



Overhauling and Revamping One-Stop Government Service Shops in the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil, 2003–13



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In Brief

- **Development Problem:** In Minas Gerais, Brazil’s second most populous state, residents had long bemoaned the difficulty of obtaining work permits, passports, driver’s licenses, and other documents that were issued by a variety of federal, state, and local agencies.
- **Program Solution:** In 2003, the new Minas Gerais government pledged to improve government efficiency and serve its citizens better by overhauling its one-stop shops.
- **Program Results:** Surveys indicated relatively high citizen satisfaction, with reasonable wait times, and that the majority of integrated citizen assistance units (unidades de atendimento integrado, UAIs) achieved their efficiency targets. Moreover, the UAI “brand” was regarded more favorably by citizens and by government agencies than the previous generation of UAIs, known as the postos de serviço integrado urbano (integrated urban service units).

Executive Summary

How did Brazil’s Minas Gerais government gain the needed interagency support to overhaul and revamp its one-stop service shops, create a new organizational culture for the shops, and create an evidence-based system for performance monitoring?

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Rushda Majeed, at the Innovations for Successful Societies at Princeton University, prepared and researched this case study. Many individuals contributed to this case study, starting with the 29 interviewees who provided context, detail, and insight. The following individuals contributed additional assistance: Gustavo Henrique de Andrade, Felipe Moreira de Oliveira, Erick Brazil de Vasconcelos, and Fernanda Valadares Couto Girão. Special acknowledgments are due to Laura Bacon, Douglas Hulette, Jennifer Widner, and Robert K. Yin for their in-depth reviews and editorial support.

In 2003, the new government in Minas Gerais, as part of its pledge to improve government efficiency and better serve its citizens, began to overhaul its inefficient one-stop shops. Minas Gerais residents had long bemoaned the difficulty of obtaining various government-issued documents from federal, state, and local agencies. In 1996, the state government set up one-stop shops, called *postos de serviço integrado urbano*, or PSIUs (integrated urban service units), to offer a variety of services in single locations around the state, but the shops failed to reduce delay or confusion. This case study examines the steps the government took to overhaul the one-stop shops.

First, the state government undertook major organizational changes. To help move toward this goal, the governor established a new department, the Secretariat for Planning and Management (SEPLAG). In 2007, the state's one-stop shops were moved under the authority of SEPLAG, and Fernanda Valadares Couto Girão, assistant secretary of management, was assigned the tasks of overseeing and overhauling the one-stop shops.

Girão and her team began by identifying several underlying problems that contributed to the PSIUs' poor performance. First and most importantly, the independence of the national, state, and local governments under Brazil's federal system made it hard to create a unified approach, and there was little incentive to cooperate. Second, staff training and vetting were poor; employees did not share an ethic of citizen service. Third, the shops lacked standard operating procedures. Finally, in some instances—especially outside the main cities—managers cut deals with suppliers, creating conflicts of interest.

Girão and her team addressed the core delivery challenges, particularly interagency fragmentation, to upgrade the one-stop shops and enable them to improve service delivery under one roof. The improved model, renamed *Unidades de Atendimento Integrado* or UAIs (Integrated Citizen Assistance Units), started with two one-stop shops upgraded in 2007, with eight more shops in 2008, and more in the following years. By 2013, after the secretariat had transformed 24 PSIUs and added four new one-stop shops, only two PSIUs remained unchanged. To ensure greater efficiency gains and keep down costs, several UAIs were set up, using a public-private partnership model.

The performance improvement in the UAIs was measured by both citizen satisfaction surveys and a specially developed efficiency measure, with multiple evaluation rounds conducted between 2008 and 2013; the surveys indicated relatively high citizen satisfaction,

with reasonable wait times, and that the majority of UAIs achieved their efficiency targets. Moreover, the UAI “brand” was regarded more favorably by citizens and by government agencies than the PSIUs. The public-private partnership model was regarded as an overall success in surveys of citizens, government officials and agencies, and experts on one-stop shop management.

