

ANNEX 4

Monitoring effective development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations

Part 1 of 2: Mapping International Commitments and Key Challenges

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Abbreviations

BMZ	Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSPPS	Civil Society Platform for Peace-building and State-building
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
EU	European Union
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
IDA	International Development Association
IDPS	International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
ISE	Institute for State Effectiveness
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PFM	Public Financial Management
PSGs	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UCS	Use of Country Systems
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank
WP-EFF	Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices

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A. Introduction

This paper is to inform discussions of an open working group (‘working group’), which, under the auspices of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (the ‘Global Partnership’), has been convened to guide, in an inclusive and transparent manner, the **development of a tailored approach to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation in fragile and conflict affected situations** (‘fragile contexts’). The direction provided by the working group will aim at resulting in a relevant, context-specific approach to monitoring effectiveness in fragile contexts that is supported by key stakeholders. The Steering Committee of the Global Partnership will consider the deliberations of the working group, with a view to roll out a tailored approach to monitoring effectiveness in fragile contexts in the 2020 monitoring round of the Global Partnership.

The paper will (i) **map key international commitments** for effective development co-operation, and (ii) identify the **key issues and challenges** to making progress against these commitments¹. The paper draws on three key sources: a body of international commitments on effective development co-operation and engagement in fragile contexts; inputs received from members of the working group (consisting of written contributions, a meeting of the working group held in Paris on 10 September 2018, and bilateral interviews); and, a panel discussion on delivering effectively in fragile contexts held during the Global Partnership event *Reinvigorating Effectiveness for the 2030 Agenda* on 12 September 2018. The paper is co-authored by the Institute for State Effectiveness and the OECD-UNDP Joint Support Team of the Global Partnership.

Purpose

Countries in fragile and conflict affected situations are home to some of the world’s most vulnerable populations and, as the joint-report of the UN-World Bank *Pathways for Peace* notes, they have only been increasing in number and complexity since 2011 (UN and World Bank, 2018b). It is projected that unless concerted action is taken, more than 80% of the world’s poorest could be living in fragile contexts by 2030 (OECD, 2018). The international community has begun to scale-up targeted efforts. IDA18 represents a ‘paradigm shift’ in this regard by doubling financial support (to \$75 billion) for countries facing current or rising risks of fragility (World Bank, 2018a). In support of scaled efforts, and to maximise the impact of limited resources, ensuring that all development co-operation in these contexts is effective is critical. Getting monitoring right to track effectiveness is essential to provide a feedback loop to inform ongoing efforts, reinforce mutual accountability of all partners, and enable the right decisions at the right time.

This review is situated within broader efforts to ensure that the Global Partnership delivers relevant, cutting-edge data on effective development co-operation. Upon agreeing on its monitoring framework in 2012, the Global Partnership foresaw a comprehensive review to ensure relevance to the successor of the Millennium Development Goals. In 2016 at its High Level Meeting in Nairobi, the Global Partnership reaffirmed the relevance of existing effectiveness principles – on country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and mutual accountability and transparency – but stressed the need to “update the existing monitoring framework to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda, including the pledge to leave no one behind” (GPEDC, 2018). As a result, in 2017-18, the Global Partnership strengthened the quality and usefulness of the existing indicators based on lessons and feedback from past monitoring rounds (see Annex 1 for information on existing framework and indicators). In this second-stage of the

¹ Based on upcoming deliberations of the working group, the paper will be updated to include a second part that presents critical actions to address the challenges to delivering effectively in fragile contexts, and consider options for a more tailored approach to tracking progress toward effectiveness commitments in these contexts.

review, the focus is on adapting Global Partnership monitoring to the pressing challenges of the 2030 Agenda, starting with a focus on conflict and fragility as agreed by the GPEDC Steering Committee in April 2018 (GPEDC, 2018).

As a result, the Global Partnership is taking a closer look at its current monitoring approach with the view to ensure that it is adequately tailored to track progress in fragile contexts. To do this, the Global Partnership has brought together a community of relevant stakeholders through the working group to build on the current monitoring approach and advise on actionable, relevant monitoring approaches that meet the needs of practitioners and policy makers operating in fragile contexts. There is an extensive body of commitments, frameworks, tools, and organising entities that guide development co-operation in fragile contexts and progress towards SDG 16. Building on this expertise and practical experience, the working group will discuss options to guide the development of a tailored approach to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation in fragile contexts. As with all Global Partnership monitoring, it will remain a voluntary, country-led and multi-stakeholder exercise. The end goal is to develop a light monitoring approach to reduce the burden on already stretched bureaucracies, provide more pertinent data and a clearer understanding of progress toward commitments on effective development co-operation in fragile contexts.

B. International Commitments on Effective Development Co-operation

To devise an appropriate monitoring approach for fragile contexts, the first step is to outline the key international commitments on effective development co-operation from the past 15 years. These commitments are well-documented (see, e.g., Abdel-Malek, 2015; OECD, 2018) and will not be restated at length here. They are summarised for the purposes of framing and distilling the key challenges in implementing these commitments, which will inform the working group's consideration of critical actions, and options for monitoring progress in these contexts. Set out below (Table 1) is a summary chronology of key international commitments from 2003 to 2016, including specific commitments made with respect to fragile and conflict affected situations.

