaged in Partnership and cooperation structures, e.g. Vertical funds, Arab donors, China/India, Humanitarian agencies (to an extent), Foundations, DFIs and the Private sector.

2. A growing share of development financing is provided increasingly outside of government systems. The reduction in Budget Support, the reduced willingness to use any government systems and the corresponding move to implementation through NGOs/CSOs and the private sector. The result is reduced GoU engagement with external financing, leading to less awareness, ability to influence and less ownership.

Both issues affect (among other things) the degree of transparency of the flows to national priorities and the degree to which GoU can guide the approach (inputs, targeted outputs) to one that is tailored to Uganda’s country-specific situation and needs. Making progress on these issues involves solving the accountability and inclusiveness issues above, and practical issues, such as improving aid data collection (see Box 6).

3. The third issue is that the policy and institutional framework is fragmented and misaligned. This prevents GoU from providing effective leadership where opportunities are available.

4. Finally, the fourth issue is that, despite being required by the Partnership Policy/Framework, there is currently no functioning aid/development effectiveness process that would allow GoU to provide leadership, on key issues, such as allocation choices, or the use of country systems.

The remainder of this section concentrates on these last two issues, starting with policy fragmentation and institutional misalignment.

1. Uganda has accumulated many policies covering external financing. They target different aspects, introduce different frameworks and relate to different GoU process. They are not designed to work together.

2. The policies cover many aspects that are not consistent with the current partnership, e.g. institutions that no longer exist, ambitions that are no longer shared and are silent on more recent aspects, such as the SDGs, or refugee issues.

3. The coordination and partnership responsibilities of OPM, MoFPED and NPA are not aligned with their incentives and responsibilities in government. As a result, all three are working in parallel, and it is difficult to provide consistent GoU leadership.

In practical terms:

- OPM are responsible for all GoU coordination and, therefore, coordination between GoU and donors, but OPM isn’t responsible for the content of the national plan, the budget, project/country strategy approvals, or PFM reforms—the primary areas where external actors interface with GoU.
- The other side of this situation is that MoFPED is the institution that meets the most regularly with the widest range of external financing actors, but it does not have any responsibility for coordination.

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98 These range from the principled, e.g. following a formal principle of non-intervention in Ugandan policy space (China) or non-engagement with government (some humanitarian agencies), to the practical, e.g. a lack of a Uganda country office (vertical funds and foundations), to institutional, e.g. no forum or incentive to attend for that stakeholder.
Within MoFPED, the Department for Assistance and Regional Cooperation (DARC) is responsible for Aid Effectiveness, but MoFPED are not responsible for (or closely linked to) the policies that govern it, which are all overseen by OPM.

MoFPEDs requirement to collect aid data and publish the Annual Loans, Grants and Guarantees report is driven by the Budget Act and PFM Act and is not linked to its key role in achieving coordination or even tabled at NPF. Similarly, key coordination tools, such as the Development Committee and donor portfolio reviews are not actively a part of the coordination structures, do not benefit from their frameworks and do not actively report to the NPF (despite formally being an NPF/IPCC sub-committee).

The NPF has currently selected the GAPR as its primary focus, but so far this is not done in coordination with the government GAPR processes (e.g. in terms of timing).

Much of the NPFs status should come from its links to the government-decision taking processes, but these previously came from the PCC, the ICSC and the TICC that no longer regularly meet with external stakeholders and so this has been lost.

The Joint Framework for Results/NPF Action Agenda (which has inherited the tasks of the former High-Level Action Matrix as the tool for donor PFM and similar demands) is tabled at the NPF, but without ownership from MoFPED or line ministries/agencies.

NPA are responsible for issuing certificates of NDP compliance and supporting project development, but have no responsibility or power99 to link this to overall alignment, coordination between actors, transparency or accountability. The situation is made worse when the majority of externally financed projects are off-budget.

Line ministries and agencies officially only have a supporting role, but with the rise of off-budget projects, often the only GoU liaison point. The same applies for local governments, especially for NGO programmes. As neither have much formal responsibility in the various policies, they are free to make their own.