Establishing high-level political support, which had been absent during the creation of the PSIUs, was a crucial point for the overhaul and helped to make implementation work. In 2007, Girão's team received support from the Office of Projects, a unit in the planning secretariat that followed the strategic priorities of the governor's “management shock” program, a set of reforms to reduce state expenditure and improve finances. This office's involvement gave the team a direct line to the governor.

Girão's team gathered evidence to understand the one-stop shops and their problems; the team used its finding to propose a complete reworking of the shops. Like the original shops, the UAIs would bring related services together in one place. Under the UAI manager's supervision, uniformed clerks would accept and process applications at identical booths or counters. Participating agencies committed to little or no service disruption during UAI business hours, and business hours were extended for greater citizen service.

To address the most important challenge—to bring together and coordinate multiple government agencies to provide services—the reform team crafted incentives to induce the agencies to cooperate. Under the new arrangement, the planning secretariat took care of hiring personnel, paying their salaries, and managing employees, in addition to taking care of facilities and monitoring the service delivery quality. These incentives and the agreement turned out to be an important inflection point. In exchange, the agencies would agree to accept new service standards and abide by UAI rules.

Girão's unit broached legal and procedural obstacles in its negotiations. The secretariat negotiated with individual department heads; several federal agencies agreed to offer services through the UAIs after Girão negotiated with them on rules that would allow contract workers to provide their services. Other agencies were convinced to join the UAIs when offered the prospect of expanding their reach. With time, the UAIs' leverage increased.

Changing organizational culture in agencies that operated at a UAI was not easy, and this barrier had to be surmounted for the UAIs to function. The UAI team

had to work with the individual agencies to resolve some issues with staff such as insisting that the workday ended only when everyone had received service. Coordination with the agencies involved helped to enforce adherence to the rules, and a dedicated stream of management (the UAI coordinators) devoted to overseeing UAI staff ensured a focus on citizen service.

The team instituted other procedures to limit favoritism, such as enforcing the UAIs' customer ticketing system and creating an ombudsman system. To strengthen the attention paid to citizens and to create stronger feedback loops from users, the secretariat team monitored citizen complaints through an ombudsman desk at each UAI, a hotline, and the state government website. The coordinators mandated swift turnaround in resolving issues.

The "situation room" was the most important performance measure implemented at the UAIs. The situation room gave the UAI team the information needed to track each unit's service delivery in real time, thus allowing the team to identify potential trouble areas and quick responses to incipient problems.

Using a variety of types of evidence to redesign the system underscores the importance of deploying evidence for results throughout the intervention, and serves as an important lesson for the science of delivery. For example, the team designed and installed a formal online system to measure the ongoing services at each shop, helping to redeploy resources in real time. Flexibility and adaptability were a hallmark of the UAIs, with observation and analysis frequently feeding back into implementation to improve these processes.

Successful implementation has meant overcoming legal and procedural obstacles to coordination and the involvement of 15 federal, state, and municipal agencies in the one-stop shops (see annex A for a timeline of key events in the implementation process).

The Development Challenge: Citizens' Need to Gain Better Access to Government Services

In 2003, the new government in Minas Gerais, Brazil's second most populous state, after pledging to improve its efficiency and serve its citizens better, turned to address its inefficient one-stop shops. Minas Gerais residents had

long bemoaned the difficulty of obtaining government-issued documents. The existing state government-run one-stop shops, the PSIUs, were designed to offer a variety of services in single locations around the state, but these shops failed to reduce delay and confusion. "Many citizens arrive at dawn to receive a ticket number and many times there are attempts to sell a place in line. There are citizens who wait five to six hours ... in line," said one report on the state's first generation of one-stop shops for citizen services (Res Pública 2007). At a municipality in the state capital of Belo Horizonte, ticket numbers issued to people who lined up for services "run out around 10 a.m. and many citizens are turned away" (Res Pública 2007). The failing one-stop shops were one of the challenges the new state government faced in 2003. This case study examines the steps taken to meet this challenge and turn the one-stop shops around.