Table 1: Overview of international commitments, 2003-2016

Year	Instrument	Participation	Key Principles	Monitoring	Fragile context specificity
2003	Rome Declaration on Harmonisation	150 delegates, 28 partner countries, various UN agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ownership • Alignment • Harmonisation 	No single, systematic framework	-
2005	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	50 partner countries, 30 development agencies, various CSOs	Ownership, alignment and harmonisation, plus: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on results • Mutual accountability 	Binding targets and monitoring framework (5 principles, 12 indicators, baseline data); monitoring conducted in 2006, 2008, and 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective governance • National development strategies • Broad participation • Avoid harm • Flexibility
2007	Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations	OECD Development Assistance Committee	10 principles on engagement in fragile contexts with the aim of doing no harm	Voluntary country survey of the 10 principles; monitoring conducted in 2009 and 2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Context specificity • Avoid harm • Effective governance • Prevention • Non-discrimination
2008	Accra Agenda for Action	1700 participants, 120 countries, 80 CSOs, dozens of development agencies	Re-emphasising Paris commitments; emphasis on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country ownership • Effective & inclusive partnerships • Results • Aid predictability • Reducing conditionalities 	Paris Declaration monitoring framework (above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fragility assessments • Capacity development • Humanitarian & peacebuilding support • Addressing root causes • Implementation monitoring
2011	Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation	3,500 delegates, 160 countries, 50 CSOs	Re-emphasising: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on results • Country ownership • Transparency and mutual accountability Emphasis on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing inclusive partnerships 	GPEDC monitoring framework (10 indicators), structured around the 4 effectiveness principles (left) and building on Paris Declaration monitoring efforts; monitoring conducted in 2014, 2016 and ongoing in 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Results frameworks tailored to country needs • Untying aid • Use of country systems • Transparency • Common data standards Reducing project proliferation & development partner fragmentation
2010-2011	Dili Declaration on Peace-building and State-building and New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States	IDPS members (g7+, INCAF, CSPPS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New aid architecture for fragile contexts specific commitments on: • 5 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals • FOCUS principles • TRUST principles 	34 indicators developed; monitoring conducted in 2014 through a New Deal country survey and an INCAF survey; review of the New Deal and its impact conducted in 2016	<i>Dili Declaration</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity development • Flexibility • Planning processes • Political dialogue <i>New Deal – PSGs</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimate politics • Security • Justice • Economic foundations • Revenues and services

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2015	SDGs (Goals 16 & 17 especially)	193 countries, UN General Assembly, dozens of CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions; • SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SDG 16: 10 targets, 23 indicators • SDG 17: 19 targets, 25 indicators Annual SDG follow-up and review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Of the 34 New Deal indicators, 21 are covered by SDG indicators
2016	Nairobi Outcome Document	Constituencies of the Global Partnership, 1,900 participants, 157 countries, hundreds of representatives from CSOs, private sector, parliamentarians, foundations, academia and others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reaffirmed principles (Busan 2011) • Mandated update to the existing monitoring framework to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda, including the pledge to leave no one behind 	GPEDC monitoring framework (above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition of the New Deal • Fragile-to-fragile co-operation • Engagement between humanitarian and development partners
2016	Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Peace-building in a Changing World	IDPS members (g7+, INCAF, CSPPS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reaffirmed commitment to New Deal principles for achieving SDGs 	New Deal framework (above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Root causes • Inclusion & accountability • Rebuild state trust • New Deal principles • Targeted development in humanitarian crises • Build effective coalitions
2016	World Humanitarian Summit	9,000 representatives from government, civil society, the private sector and international organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 core responsibilities • 24 proposed shifts/ changes in direction • Multiple initiatives including the New Way of Working, the Grand Bargain and others 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engagement between humanitarian and development partners • Common objectives

Source: Institute for State Effectiveness, 'Re-examining the Terms of Aid' project (ongoing)

2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation – first set of concrete commitments

The Rome Declaration represented the first concrete set of international commitments on effectiveness. Broadly, commitments were made on:

- **Ownership:** providing support for country analytical work in ways that strengthen government leadership and ownership of development results;
- **Alignment:** delivering development assistance according to partner country priorities, bolstering country-led efforts to streamline development partner procedures and practices (including with respect to technical co-operation), aligning with country budget cycles and poverty reduction strategies, improving development partner efforts to work through delegated co-operation, and increasing the flexibility of staff to manage country programs and projects; and
- **Harmonisation:** tailoring policies and practice to facilitate greater aid harmonisation at country, regional and global levels, including reducing development partner missions, reviews, and reporting; streamlining conditionalities; and developing incentives to foster recognition of the broader benefits of harmonisation.

Rome commitment monitoring was undertaken by the OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices (**WP-EFF**) chaired by the World Bank, however, there was no single, systematic monitoring framework. Rather, the monitoring report presented in Paris in 2005 drew from a range of sources, including, a country-level survey on harmonisation and alignment. The survey, which collected responses from 14 countries, reported on 12 measurement indicators selected by the WP-EFF. The results showed some progress on achieving better alignment with partner country development priorities, but also persisting implementation challenges, including: (i) the costs of implementation and inadequate resourcing, and (ii) lack of incentives to change policy and behaviour in both development partners and partner countries. The World Bank also pointed to challenges with the survey itself, including the reporting burden (the survey requested information on 118 items) and relevance of certain indicators.