SWGs are a constant across all the frameworks and although they formally report to the PCC/OPM it is very unclear what would happen to their reports if this process exists, not helped by SWG’s primary responsibilities being to plan and budget processes managed by MoFPED.

Stakeholders, such as NGOs, CSOs and the private sector are integrated into SWGs, but this is not reflected consistently across the rest of the coordination structures. Similarly, donor engagement in PFM reform indicators is high, but is very low in NDP planning and these should be equalised.

Parliament and the NGO board are further examples of key agencies who currently manage specific aspects of the process (e.g. monitoring NGO activities or assessing loans) without any link to the main partnership objectives, or a clear role.

The separate refugee and SDG coordination frameworks, both function largely in parallel to the existing Partnership and cooperation structures, despite involving all the same actors.

In order to make progress on these issues, the policies that govern the coordination and partnership structures need to be re-assessed and adjusted. Several initial processes need to take place as part of a review:

Meetings that no longer exist or no longer engage with the coordination and partnership structures need to be removed and (if still required) their responsibilities and mandates must find new owners.

Many stakeholders no longer stand by the commitments that they made in the past, in particular, those concerning aid effectiveness. Therefore, these need to be removed and a process should be started to replace them. (for example, see below on restarting an aid effectiveness process).

The policies need to standardise their guiding frameworks. For example, all of the policies need to align with the SDGs, and in order to do so, they must all agree on a common approach to come into alignment with the NDP, and from there with the SDGs. As a practical example, this means that the structure of working groups under each policy should be aligned with the NDPs (whether they be SWGs, DWGs, SDG-WGs, NDP-WGs, Humanitarian Cluster groups, even CRRF-sub-SWGs). Similarly, the approaches for performance assessment need to be rationalised so that a donor portfolio review that includes off-budget projects, can share a framework with the on-budget reviews done under the GAPR. Equally, if the NPF decides to follow the GPEDC aid effectiveness commitments, these should be the same commitments that are evaluated within the LDGP, and at SWG level, and should also form part of

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99 Other actors also do not use this information, as despite NPA consistently documenting that that development projects in the budget are not adequately aligned with the NDP, no action has been stimulated through any parts of the coordination and partnership structures.
the guidance for the Development Committee and NDP planning processes.

- This is also the opportunity to implement the inclusiveness and accountability measures outlined in the previous sections, for example related to the inclusion of SSC or the private sector.
- There is a need to formalise how (formally subsidiary) frameworks, (with their own objectives, meetings, standards, and procedures) such as the Humanitarian architecture, CRRF and SDG Framework, relate to and fit into the overall coordination and partnership architecture, either by removing duplication between the different frameworks and establishing clear lines of reporting between them, or by integrating them. This approach should also define the space for other similar sub-frameworks to be formed in the future in a way that does not create duplication and confusion.
- The style/approach taken by the policies can be adjusted to be closer to the Public Financial Management Act model, i.e. reducing the number of pages of explanation (using annexes, if necessary) and instead outlining clearly the actors with responsibilities, where they will rely on inputs from other stakeholders, what the outputs will be, how they are scheduled in the annual calendar, and linked to other GoU processes. Policies that just state that ‘predictability is important to achieve in Uganda’ stand very little chance of being implemented.
- These measures also need to be reflected in the Terms of Reference of the different stakeholder groups.

A decision needs to be taken on the best approach to make the different policies work together, and the choice is whether it is easier to do this by integrating the various policies or adjusting each one to make sure that all their lines of reporting, approaches, timing, membership, relations to each other are properly aligned.

**Option 1:** make an integrated policy - combine the Partnership Policy, the Framework for the Partnership Dialogue and the upcoming MoFPED Development Cooperation Policy (DCP) into a single integrated policy.