In a strong push to reorganize government agencies, Governor Aécio Neves da Cunha mobilized a team whose members had strong management skills and experience (for a list of key decision makers and team members discussed in this case study, see annex B). Determined to reduce state spending, improve the investment climate, and enhance the quality of citizen services, in 2003, he appointed lawyer Antonio Augusto Junho Anastasia to head a new department, the Secretariat for Planning and Management (SEPLAG). By creating a secretariat, the new governor underscored his priority of making the government work better and brought much-needed political clout to the task. An adviser at the secretariat, Mauro Cesar da Silveira, said: "The technical expertise and strong role of SEPLAG was very important in the beginning. It had the keys to the vault." Renata Maria Paes de Vilhena, a career civil servant who had served in both the state and federal government, became deputy secretary of state for planning and management under Anastasia.

In 2007, Neves moved direct responsibility for the state's 26 one-stop shops from the umbrella of the state secretariat for regional development and urban policy, which had provided loose oversight, to the planning and management secretariat. Under the supervision of Secretary Vilhena, the job of evaluating and developing the existing one-stop shops went to Fernanda Valadares Couto Girão, assistant secretary of management. Girão's initial mandate was to coordinate the state's e-government initiatives, as well as the government's telephone assistance line, in-person assistance services,

and website. In 2007, her office's mission expanded to include the review and reform of the PSIUs. This case study focuses on her team's overhaul and revamp of the one-stop shops.

Delivery Challenges: Improving Interagency Coordination and Standardizing Operations

Girão and her team identified several underlying problems that contributed to the PSIUs' poor performance. First and most important, the independence of the national, state, and local governments under Brazil's federal system made it hard to create a unified approach and the government's disparate units and levels had little incentive to cooperate. Second, staff training and vetting were poor; employees did not share an ethic of citizen service. Third, the shops lacked standard operating procedures, including regular hours of operation. Finally, in some instances—especially outside the main cities—managers cut deals with suppliers, creating conflicts of interest.

A prime challenge was winning agreement among agencies as there was no formal institutional partnership and the respective managers and workers did not coordinate their work. The PSIUs had no special authority to provide services or to decide how the various agencies should staff their operations and manage their functions. The shops merely convened local, state, and federal agencies responsible for providing specified services at single delivery points. Each agency controlled its own activities. There was no shared staffing plan or guidance on the employment of civil servants, contractors, and interns.

Further, the PSIUs were viewed as a place of last resort for employees with problems. At the time, customer service was not a high-status job or government priority. As a result, agencies often viewed the one-stop shops as a place to send troublesome workers who often lacked the right qualifications, Girão noted. "There were people sent to the PSIUs as a punishment—sent to the front line to go and serve the public." In the late 1990s, as government restructuring closed some state offices, agencies shifted employees to PSIUs instead of laying them off.

Nontransparent personnel policies at the one-stop shops also affected managerial capacity. Usually appointed on the basis of political connections, most managers did

not have the appropriate skills to run a shop effectively. The PSIU coordinators, as the managers were known, came from diverse agencies and had both varying salaries and years of experience.

Staff accountability and responsibility were lax because managers had little authority over staff, who reported back to their home agencies. Civil service rules gave the PSIUs no authority to set up weekend shifts or evening hours. As a result, many shops were closed when many citizens wanted to visit. In addition, employees received little training in working with the public.

Partly as a result of these issues, the organizational culture failed to reward employees—both managers and staff—who cared about citizens' experiences. Girão described this, saying "The mentality was one of obligation: 'I have to do it because I am a civil servant, but I don't have to worry about quality.'"