2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – binding targets and formal monitoring framework

Building on the lessons from Rome, the Paris Declaration introduced binding targets and a framework for monitoring progress against commitments. There was considerably more momentum behind the 2005 Paris forum, with double the number of participating partners and countries. The Paris Declaration also introduced two additional effectiveness principles:

- **Managing for development results:** delivering effectively with a view to focussing on results, with partner countries strengthening links between development strategies and budget processes and establishing monitoring frameworks, and with development partners improving linkages between country programs and results and aligning better with performance assessment frameworks.
- **Mutual accountability:** improving accountability between development partners and partner countries to their respective constituencies and each other with respect to the use of development resources, including by strengthening the role of parliaments and reinforcing participation of a broad range of development partners, and with development partners increasing transparency and timely publication of data on development co-operation.

Paris also marked the start of a specific focus on delivering effectively in fragile contexts, recognising the need to address unique factors and circumstances in fragile contexts and for greater adaptability in

“environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service delivery” (Paris Declaration, [37]). It identified five specific commitments for fragile contexts: (i) building effective governance structures and institutions; (ii) engaging with partners in developing national planning tools and development strategies; (iii) encouraging broad participation in priority-setting by a range of national actors; (iv) avoiding activities that undermine national institution building; and (v) using an appropriate and flexible mix of instruments, particularly for countries in promising but high-risk transitions.

The Paris monitoring framework comprised 12 indicators across five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and accountability, to measure progress against commitments. The first monitoring round in 2006 established baseline data for these indicators. The second round in 2008, which had 54 participating countries, showed mixed results. Key takeaways included the continuing need for political leadership and change in the underlying incentives for both development partners and partner countries, as well as greater involvement of stakeholders beyond government and development partner officials, and improvements in the monitoring and evaluation process (Abdel-Malek, 2015, 105).

2008 Accra Agenda for Action – an attempt to accelerate progress

In an attempt to accelerate progress against the Paris commitments, and building on the principles set out in the OECD’s 2007 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (‘Good Engagement Principles’), the Accra Agenda re-emphasised priority areas of country ownership, building more effective and inclusive partnerships, and managing for development results. Greater attention was also given to improving predictability as well as reducing conditionalities. For fragile contexts, additional commitments were made on:

- **Fragility assessments:** conducting joint fragility and governance assessments, and engaging developing country authorities and other relevant stakeholders to the maximum extent possible;
- **Capacity development:** providing demand-driven, tailored and co-ordinated capacity-development support for core state functions and for early and sustained recovery;
- **Humanitarian & peacebuilding support:** working on flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities, on a pooled basis where appropriate, to support humanitarian development phases and peacebuilding;
- **Addressing root causes:** working and agreeing on a set of realistic peace- and state-building objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and participation of women; and
- **Monitoring:** monitoring implementation of the Good Engagement Principles and sharing results as part of progress reports on Paris implementation.

Accra marked a shift in thinking towards results. The third monitoring round carried out in 2011, based on the Paris monitoring architecture, again revealed mixed, though generally poor, results with only one indicator target (50% of technical co-operation implemented with co-ordinated programs consistent with national development strategies) being achieved. For fragile contexts, the 13-country survey in 2009 to assess progress on the Good Engagement Principles also revealed slow progress, with key challenges including the absence of a shared vision for change, conflict/fragility analyses, and trust between partner countries and development partners, as well as divergent stakeholder priorities.

2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation – inclusive development strategy

The Busan Partnership marked a fundamental shift in focus and approach from ‘aid effectiveness’ to a broader conceptualisation of ‘effective development co-operation’. This semantic change reflects a conceptual shift beyond the traditional ‘donor-recipient’ relationship, recognising the importance of all development actors, including civil society, the private sector, parliamentarians and trade unions among others. While reiterating the core principles set out in the Paris/Accra framework, greater emphasis was placed on forming inclusive development partnerships that captured the new realities of the global architecture of development co-operation. One key outcome was the establishment of the Global Partnership, and its monitoring exercise to track progress on effectiveness commitments.

2010 Dili Declaration and 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States – a new architecture for fragile contexts

To address the growing concern around the unique challenges facing fragile contexts in meeting the Millennium Development Goals, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) at its first global meeting in 2010 endorsed the Dili Declaration, which identified four areas of focus for fragile contexts: capacity development, resource flexibility, planning processes, and political dialogue.

Building on Dili, and crafted in the margins of the Busan Partnership, the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the ‘New Deal’) set out a new architecture and ways for working in fragile contexts, better aligned to their conditions and priorities. Signatories committed to using:

- **Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs):** which prioritise legitimate politics, people’s security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and fair services, as an important foundation to enable progress towards the MDGs to guide work in fragile contexts;
- **FOCUS:** a new country-led and owned approach to engaging in fragile contexts, comprising five features: fragility assessments, ‘one vision, one plan’ approach, compacts (mutual accountability frameworks), use of PSGs for monitoring, and support to political dialogue; and
- **TRUST:** a set of commitments to enhance transparency, share risk, use country systems, strengthen national capacities, and improve the timeliness and predictability of development co-operation to achieve better results.