**Option 2:** Continue developing the DCP, but do so in a way that integrates with the other policies: allowing several policies to continue, but aligning their content. To achieve this:

- Inconsistencies between the Partnership Policy and the Framework for Partnership Dialogue need to be removed, e.g. the relationship between NPF and the PCC and the role of the Technical NPF.
- The DCP should limit itself to processes for which it is clear under the Partnership Policy that MoFPED is functionally responsible, e.g. information required for the budget, information and signoff required for assessing and signing projects and country strategies, processes for monitoring and managing external project debt. and these processes should be removed from the Partnership Policy, replacing them with references to the DCR.
- The DCP should directly support (through identifying the inputs required, and outputs required from, and at what stages) the following processes, which are direct MoFPED responsibilities: Aid data collection (See Box 6), Public Investment Management, Aid Effectiveness and the use of country systems.
- The DCP should also act as an overarching policy that identifies the need for various external finance related guidelines, such as the new Loans and Grants negotiation guidelines. Having regularly updated guidelines is a good way to keep a policy relevant, without having to re-write and re-negotiate the whole policy each time.

Then a decision is need on how to manage the misalignment of the roles of OPM, MoFPED and NPA. Several approaches are likely required:

- Clarifying the roles and responsibilities—not just to GoU—but to specific agencies.
- Allocating more specific roles for MoFPED and NPA at the NPF meetings.
- Increasing transparency, and making sure that all processes are formally part of the coordination and partnership structures, so that information received by one agency is received by all.
- Formally tabling the receipt of information, for example, projects presented to MoFEPD over a certain size, should also be tabled at NPF (even if there is no discussion).
- Re-arranging is also likely needed. Several of the earlier options, such as the delegation of NPF technical responsibilities to EMG and the delegation to NPA as host for the annual strategic discussions also have this misalignment in mind.

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101 For example, if the DCP wants to work on predictability, it should identify which MoFPED unit is responsible for measuring it, and how (perhaps by PIUs entering project disbursements into the IFMIS), at what stage (perhaps during the budget planning process, once the previous Q3 out-turns are released), and what will happen with the information (perhaps DARC will call a meeting with donors to review the results) and how it is expected to improve predictability (the knowledge will lead to better projections for the next year).
Re-introducing an aid/development effectiveness and Use of Country Systems process.

Many aid policies (such as the Partnership Policy) include a long wish list of aid effectiveness issues. As the relationship between stakeholders and GoU changes (as it has drastically in Uganda), the wish-list very quickly becomes irrelevant as the issues either have no agreement, or are not ambitious enough, and this leads the whole policy becoming irrelevant.

In order to restart this process, it is better for the policy to establish that there will be a process where (probably annually) during which all stakeholders should gather, identify a set of issues with communal agreement that they are both priorities for Uganda, and that there is the political and technical scope to make progress. The policy should also establish that there should be a baseline and that there should be someone responsible for the monitoring and managing when the assessment will take place.

In order to be implemented, any revised policy will need consultations during development, and fresh commitments from the local offices and/or headquarters of all stakeholders, with signatures.

One or two aid/development effectiveness elements should be prioritised each year by mutual agreement between the stakeholders, which are then measured and tracked and for which they are held accountable. Other countries have had considerable success through the production of an annual dashboard, showing which stakeholders have made the most progress. Figure 2 below shows an example from the Rwandan DPAF\(^2\). The following year, stakeholders should choose one or two new issues

According to the Partnership Policy, a similar exercise should be carried out in Uganda, tabling an annual report at the Policy Coordination Committee, which should publicly publish the scores for Uganda, and the individual donor scores at least once a year. This role could also be handled by the NPF and aid/development effectiveness should return as a standing agenda item. MoFPED should prepare an annual aid/development cooperation report to inform the discussion.

Several stakeholders were reported to be operating in Uganda without a country strategy. Exercises (and formal reporting) like this one should identify them publicly so that they can be held accountable, and be forced to explain themselves—not just to GoU—but to the NPF as a whole. Formalising this requirement (for all donors to have a country strategy signed with GoU) at NPF (and most likely implemented by MoFPED) illustrates how the specific roles also need to be defined on the GoU side for the rule to be clearly implemented. Donor country strategies should also be required to follow the NPD structure, so that it is clear to which NPD areas donors are contributing, rather than each donor operating from on its own (incompatible) results framework.