Measuring overall service efficiency and employee effectiveness was impossible because the secretariat for regional development and urban policy, which had original responsibility for the PSIUs, had not created a central performance monitoring system. A 2007 diagnostic report noted: "With this system, it is not possible to know how long each citizen waited in a line, how long each attendant took, nor the productivity of each attendant" (Res Pública 2007). Although sample wait times observed by the report's authors were as high as six hours (Res Pública 2007), managers did not capture the average PSIU wait time or the average wait time for each service in a systematic manner, nor did managers track the number of canceled services and the demand for each service.

The absence of shared procedures and standards meant that citizens had far different experiences, depending on which PSIU they visited. Most PSIUs did not list the menu of services offered. There were no systemwide opening and closing hours or operating practices, and no common criteria to guide the physical layout of the shops or the choice of technology and other equipment. Many shops were uninviting to both the public and the employees who worked there. Rodrigo Gitirana Lyrio Do Nascimento, charged with improving the shops' infrastructure in 2007, described the shops: "The units were dark spaces. The walls were dirty with paint and ink marks because people wiped the fingerprinting ink on them. Cabling and electric systems were poor. Desktops and workstations had all been trashed. The furniture was bad. There was no architectural standard. The working conditions were very poor."

Budget constraints and the use of back-door connections intensified the problems in one-stop shops outside the capital city of Belo Horizonte. Girão said, “If a chair broke, the coordinators made deals with municipal government or local stores to get one through donation. The flip side, in some cases, was that they would provide expedited services for the people who agreed to the deal. Their function and focus was not on the technical management, but on the political aspects.” She noted that “these deals kept the unit functioning,” but they were detrimental to the overall service quality.

In rural areas, coordinators wielded extraordinary influence because they could hold out the promise of services to buy votes for local politicians or to run for city council themselves. “The coordinators would use the provision of services as a means for getting votes,” Girão said. “We used to joke that in the interior of the state, you have three important kinds of people: the police, the priest, and the coordinator of the PSIU, because of the political currency involved in these politicized positions.”

As the quality of service at the one-stop shops slipped further, even the participating agencies began to have second thoughts about sending people to work there. Breno Eduardo Elias Dos Santos, in charge of managing business processes, recalled: “A lot of the agencies started leaving the PSIUs because of their bad image.”

Tackling Organizational and Interagency Issues: Fixing the One-Stop Shops Step-by-Step

From the beginning, Girão believed that the one-stop shops were a sound idea that needed fixing, not replacement. “People still approved of the service in the PSIU,” she said. “Citizens felt that even if they missed a workday, they could still get a number of services done in one day at a PSIU. They knew that they had to only go to one location to access the services they needed instead of running between different locations around the city.”

Girão’s team overhauled and revamped the one-stop shops using a systematic approach that was rolled out over six years. Converting the PSIUs to the improved model, renamed Unidades de Atendimento Integrado or UAIs (Integrated Citizen Assistance Units) started with two one-stop shops in 2007, followed by eight shops in 2008, and more in the following years. By 2013, the secretariat had transformed 24 PSIUs and added

four new one-stop shops; only two PSIUs remained unchanged (see tables 1 and 2).

In tracing the overhauling and revamping of the one-stop shops, this case study addresses three questions, as follows:

Question 1: How did the conversion process gain the needed interagency support?

Question 2: How were the implementers able to create a new organizational culture for the one-stop shops?

Question 3: How did the implementers create an evidence-based system for monitoring the performance of the one-stop shops?

Each question covers a key aspect of the conversion process—and the experiences in Minas Gerais may be informative for conversion efforts elsewhere.

Table 1 Distribution of Three Generations of One-Stop Shops, 2007–13

Year	PSIUs	UAIs	UAIs on the PPP model	Total one-stop shops
2007	24	2	-	26
2008	18	10 (including 2 new UAIs)	-	28
2009	10	18	-	28
2010	7	22 (including 1 new UAI)	-	
2011	2	22	6 (including 1 new PPP)	30
2012	2	22	6	30
2013	2	22	6	30

Note: PPP = public-private partnership; PSIU = posto de serviço integrado urbano (integrated urban service unit); UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistance unit).