In 2014, a monitoring report of the New Deal highlighted mixed progress against the PSG-FOCUS-TRUST commitments, with the poorest results in use of country systems, capacity strengthening, and use of PSGs for monitoring.

2015 Sustainable Development Goals 16 & 17

Together, Sustainable Development Goals 16 (peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice, and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions) and 17 (means of implementation and revitalizing the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development) underscore the importance of both effective partnerships and the necessity of peace, prevention and resilience in the context of our shared long-term objectives to be achieved by 2030. As part of a wider conflict-prevention agenda, SDG 16 recognises that fragility impedes, and can indeed reverse, hard-won development gains. The first comprehensive audit of global progress against SDG 16’s 10 targets and 22 of its 23 indicators was published by the Institute of Economics and Peace in 2017. It highlights several critical challenges in monitoring progress against SDG 16, including: (i) data availability and statistical capacity (e.g. 8 of the 22 indicators have data for less than 50% of countries), (ii) political sensitivities in monitoring, (iii) methodological issues with indicators that

are multidimensional or globally oriented, and (iv) contextual constraints in fragile contexts (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017).

The commitment in SDG 17 to “strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development” cuts across all the other SDGs, including SDG 16. It has 19 targets which span a range of related issues, including ODA, debt relief, trade access, and ‘operational’ dimensions such as capacity building and data monitoring/accountability. Global Partnership monitoring provides source data and measures progress against SDG targets 17.15 (country ownership and leadership in forming national development policies), SDG 17.16 (enhancing global, multi-stakeholder partnerships in achieving the SDGs) and SDG 5.c (sound policies and enforceable legislation for gender equality and women’s empowerment).

2016 Nairobi Outcome Document

The Nairobi Outcome Document built on the findings of the 2016 monitoring round of the Global Partnership, which was led by 81 low and middle-income countries and included the participation of 125 countries, 74 development organisations and hundreds of civil society organisations, private sector representatives, trade unions, foundations, parliamentarians and local governments. The 2016 monitoring results found that fragile contexts: (i) are particularly affected by low annual predictability; (ii) show, in general, comparatively lower levels of scheduled development co-operation funding on annual budgets; and (iii), had no proportionate increase in use of countries’ public financial management and procurement systems while improvements had been made in several fragile contexts.

Reflecting on this, the Nairobi Outcome Document sought to strengthen previous commitments, including the New Deal, by reconfirming the importance of upholding effective development co-operation principles in fragile contexts. The Nairobi Outcome Document committed to: “a) support the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States as a set of guiding principles for co-ordinated action among development partners providing and receiving support, civil society and the business sector; and b) address the challenges in improving the effectiveness and results of development co-operation, in particular ODA, for countries in fragile situations.” Commitments were also made to promote peer learning among fragile contexts, enhance co-ordination between development, peacebuilding, security and humanitarian efforts, and “reaffirm in particular the 2030 Agenda’s pledge to leave no-one behind as a philosophy that imbues our work and recognise that development co-operation must leave no-one behind to be effective.” As a result, the Nairobi Outcome Document set out a renewed mandate of the Global Partnership, which among other things, stressed the need to update the existing monitoring framework to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda, including the pledge to leave no one behind.

2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the Stockholm Declaration

The World Humanitarian Summit was a watershed moment in strengthening coherence between humanitarian and development efforts. An unprecedented number of stakeholders came together in Istanbul with an Agenda for Humanity that set out five core responsibilities and 24 proposed shifts/changes in direction (UN, 2016). Numerous commitments and initiatives were launched as a result of the Summit, including the New Way of Working. The New Way of Working aims to transcend the humanitarian-development divide by working to collective outcomes, which is “a commonly agreed quantifiable and measurable result or impact in reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities and increasing their resilience, requiring the combined effort of different actors” (OCHA, 2017).

Also 2016 – and in light of the SDGs – IDPS members made a renewed commitment in the Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World, to implement the 2030 Agenda in line with the principles and commitments set out in the New Deal and considering the specific contexts of fragile contexts.

Working Draft

C. Key Challenges to Effective Development Co-operation in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations

The challenges to effective development co-operation are well-known and have been the subject of targeted international attention since the Rome Declaration. Also well-documented is the reality that the manifestation and impact of these challenges in fragile and conflict affected situations ('fragile contexts') is more complex and/or pronounced, making implementation of commitments considerably less straightforward. In order to adapt Global Partnership monitoring to capture progress against effectiveness commitments in fragile contexts, it is important first to agree on *what* the challenges are to delivering effectively in fragile contexts and *how* they play out in these contexts. This allows stakeholders to find consensus on the critical actions to address the challenges and bottlenecks, and to develop a monitoring approach that both adequately captures progress being made towards key effectiveness commitments and in fragile contexts.