Many of these aspects are currently managed through the donor Portfolio Reviews carried out by MoFPED; however, it is unclear what the ambitions of this process are and this (plus the results) should be made transparent (tabled at NPF) and directly linked to the targets and responsibilities outlined in the new Partnership/Development Cooperation Policy.

One of the most damaging aspects of the withdrawal of budget support was that the breakdown in trust meant that DAC donors also withdrew from using most other government systems, even though their use is unrelated to budget support.

Donors introduced the High Level Action Matrix to address weaknesses in the PFM system on the basis that, when fixed, donors would provide budget support again. However, despite a range of positive developments in government systems (for example, the Treasury Single Account process), including those following the implementation of the PFM (2015) Act, and meeting most of the HLAM conditions, most donors not only do not intend to return to budget support, but still avoiding all GoU systems. Given this failure to agree on and keep to even the most basic elements, it is not surprising that DAC donors also withdrew from using most other examples of UNEPI and USAID show that plenty of good practice still exists.

- It is essential to explain to all stakeholders the fundamentals of UCS i.e. that:
  
  » even when funding projects that are aligned to the NDP, it still creates misalignment and potential for the duplication of resources if GoU and other stakeholders are not aware of the project.
  
  » the use of government financial systems is only one small part of UCS, and that there are significant benefits available even when using parallel mechanisms, as long as they are designed to support and coordinate with government systems i.e. with shared reporting or co-signing expenditure.

- Following the USAID example, UCS should be driven by shared analytic work between GoU and stakeholders. A key part of which is to formally agree with stakeholders (as a group, not bilaterally) on the specific changes that are required to allow funding to return to using different GoU systems. This should then be enforced during project and strategy approval.

### Figure 2: Rwanda DPAF Dashboard for aid/development effectiveness indicators

**Table: Rwanda DPAF Dashboard for aid/development effectiveness indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results area</th>
<th>Indic</th>
<th>FY 13/14 Actual</th>
<th>FY 14/15 Target</th>
<th>FY 15/16 Actual</th>
<th>FY 14/15 Target</th>
<th>FY 15/16 Actual</th>
<th>FY 16/17 Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Financing national strategies in support of the MDGs and Vision 2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1 % ODA recorded in the national budget (Busan Indic 6) (ratio invested where % disbursed % budgeted)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 % ODA disbursed using GoR budget execution procedures (Busan Indic 3b)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Use of national systems and institutions for strengthened ownership, sustainability and reduced transaction costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1 % ODA disbursed using GoR budget execution procedures (Busan Indic 3b)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2 % ODA disbursed using GoR budget execution procedures (Busan Indic 3b)</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3 % ODA disbursed using GoR financial reporting systems (Busan Indic 3b)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4 % ODA disbursed using GoR procurement systems (Busan Indic 3b)</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5 % ODA disbursed that are recorded in the GoR systems</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Facilitating longer-term planning and implementation through predictable development financing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Non-binding indication of future aid to cover at least 3 years ahead, on a rolling basis and according to GoR fiscal year? (Y/N) (Busan Indic 5a)</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 % ODA delivered in the year for which it was scheduled (Busan Indic 5a)</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Reduction of transaction costs and strengthening of partnerships through the adoption of harmonised approaches</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1 Number of missions without GoR authorisation held during Silent period</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2 % of total missions that are joint (PD Indic 10a)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Streamlining delivery at the sector level through effective use of comparative advantage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1 Average number of sectors of intervention per donor (Aggregate and individual DP level) as per the DoL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 Percentage of their total aid portfolio for the country that the funding to DoL 3 sectors (Individual DP Level)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, MoFPED should support the addition of a dedicated aid/development effectiveness/UCS mandate and process into the policies/workplans of all the coordination fora, as well as leading a specific working group on aid/development effectiveness/UCS to coordinate the workstream across all fora.