Table 2 PSIU and UAIs Conversion Timeline, 2007–13

Year	Status
2007	Of the 26 PSIUs, 2 were converted to UAIs.
2008	Of the 24 remaining PSIUs, 6 were converted to UAIs and 3 brand new UAIs were added.
2009	Of the 18 remaining PSIUs, 8 were converted to UAIs.
2010	Of the 10 remaining PSIUs, 3 were converted to UAIs, and 1 brand new PSIU was added.
2011	Of the 7 remaining PSIUs, 5 were converted to PPP UAIs, and 1 brand new PPP was UAU added.
2012	2 PSIUs remained unchanged.
2013	2 PSIUs remained unchanged.

Note: PSIU = posto de serviço integrado urbano (integrated urban service unit); UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistance unit).

Furthermore, although the case study focuses on serving citizens through the one-stop shops as a particular service to citizens, the lessons learned by addressing these three questions may pertain to a variety of other locally based citizen services.

Context: A Budget Crisis Leads to Management Shock

The Neves Administration: Addressing Fiscal Shortfalls and Preparing Reforms

From 1999 to 2002, Brazil's economy floundered, reversing the trend from prior years. In the throes of a currency crisis in 1999, Minas Gerais had stopped repaying its US\$13.5 billion of debt to the federal government because of a budget deficit (Schemo 1999). The state's default scared off private investment, which plunged 29.1 percent in 1999 and slumped an additional 19.3 percent in 2000 (World Bank 2010). From 1999 to 2003, the Minas Gerais' average annual growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) was 0.7 percent, even less than the sluggish national average of 1.8 percent (World Bank 2007). The state's economic underperformance reversed the pattern from previous years. In 2002, the state government's personnel expenditure was 66 percent of net current revenue, and the state's net consolidated debt to the federal government was 236 percent of state net current revenue (World Bank 2010).

When Aécio Neves da Cunha was elected in 2003, he promised a management shock program that would fix the insolvent and floundering Minas Gerais government and transform the state into "the best place to live in Brazil" (World Bank 2007). Humberto Falcão Martins, who advised the government, summarized the conditions that created a reform moment: "The state was bankrupt—fiscally, managerially, and politically. It was the end of the road, the bottom of the well. People felt that no one had anything more to lose. That was the window of opportunity."

After the management shock reforms that Neves implemented in his first term (2003–06) balanced the state budget and won him an overwhelming second gubernatorial term in December 2006, he empowered the planning and management secretariat to move forward with an effort to improve the one-stop shops. This new effort was as part of a second

phase of reforms—the State for Results. Starting in 2006, the World Bank supported this initiative with a US\$170 million loan, followed by a second loan of US\$976 million in 2008.

Learning from Other One-Stop Shop Models

Eager to improve the performance of PSIUs, Girão and her team began to look at examples from other areas in 2007 and studied one-stop shops in other parts of Brazil, including Bahia, the Federal District, Rio Grande do Sul, and São Paulo. These site visits helped Girão and her team understand the "difficulties, advances, technology, and quality of personnel," she said. The team discovered that it need not have looked far for one of the most compelling models. When Neves had first come to office, he launched a project called Programa Empresa Mineira Competitiva (Competitive Minas) to attract business and reverse the collapse in private investment. The project, housed under the planning and management secretariat, created Minas Fácil, separate one-stop shops designed specifically for businesses to register and get licenses (see box 1).

The success of Minas Fácil led to the development of a citizen-oriented model. The director of information and modernization at the state's commercial board in charge of the Minas Fácil units, Alex Francisco Barbosa, said: "We had integrated services and also integrated work across different levels of government. So the governor came up with the following proposal: 'We have to do the same for the citizen, as well as for the state itself.'" The governor pushed the secretariat to consider the Minas Fácil model and proposed that improved PSIUs be renamed Unidades de Atendimento Integrado or UAIs (Integrated Citizen Assistance Units). The acronym, pronounced as "why" in Portuguese, mimicked a local greeting. Girão said: "It's a common term here, like 'Yo!' or 'Aloha!' ... It was necessary to demonstrate to society that we were breaking with a previous culture." The governor had coined the term for this reason.