Based on inputs from working group members at their first meeting in September 2018 and during separate interviews, four major challenges were identified as preventing realisation of commitments in fragile contexts: (i) lack of trust, (ii) fragmentation (iii) weak humanitarian, development and peace coherence, and (iv) lack of country ownership/ weak capacity.

These challenges are not exhaustive, nor necessarily unique to fragile contexts but perhaps more pronounced. They were raised consistently during the working group's first meeting, in bilateral exchanges, and during the Global Partnership's panel discussion on delivering effectively in fragile contexts. The identified challenges and the symptoms are interlinked: a lack of trust can lead to a lack of country ownership, which in turn can fragment development activities and actors in country. While each challenge is listed independently, there are overlapping issues. A short description of each of the challenges follows, along with a brief list of symptoms and/or key contributing factors that were raised by the working group and highlighted in other inputs.

Lack of trust

Lack of trust was a recurring theme raised by the working group as preventing actors from upholding effectiveness principles in fragile contexts, including ownership of development priorities by developing countries, inclusive development partnerships, focus on results, and transparency and mutual accountability. This trust deficit can manifest in many ways. A lack of trust can exist between development partners and partner countries. It can result from tensions within government between competing factions, sectors and/or interests, and it can also surface between partner country governments, their citizens, civil society organisations and the private sector. However, trust is foundational to building strong relationships and effective partnerships. The working group identified key causes for this lack of trust throughout the entire sequence of the development relationship in contexts of fragility:

- **Failure to deliver.** Real and perceived failures by parties to deliver on commitments reinforces a trust deficit. Both development partners and partner countries can fail to uphold commitments, including those enshrined in international declarations and requiring behavioural or organisational change, which for example can entail predictability of funding and programming.
- **Concerns regarding legitimacy and representation.** In cases of severe political and/or security fragility, where institutions have been eroded over time, concerns regarding government legitimacy and representation can fuel a lack of trust. The working group noted how in certain fragile contexts, concerns about government legitimacy and inclusion of citizenry in formulating

national visions and development strategies can contribute to a lack of trust. Where such concerns arise, this can lead to fragmentation and a lack of ownership as partners tend to follow their own development strategies in country, undermining existing co-ordination mechanisms and limiting the extent to which country systems are used.

- **Concerns on assessment processes and results.** Sensitivities and tensions surrounding fragility and other assessment mechanisms weaken trust from the very beginning of partnerships. Post-conflict, -crisis, and -election assessments, including fragility assessments, help new governments determine national and development priorities. They also provide a common framework for partners to agree on areas of focus, shaping co-ordination, co-operation, and resource allocation outcomes. By their nature, these assessment mechanisms raise fears of criticism among all participating actors, including development partners. As noted above, particularly in contexts where the peace or political settlement may be contested, there are often compounding concerns about inclusivity and transparency in the process and results. This trust gap endangers the legitimacy and utility of these assessments, which lay the foundation for the relationship between development partners and governments, and between states and their citizens.
- **Lack of broad consultation.** Lack of trust can build from the way in which national visions and development strategies are developed and implemented. Inclusive partnerships that draw on the voices of citizens, civil society, the private sector and other national actors are essential to achieving long-lasting development results. In addition, while competing interests can exist in any government this can be more pronounced in fragile contexts. The term ‘country-led’ assumes one voice for government whereas there can be competing views and priorities across ministries and sectors. For instance, in Cameroon, co-ordinating a national strategic document was difficult, given each ministry, overseeing a different sectoral issue, needed to have a sense of ownership of their contribution. If the final national strategic document does not adequately reflect each Ministry’s perspective, the national strategy will ultimately lack country ownership. Furthermore, this consultation on development plans sometimes only occurs at the highest levels of government leadership, meaning there is little input or ownership at the lower levels of the bureaucracy/administration. There was also a sense among working group members that development activities could better integrate subnational levels of government to prevent capture by capital cities.
- **Lack of available information.** A trust deficit in sharing information and data compromises commitments to transparency and mutual accountability. Making transparent information publicly available – and accessible – is central to effective development co-operation. However, this can be politically sensitive and a lack of trust can prevent actors from fulfilling these commitments. Information and data on development co-operation is often reported at global level due to the way in which co-operation is channelled. Partner countries that participate in Global Partnership monitoring, however, overwhelmingly cite difficulties in accessing (e.g. language barriers) and understanding (e.g. limited capacity) data reported through these initiatives. Moreover, it is often considered a low priority in contexts with so many priorities, as in fragile contexts, so data collection and co-ordination remains under-resourced. While lack of publically available, and accessible, information at country level reinforces a trust deficit between development partners and partner countries, it also inhibits the ability of civil society to hold governments accountable thus adding to a lack of trust between governments and their citizens.