GOOD PRACTICE EXAMPLE - UNEPI

A second example of good practice is the Uganda National Expanded Program on Immunisation (UNEPI). UNEPI is a multi-stakeholder group, with strong GoU leadership that is actively using GoU systems, and where it is not, is seeking to strengthen them so it can do so in future. Key features are the series of committees embedded into the Ministry of Health designed to achieve coordination, integration into Ministry of Health planning and budgeting systems (often through innovative methods, e.g. to integrate both donor and GoU audit trails), the provision of long-term projections, and the Immunisation Act (2017,) which strongly commits all stakeholders to these practices.

GOOD PRACTICE EXAMPLE - USAID GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT

The corruption crises and the breakdown in political relations that led to the withdrawal of large-scale budget support in Uganda, also led to a withdrawal from the majority of GoU systems by most DAC donors. This continues, to the extent that many stakeholders have country strategies that do not allow them to use GoU systems when designing new interventions. As such, there are few stakeholders actively working on the use of country systems. One example is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has a requirement for country offices to regularly assess whether their operations are making the most effective use of recipient country systems. While USAID is not a big user of GoU systems, they were one of the few stakeholders identified as having an official (and mutually accountable) process to guide their decision, as well as regular monitoring and assessments.
BOX 6: AID DATA

The failure to provide, collect and share data on external financial flows means that allocation decisions (e.g. the budget) are being taken based on an unsound evidence, opportunities for coordination and joint-working are being lost, and Ugandan citizens are not receiving the transparency and accountability that they deserve. These goals are supported by all stakeholders in Uganda, through their commitments in the Partnership Policy, in the Budget Act, as part of the workplans of the LDPG, and at the international level, by donor headquarters. This box deals with the ongoing challenge of turning those commitments into reality.

Significant funding (from stakeholders) and effort (from GoU) have been invested in setting up the AMP (Aid Management Platform, an online database to collect and share aid data\textsuperscript{103}, as well as by international stakeholders, e.g. to collect information for the GPEDC Monitoring indicators. Despite this, many\textsuperscript{104} stakeholders are not providing aid data, with a variety of explanations, ranging from a lack of time, to a lack of technical ability of their staff, and criticising the AMP system. Due to these complaints\textsuperscript{105}, MoFPED have previously allowed stakeholders to fill out an Excel spreadsheet instead.

MoFPED’s 17/18 annual (Budget Act mandated) ‘Loans and Grants’ report is based on the Excel sheets and expects USD 413 million of off-budget aid\textsuperscript{106} in 16/17, a fraction of the aid reported by donors to international databases. Figure 2 shows flows recorded in the AMP. Just 10 donors (only 7 LDPG members) have managed to record disbursements for 2017/18, in the amount of more than USD 15 million, as of March 2019. China, the World Bank, France, Japan, Denmark, the EIB, IFAD and several others, deserve recognition for meeting their commitments.

This data represents only the simplest and most basic information on projects (e.g. the name, start and end dates, NDP pillar, location, project value and annual disbursements), so as a group of stakeholders in Uganda, an open (with minutes) and binding discussion needs to take place at NPF about the way forward, with the starting point that basic data collection is essential.

Practical suggestions for aid data collection include:

- Stopping allowing stakeholders to use an Excel spreadsheet, and insisting on the AMP as this makes the data submitted available to all stakeholders, not just GoU
- Tying data collection more closely to budget process, e.g. regular provisions of data in line with ministries, SWGs and local governments, before the budget call circulars to get feedback on data gaps.
- Be clear that aid data submission is required for all forms of aid, whether on or off-budget, delivered via intermediaries, as core funding, or as budget support, and as a financial transfer, as goods-in-kind, or as an investment, guarantee or similar.
- Introducing consequences for stakeholders who do not submit data, for example, limiting their ability to have missions, to ask questions at key partnership fora etc, as well as incentives for those that do provide data. Donor reporting status should be publicly shared as part of the aid effectiveness dashboard presented at the NPF.
- MoFPED should be requiring SWGs and line ministries to provide data on off-budget external financing in their areas and collecting data from LG Budget Performance reports, which indicate all the donor accounts that the LGs are holding.
- MoFPED need to proactively find data from international databases e.g. the OECD DAC CRS database contains more than 70 official donors (DAC and SSC) and more than 50 Philanthropic organisations active in Uganda and can also show their projects. This should also include reaching out to SSC and private sector financing providers.
- The chasing of data should be the responsibility of MoFPED as the technical service provider, in combination with a nominated representative from each stakeholder group who will chase data from their peers.
- Finally, the best way to ensure the provision of data, is to start using the existing data, for example presenting it at fora, using it for reports and analysis. In that way, data providers will be more secure that their time spent adding data is not wasted, and gaps will be quickly exposed. Data providers should demand to see data in use (even if incomplete) before providing further data.