The decision makers expanded the scope of Competitive Minas from facilitating business to include projects to improve citizen service delivery. They reconfigured Competitive Minas into an innovation think tank, Projeto Estruturador Descomplicar (literally Structuring Project Uncomplicate), which would work closely with Girão

Box 1 The Minas Fácil Model: One Stop-Shops for Business Registration

In 2006, Minas Gerais set up new offices called Minas Fácil (“Easy Minas”) to issue business licenses and other paperwork speedily—a model for the delivery of citizen services. Minas Fácil was a huge improvement from the state’s old system, where the steps to register a business were neither simple nor integrated across government agencies. It took an average of about three months to register a firm and get a business license.

Together, the commercial board of the state of Minas Gerais, in coordination with Programa Empresa Mineira Competitiva (“Competitive Minas”), a project at the secretariat of planning and management, designed an initiative to increase registrations. Program Head Alex Francisco Barbosa met with business associations and entrepreneurs to understand the reasons for low business registration rates, to discuss bottlenecks, and determine needs. His team traced the process of opening a business from beginning to end. Then they worked to change rules and laws and negotiated with local, state, and federal agencies to make it possible to offer services that businesses needed in one place. Gradually, they won support for common procedures and put several parts of the process online. Between 2007 and 2012, they opened 34 one-stop shops—and more thereafter.

The development process was not easy and had many roadblocks. Barbosa said that, initially, “We got a lot of resistance. The old process worked because there are a lot of rules. There was room for third parties, like accountants, to come in and make money.” The legal measures took two years to implement. Sometimes different government offices backed away from shared procedures. Communication with the business community was vital to the program’s success and required many public presentations.

In 2011, the team added Minas Fácil Expresso (Easy Minas Express) units, one-person units set up in municipal offices, typically in cities with a population of roughly 56,000, and averaging registration of 12 firms per month in the year before the program was introduced. An Expresso unit representative coordinated with the Minas Fácil central office in Belo Horizonte, sending digital copies of documents to headquarters for review before issuing a license on-site.

By 2013, Minas Gerais had grown rapidly throughout the state. It hosted 32 conventional Minas Fácil and 59 Expresso units in 91 of the state’s 853 municipalities. The largest Minas Fácil in Belo Horizonte served an average of 1,000 citizens daily. Instead of months, business licenses took an average of five days in Belo Horizonte and eight days in other places. The board aimed to serve 90 percent of all businesses in the state by 2015, compared to 67 percent in 2013.

and the one-stop shop coordinating office to facilitate the transformation of the original PSIU one-stop shops into the new UAIs (see box 2).

Implementation: Revamping the One-Stop Shops with a New Model

After the work to revamp the one-stop shops began in 2007, citizen surveys and service efficiency measures were used to measure how well implementation worked. Over time, the government had to address the issue of rising costs.

Raising the Bar on Citizen Services

In 2007, Girão assembled additional staff with new connections to implement the new one-stop shops. Her office eventually expanded from 6 to 17 people. She also

relied on the Office of Projects, a unit in the planning secretariat that followed up on the strategic priorities of the governor’s management shock program. With the office involved, there was a direct line to the governor. Establishing this signal of high-level political support, which had been absent during the creation of the earlier one-stop shops, represented a crucial early inflection point for the overhaul. Girão said: “This strategic link to the government macroplanning was missing during the PSIUs, and this what made the UAI project possible.”