Fragmentation

A multiplicity of projects, sometimes with very low project budgets, leads to project and resource fragmentation. Spreading resources thinly across a number of projects reduces cost and time efficiencies in addition to other negative implications mentioned below. The working group identified fragmentation as a critical and long-acknowledged challenge to delivering effectively in fragile contexts, and made the following observations on the persistence of fragmentation in contexts of fragility:

- **Weak institutional capacity.** Fragmentation in fragile contexts is multi-dimensional, affecting all actors and all levels of co-operation, and is compounded by weak capacity. Members of the working group noted that weak administrative and national procurement systems and insufficient investment in strengthening these core capacities results in limited institutional capacity to engage with and fulfil the requirements of technical and financial partners. This frustrates the ability of all parties to track resources and results, and impacts recipient governments' abilities to effectively co-ordinate development partners.
- **Lack of alignment to and use of country systems.** Lack of alignment to national priorities and development strategies increases fragmentation of projects and resources. Not operating through or in alignment with country systems results in fragmentation of country-led development in several ways, including by: (i) limiting the utility and effectiveness of co-ordination mechanisms; (ii) disempowering country governments from overseeing activities and funds spent in country, (iii) reducing the likelihood that programs align with country strategies and ministerial activities, (iv) restricting their ability to track progress against national visions and plans; (v) creating parallel programs and/or implementation units that are sometimes duplicative and contribute to domestic 'brain drain', and (vi) leaving systems that are considered 'too risky or problematic' without any of the support to improve. One example of how to tackle this comes from the Federal Government of Somalia, which is currently addressing this challenge through efforts to align development assistance with national priorities. The Government is undergoing a mapping initiative aimed at supporting national planning through tracking future development co-operation flows by projects and programs rather than by development partners.
- **Competing priorities and interests.** While competition can create efficiencies, pervasive competition of partners' priorities and interests can fuel resource fragmentation in fragile contexts and increase costs. There is often a strong domestic imperative for development partners to invest in certain sectors, such as health and education, and less on others, including public financial management or bureaucratic processes, which then remain chronically underfunded. As noted by the working group's representative from Haiti, the lack of alignment in partner priorities can result in sectoral and/or regional development partner crowding. This crowding results in overlap between projects of varying scales, making it more difficult to track the impacts of development resources and increasing the transaction costs of co-ordination and harmonisation (already high to begin with). A recent study by Bigsten and Tengstam (2016) estimates that development partners could save up to US\$1,840 million in transaction costs by reducing fragmentation (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2016, 79).
- **Attribution.** The desire to demonstrate short-term results, and put a label on who delivered those results, exacerbates fragmentation. The working group noted that in some cases, the multiplicity of actors makes it difficult for development partners to track their 'attribution' and demonstrate the impact of their development assistance. This results in fragmentation of development activities

as it causes development partners to ‘badge’ activities and fund national actors (NGOs, contractors, suppliers etc.) through earmarked contributions.

- **Risk diversification.** Managing risk can be another cause of fragmentation in fragile contexts. Due to risk – real or perceived – development partners can seek to manage and mitigate risk through a dispersion of activities and programmes, which contributes to overall fragmentation.
- **Exclusion of actors.** Lack of inclusion and poor information sharing exacerbates fragmentation. The working group noted that fragmentation can also stem from information gaps between actors, including from the exclusion of civil society from negotiations and decision-making processes. These information asymmetries drive a wedge between parties that should be striving to work in co-ordination with one another. This is especially acute given overlap of multiple development, humanitarian and private actors in fragile contexts. Information sharing systems are an important tool for reducing the degree and effects of fragmentation, but are too infrequently used.

Weak humanitarian, development and peace coherence

As is increasingly being raised by global reports and forums, including in the joint UN-World Bank *Pathways for Peace* report, the disconnect between humanitarian assistance and longer-term development co-operation poses a significant threat to delivering effectively in fragile and conflict affected situations. Recognising the need to also address incoherent, and occasionally contradictory, humanitarian, development and peace efforts, the twin UN resolutions on sustaining peace and the subsequent reports of the UN Secretary General call for stronger operational and policy coherence (UN, 2018). The working group highlighted this also in the context of natural disasters, given that they can dramatically increase fragility, and brought up Haiti’s annual hurricane season and Somalia’s recent droughts. The working group deliberated on some of the symptoms and contributing factors to weak co-ordination and linkage of humanitarian, development, and peace efforts. Their observations included the following:

- **Lack of complementarity.** Fragile contexts require greater coherence and complementarity across humanitarian, development and peace efforts. Building on comparative advantages, greater complementarity means working better together while respecting the roles and responsibilities of each actor. The representative from Somalia noted the impact of recent droughts in prompting policy practitioners to think urgently about more innovative ways to strengthen these linkages. Working group members noted the importance of co-ordinating between actors, including partner governments, at all stages of assistance, beginning with the earliest stages of conducting assessments. The European Commission referenced post disaster needs assessments and recovery and peacebuilding assessments as focal means for co-ordinating actors with multiple and often divergent priorities, and highlighted the Central African Republic and Nepal as examples. However, challenges in timing (i.e. knowing when to conduct a ‘post-conflict assessment’) and mandate (that humanitarian actors may not be obligated to the same principles) were also acknowledged. In fragile contexts in particular – which again, are increasing globally – development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding agendas and actors are deeply enmeshed, making co-ordination tools that work ‘on the ground’ increasingly important to facilitate better, and more co-ordinated, outcomes.
- **Differing goals, incentives and principles.** It is often the case that fundamental incentives and drivers of humanitarian and development assistance do not neatly align. Humanitarian actors have different objectives and institutions that are designed to respond quickly in times of crisis and help

meet immediate needs on the ground. Humanitarian actors are not bound by the principles of development co-operation. However, greater coherence between the two actors is needed. Humanitarian emergencies are increasingly complex, sustained, and linked to broader development challenges, meaning there is greater need for closer alignment on joint analysis, programming and planning, leadership and co-ordination, and financing (OCHA, 2017). The challenge here is understanding the multiplicity of needs and priorities in situations of fragility and co-ordinating to make sure that the two are not working in opposition. Working group members pressed that Global Partnership monitoring should track progress on this issue.