\textsuperscript{103} http://154.72.196.89/portal/

Figure 2: AMP Data availability – 2017/18 Disbursements as of March 2019.
Conclusion

Uganda faces a series of turning points and an opportunity. The partnership and cooperation structures that were designed during the era of budget support no longer provide the tools that GoU and other stakeholders need to maximise the benefit of external development financing to Ugandans. At the same time, the external financial flows are slowly starting to change, along with the behaviours of the stakeholders who provide them, and the channels that they use to implement projects.

All stakeholders in Uganda were acutely aware of aspects which they would like to improve about the coordination and partnership structures. The aim of this GPEDC Country Pilot study has been to be an opportunity to publicly voice those concerns and suggestions in order to start implementing them, to start to strengthen trust and relationships and recognise that there are still many incentives for cooperation.

The Good Practice examples included here should serve as a tool to see that where the political economy between stakeholders allows, changing to a more mutually beneficial option is possible.

The four aid/development effectiveness aspects focussed on were all suggested by multiple stakeholders and should therefore have a coalition of champions to drive them forwards.

1. Introducing a strategic decision-making mechanism
2. Strengthening, formalising and delegating the accountability structures
3. Expanding the structures to include all stakeholders
4. Refreshing the key policies, and restarting aid/development effectiveness, and Use of Country Systems processes

None of the suggestions can be achieved by just one stakeholder (or one group of stakeholders), and while the vast majority are either administrative or technical in nature, they are all the result of a commitment by multiple actors to work together in a new way. The main risk is therefore that stakeholders are unwilling to be as open and committed in a formal and multi-stakeholder discussion as they have been when giving evidence to this study in private.

The primary recommendation of this report is therefore for MoFPED to table the report at NPF, so that all stakeholders can be consulted, on-route to developing a clear action plan, outlining which options have been selected, identifying the changes to policies and practices needed, identifying which organisation(s) are responsible for which aspects, and agreeing the expected timeline.
Annex 1: Development Finance data sources

Key points to note include:

- Data is in USD millions, and approximates to disbursements, not commitments\(^1\).
- The data is mainly for Official Development Assistance (ODA)\(^2\), but also Other Official Flows (OOF\(^3\), these are flows that are official, but are not sufficiently concessional to qualify as ODA), from LDGP members, China, and Arab donors.
- The data includes flows channelled via, and/or directly targeting the Ugandan private sector, but only where the original funding is from a donor agency with a development purpose.
- India is included because, while not data was found, there is substantial evidence (news reports, official publications) of financing flows. For example, over USD 200 million was committed in 2018 so this is likely to be substantial.

The following sources were used to compile Tables 1, 2 and 3.

LDGP members, Non LDGP DAC reporting donors, Vertical Funds

- The list of LDGP members was sourced from their website: [https://www.ldpg.or.ug/ldpg-members/](https://www.ldpg.or.ug/ldpg-members/) and referenced against data from the OECD CRS database: [https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1#](https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1#) and does include regional projects for which Uganda receives benefit.

China:


- This is confirmed by a forthcoming UNDP SSC to Uganda report (UNDP/Matovu, 2019, National Report on South-to-South Cooperation in Uganda), which gives an average value of commitments for 2012/13-2017/18 of USD 275 million a year.