Identifying service delivery gaps to define a new model. Girão and her team worked to trace the service delivery process at the PSIUs, aiming to identify service delivery gaps before proposing measures to overhaul the system. “We did actual fieldwork,” she said. “We went to the largest PSIUs in Belo Horizonte and took notes on what services the citizens were using, talked to attendants and citizens, and recorded procedures and the time taken.”

Box 2 Projeto Estruturador Descomplicar and Minas Gerais's One-Stop Shops

Between 2003 and 2006, the Minas Gerais government introduced a number of reforms to reduce expenditures, streamline procurement, and boost tax revenues. Secretary of Planning and Management Renata Maria Paes de Vilhena said that at the time, “the government was working with a fairly large budget deficit. We needed to get the financial house in order first before going on to improve (citizen) services.”

During Neves’ second gubernatorial term (2007–10), the next phase of reforms—“state for results”—introduced 57 projects related to improving government performance and service delivery. The governor empowered the secretariat of planning and management, responsible for his reform efforts, to transform the successful Programa Empresa Mineira Competitiva of his first term into an innovation think tank called Projeto Estruturador Descomplicar. Intended as an organizing principle for the entire state administration, Projeto Estruturador Descomplicar included projects to strengthen state-business relations (through Minas Fácil), improve state-society relations, and enhance coordination between state agencies. The revised one-stop shops—UAI—fell under the second prong of the governor’s three-part agenda of state-society relations.

The governor and deputy governor Antonio Augusto Junho Anastasia asked the Descomplicar team to oversee projects that would simplify and enhance the quality of citizen services. Team members worked with the UAI reform team to ensure that planning and implementation of the new units aligned with this broader government agenda and to provide strategic support. Luiz Henrique Zanforlin Pereira of the project team said: “We were consultants for Minas Fácil and the UAIs in some ways. Sometimes you can’t think of broader strategy when you are managing day-to-day details. It was great to have Projeto (Estruturador) Descomplicar, linked to the planning secretariat, which could think more strategically for them.”

Note: UAI = unidades de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistance units).

On the basis of its findings, the team proposed a complete reworking aimed at improving the citizen experience. Like the original shops, the UAIs would bring related services together in one place. Under a UAI manager’s supervision, uniformed clerks would accept and process applications at identical booths or counters. Once cross-trained, each clerk would be able to provide any service. Efficient use of technology was another linchpin in the plan. Each UAI would have a standard, upgraded information technology system capable of supporting high volumes of work without interruption, as well as an automated service desk where citizens could access services online through a web portal.

The new one-stop shops would have longer hours as well as be open on weekends and public holidays to meet public demand and have new payment windows. Participating agencies would commit to little or no service disruption during the UAI business hours. New payment windows would be created in the units so customers could conduct transactions within the UAI. Private banks operated the payment windows during the same hours as the rest of the services.

Branding considerations involved having a uniform architecture for all units, with the same layout and color scheme, and consistent service policies and procedures.

“In the past, citizens would go to one or the other unit depending on which ones offered better services,” Nascimento said. But now they would be able to access the same quality of services at any one-stop shop. This ambition extended to all parts of the state including remote locations. Girão added: “Our concept was that the citizen is the same, whether in Belo Horizonte or the interior.”

The team sought to find a way to create more flexible staffing, longer weekday hours, and weekend operations. In the past, the secretariat had contracted with a semi-autonomous public company called Minas Gerais Administration and Services (MGS) to provide support staff for functions. People hired through the company were governed by policies that were more flexible than the government’s civil service rules. Vilhena and Girão proposed to extend this contracting system to the UAIs, and the secretariat would now hire line employees through the company. Each agency responsible for a citizen service would train its employees in the particular skills needed to perform their duties in the one-stop shops. The shift would enable UAI managers and the secretariat to monitor performance, coach more effectively, and tell the company to remove or discipline those who failed to do their jobs.