- **Lack of shared information.** Joint information systems can be critical mechanisms for building linkages between security, humanitarian, and development actors in fragile contexts. The working group representative from Cameroon noted the benefits of strengthening joint information systems to establish better linkages between humanitarian activities and longer-term development programming. Establishing efficient, information sharing mechanisms can facilitate dialogue between actors that results in greater alignment in decision making and monitoring. Attempts to achieve this are being made in Cameroon with the adoption in 2017 of a multi-year humanitarian response plan covering 2017-20, which aligns with the UN Development Assistance Framework spanning 2018-20.

Weak country ownership

Country ownership is one of the guiding principles of effective development co-operation. During the working group meeting, development partners expressed concern that country ownership is often taken to refer to ‘government’ ownership, which can raise concerns about legitimacy and inclusivity. Working group members, however, stressed that country ownership does not – and need not – refer only to government. Rather, as recipient government representatives articulated, it should mean owned and endorsed by the people of the country, articulated through national institutions – government, but also by civil society, the private sector and in other forms of public deliberative democracy exchanges. As referenced in the 2030 Agenda, governments have primary responsibility for implementation, follow-up and review, of the SDGs yet this needs to be carried out with the participation of all stakeholders and all people. This highlights an important point: that supporting country ownership and building national capacity refers to both partner country governments, and to civil society organisations.

Country ownership is often linked to use of country systems. A common fallacy is that use of country systems equates exclusively to budget support; meaning that funds are dispersed to central government and managed through government systems. While this is one dimension of using country systems to build capacity it is only one, as highlighted by the CABRI (Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative) framework on use of country systems (2008). For example, ‘on plan’ support constitutes consultation with government for planning and co-ordination; alignment with national priorities; and, engagement with government during implementation. Another dimension is ‘on report’, referring to reporting on development co-operation through government structures. Other dimensions include ‘on audit’, ‘on procurement’ and ‘on parliament’ among others. . While different dimensions of use of country systems might be more applicable in certain contexts, all are critical to building national capacity, supporting statebuilding, reducing fragmentation, and delivering development investments with long-term benefit.

Allocating resources to ensuring country ownership is especially difficult in countries (fragile contexts in particular) with many competing needs and already stretched resources to deliver immediate services. It is made even more challenging when local actors are so frequently asked by development partners to use

new tools and frameworks. There is often insufficient capacity to even stay atop all of them, let alone adopt or monitor all. Working group members underscored some of the contributing factors that weaken country ownership, which notably incorporate similar themes as the underlying causes of lack of trust and fragmentation:

- **Administrative capacity constraints.** Weak and limited capacity of governments in fragile contexts are often cited as a contributing factor to lack of country ownership. Decades of violence, which many fragile contexts are emerging from, can unsurprisingly degrade or destroy administrative faculties, national systems processes, resulting in deterioration of core government functions (UN-World Bank, 2017b). The brain drain that occurs with such conflict exacerbates this, and is compounded by the establishment of parallel institutions comprising highly paid international actors.
- **Weak national data systems.** Specifically when data and statistical capacities are constrained, it is difficult for countries to lead development efforts. The international community has a strong focus on results, yet there remains a severe lack of statistical capacity in fragile contexts. Many governments do not publish comprehensive data regularly, whereas development partners seek quick and tangible results to demonstrate delivery on their mandates. National statistical systems suffer from a lack of financial and human resources, and limited technical skills and security issues make data difficult to gather. Data gaps have led development partners to rely on external data, which disempowers governments when partners go elsewhere for their information. The working group acknowledged that development partners are also not sharing enough data, and though they report to their own ministers and public, they often are not fully transparent with country governments.
- **Data and information legitimacy.** While concerns around data legitimacy can lead to a lack of trust, it can also compromise country ownership. The working group discussed the biases of data, and how with insufficient localised information, there is often disproportionate data available from some regions or some sectors, leading to skewed attention. Coherent, centralised data management systems – if designed and incentivised to function in these contexts – can help ensure more equitable representation in data, which can help support (or reveal gaps in) legitimate planning, especially in contested political contexts where national and subnational entities are debating priorities and rights. Issues around reliable data collection means there is often a much greater focus on input monitoring and weakness in outcome monitoring. This is a challenge in many countries but is often more pronounced in fragile contexts.
- **Lack of inclusive planning and implementation.** The shrinking space for civil society is also a contributing factor for lack of country ownership. This was raised as a worrying trend and prompted discussion about how to better protect constructive roles of civil society in development. The impacts of development partner-funded, or -driven, organisations were raised in creating an environment of mistrust by appearing to cater to development partner needs over those of the community to ensure their projects will be approved and financed. However, all sides also discussed that there is much room for development co-operation to more effectively utilise civil society organisations to ensure equitable and sustainable development that is people-centred, rights-based, and grounded in international norms and standards. One frequently raised example was the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis when grassroots organizations were indispensable in spreading valuable information to local communities in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries. On the other hand, a lack of information and exclusion from key co-ordination meetings hampers civil

society's contribution to national development efforts. Overall, stakeholders acknowledged that the formation of Civil Society Platform for Peace-building and State-building (CSPPS) and the New Deal in particular have helped improve collaboration, but that more resources, capacity-building, and opportunities to engage are needed to help protect and expand the space for civil society.