- In both cases, the figures are far higher in recent periods. The AidData average for the period 2010-2014 is USD 575 million a year, which is the figure we have used to represent 2016, on the basis that the average level of commitments from 2010 to 2014 would be a good guide to the likely disbursements in 2016, given the high weighting of large-scale infrastructure projects in the portfolio and likely project timelines.

- The MoFPED AMP database reports disbursements of USD 443 million ([http://154.72.196.89/TEMPLATE/ampTemplate/saikuui_nireports/index_reports.html#report/open/633](http://154.72.196.89/TEMPLATE/ampTemplate/saikuui_nireports/index_reports.html#report/open/633)) for 2017/18, covering 6 large infrastructure projects (2 * hydro, 2 * electrification, plus Entebbe road and the airport refurbishment), but this excludes various smaller projects and in-kind support provided by China and, therefore, supports the slightly larger figure.

India

- Uganda currently receives no Lines of Credit from India, which tend to be the primary development-focussed tool: [https://www.eximbankindia.in/lines-of-credit-GOILOC.aspx](https://www.eximbankindia.in/lines-of-credit-GOILOC.aspx)

- This suggests that all support (for example those mentioned by the Indian Embassy in Kampala ([https://hci.gov.in/kampala/?0889?000](https://hci.gov.in/kampala/?0889?000)) must either be grants, or must be must be classed as FDI and represent direct support to either Indian companies, or companies based in Uganda.

- The same website indicates that in 2018, a USD 202 million LOC was announced.

\(^1\) Chinese data is for commitments, but the average taken reduces the difference to disbursements.

\(^2\) [www.oecd.org/dac/stats/What-is-ODA.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/What-is-ODA.pdf)

Arab donors

- Data for Arab donors is from the OECD DAC CRS database, covering the Islamic Development Bank, Kuwait, the OPEC Fund and the UAE. Data for the Saudi Fund came from the forthcoming UNDP SSC report.

South-South Cooperation

- The SSC from other countries is very small in financial terms (USD 70,000 a year) and is taken from the forthcoming UNDP SSC report.

Foundations/Philanthropy/Charities, i.e. organised private giving:

- Data is taken from the OECD Private Financing For Development database: [https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DV_DCD_PPFD](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DV_DCD_PPFD), which reports was USD 92 million, and is probably quite a bit larger as only big organisations are reporting to the OECD.

Climate Funds:

- Climate finance is difficult to track as a separate flow, we noted evidence presented in the following papers:
  » [https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=1791e5f8-0f18-0aa8-3197-fe915e760d4e&groupId=252038](https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=1791e5f8-0f18-0aa8-3197-fe915e760d4e&groupId=252038)
- We then used the OECD DAC CRS database (therefore, not covering all donors) [https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=RIOMARKERS#](https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=RIOMARKERS#) and taking a 2010-2017 average, for both adaptation and mitigation, has USD 99 million a year with Climate as the principle aspect of the project, and a further USD 187 million with climate as a significant element in the project. Adding in additional flows from Climate Funds and other funders not reporting to the OECD DAC was estimated to add 50%, giving a total of approximately USD 150 million a year for projects principally addressing climate change.

Humanitarian:

- Humanitarian flows were taken from the UN OCHA FTS database: [https://fts.unocha.org/countries/233/summary/2018](https://fts.unocha.org/countries/233/summary/2018) which provides greater volumes than the OECD DAC CRS database (approximately USD 100 million in 2016)

Domestic Revenue:

- Domestic revenue in 2018 was USD 4.133 billion, based on the average of 2017/18 expected outturns and 2018/19 projected outturns, and sourced from the 2018/19 Approved Budget Estimates - see page 1, Table 1 Fiscal Framework of [http://budget.go.ug/budget/sites/default/files/National%20Budget%20docs/Approved%20Budget%20Estimates%202018-19%20Volume%201..pdf](http://budget.go.ug/budget/sites/default/files/National%20Budget%20docs/Approved%20Budget%20Estimates%202018-19%20Volume%201..pdf)

FDI:


Remittances:


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