- **Risk aversion.** Use of country systems is a key mechanism for bolstering country ownership. Risk aversion and concerns around fund mismanagement, however, can lead development partners to limit, or refrain from, the use of country systems – particularly where there is a general lack of trust among partners. Members of the working group highlighted that partners on all sides are often sceptical of others' prioritisation in relation to national visions and strategies. This reduces development partners' will to channel support through systems aligned with that prioritisation. Second, there are concerns about the risk of mismanagement of development resources by recipient government ministries, which after years of conflict or other manifestations of fragility may suffer degraded capacity, weakened institutions, brain drain, and a political economy of corruption. In managing these 'fiduciary risks' (perceived or otherwise), development partners often work around country systems and impose multiple conditions on development co-operation. However, circumventing country systems can create destabilising political economies and opportunities for corruption outside the state apparatus, and importantly, inhibit the needed institutional capacity building in core state functions (e.g. procurement, budgeting, and auditing).

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Annex 1: GPEDC Monitoring Framework Indicators

THE MONITORING FRAMEWORK OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

The Global Partnership monitoring framework comprises a set of indicators tracking international commitments to enhance country ownership of development efforts, focus on results, inclusiveness of development partnerships, and transparency and accountability. The current framework was established in 2012, and was used during the 2014 and 2016 monitoring rounds. In 2017-2018, the framework was refined to reflect the better challenges of the 2030 Agenda and is being rolled out in the 2018 monitoring round. The Global Partnership monitoring provides information to track progress of countries in implementing **SDG targets 17.15, 17.16 and 5c**.

Focus on results	1b Countries strengthen their national results frameworks <i>Measures whether countries are setting national results frameworks that determine the goals and priorities of their own development and putting in place mechanisms to ensure that these results are monitored and achieved.</i>
	1a Development partners use country-led results frameworks (SDG 17.15) <i>Measures the alignment of development partners' programme with country-defined priorities and results, and progressive reliance on countries' own statistics and monitoring and evaluation systems to track results. The indicator is the source for reporting against SDG target 17.15.</i>
Country ownership	5a & b Development co-operation is predictable (annual and medium term) <i>Measures the reliability of development partners in delivering development funding and the accuracy of forecast and disbursement of this funding.</i>
	9a Quality of Countries' Public Financial Management (PFM) Systems <i>Assesses improvement in key aspects of a country's PFM systems country systems by using selected dimensions of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA).</i>
	9b Development partners use country systems <i>Measures the proportion of development co-operation disbursed for the public sector using the country's own public financial management and procurement systems.</i>
	10 Aid is untied <i>Measures the percentage of bilateral development co-operation provided by OECD-DAC members that is fully untied.</i>

Inclusive partnerships	<p>2 Civil society organisations (CSOs) operate within an environment that maximises their engagement in and contribution to development</p> <p><i>Measures the extent to which governments and development partners contribute to an enabling environment for CSOs; and the extent to which CSOs are implementing the development effectiveness principles in their own operations.</i></p>
	<p>3 Quality of Public Private Dialogue</p> <p><i>Measures the quality of public-private dialogue through a consensus-oriented multi-stakeholder process, with a focus on identifying whether the basic conditions for dialogue are in place in the country.</i></p>
Transparency and mutual accountability	<p>4 Transparent information on development co-operation is publicly available</p> <p><i>Assesses the extent to which development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly accessible, and in line with the Busan transparency requirements.</i></p>
	<p>6 Development co-operation is included in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight</p> <p><i>Measures the share of development co-operation funding for the public sector recorded in annual budgets approved by the national legislatures of partner countries.</i></p>
	<p>7 Mutual accountability among development actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews</p> <p><i>Measures whether mutual assessment reviews of development co-operation commitments take place at the country level. It examines whether there is: (i) a policy framework defining the country's priorities; (ii) targets for the country and its development partners; (iii) regular joint assessments against these targets; (iv) involvement of local governments and non-state stakeholders in joint assessments; and (v) public availability of the results.</i></p>
	<p>8 Countries have transparent systems to track public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment (SDG 5c)</p> <p><i>Measures whether countries have systems in place to track government allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment and to make this information public. This indicator is the source for reporting against SDG target 5c.</i></p>

SDG 17.16.: Countries show overall progress on multi-stakeholder development effectiveness frameworks:

- Countries providing development co-operation show overall progress against their commitments (i.e. indicators 1a, 4, 5a, 5b, 6, 9b, 10)
- Countries receiving development co-operation show overall progress against their commitments (i.e. indicators 1b, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8)