A one-stop shop was a “convener” or facilitator of services provided by other agencies of the local,

state, and federal governments. In Vilhena’s words: “The Government of Minas Gerais understood that centralized service delivery through the UAI model should transcend the levels of government and, through the UAI, it took on the role of a catalyst and integrator of this model.” Girão’s office had to persuade the agencies to cooperate to streamline procedures, forge shared policies, and allow the secretariat for planning and management to monitor performance. The secretariat gathered information on each service it would host at the UAIs and negotiated the obligations of each party before formalizing the relationship through a “cooperation agreement” (see box 3).

Scrutinizing agency processes to evaluate and improve service delivery. Before moving a service to a UAI, the coordinating team signed an agreement with the responsible federal, state, or local agency; this procedure included an agreement to evaluate and improve the service delivery process. Girão explained the importance of such reviews and the usefulness of this feedback to inform work moving forward: “Most agencies did not know what their processes were and did not even map them. We shared [this information] with them and sometimes we even mapped it for them. They realize the importance of mapping and improving a process. Later we can monitor and improve a process further.”

The coordinating unit provided the agencies with specific guidance on the workflow and structure. Santos said: “We understand the workflow. We identify

the tools, the procedures, and the actors. After these activities, we present everything we see and recommend changes before agencies join a UAI. We also identify and register the structure we need, such as workstations and computers.” Depending on complexity, it usually took the team one to two months to finish mapping and implementing a process, said Santos.

The team looked for innovative solutions to solve workflow problems. For instance, in transferring vehicle registration services to a UAI to meet the high demand, the team worked with the transport office to install a machine that would produce an electronic version of a civil police chief’s signature, which was required on all car registration documents. The paper-based driver’s license test was computerized when the service shifted to the UAIs, and Girão’s team worked with the agency to develop other new procedures.

The workflow analysis extended even to building maintenance. To standardize facility management, the team created a maintenance and cleaning manual with special instructions for working in historic buildings, where some units were housed.

Reworking staffing and training to meet customer service needs. Initially, the UAI coordinating team decided to staff the units fully with workers hired through MGS, the company that had provided some staff at PSIUs. MGS was a public corporation that supplied qualified employees to government agencies, managed supplies, and maintained government infrastructure. Created

Box 3 Highlights of UAI Cooperation Agreement

A cooperation agreement between the secretariat of planning and management and a participating agency detailed each party’s obligations. Signed for a 60-month period, the agreement established, among other things:

- Each agency’s services;
- Facilities provided to the agency at the unit;
- Each unit’s hours of operations;
- Guidelines for the use of the physical space;
- Guidelines for the use of equipment;
- Guidelines for training and managing personnel;
- Each agency’s business processes, including operations manual; and
- Each party’s financial obligations.

Through the written agreement, the secretariat set rules for how an agency would operate in a one-stop shop—personnel, equipment, and working hours—and held the agency responsible for clarifying and updating its business processes. In return, the secretariat would cover the costs of operation.

in 1994, the corporation reported to the planning secretariat as well as to a board of directors appointed by the governor. People who wanted to work in government as MGS contractors had to take a public exam to qualify. The rules that governed hiring, terms of service, and dismissal were different from those for civil servants, however, and slightly more flexible. For the 28 one-stop shops, the team hired more than 2,100 workers, split in two shifts. The largest one-stop shop, in the Praça Sete area of Belo Horizonte, provided over 5,000 services per day and had about 300 workers per shift. Each unit had a coordinator or manager, an assistant coordinator, a supervisor appointed by each agency to oversee its own services, service desk attendants, plus cleaning and maintenance staff.

Civil servants displaced by the MGS workers returned to their parent agencies. Some took voluntary retirement while others stayed on in new positions. Girão said: “For the actual agencies we were working with, they were able to get their agents back and we avoided the legal hassles of using them for tasks that they were not hired originally to perform. Some nearing retirement left. Some lamented that they had worked for many years and now had to work in a different way [but]...there was no organized resistance from unions.”

Training for UAI attendants focused on customer service. “At the PSIU, the people didn’t even have the proper training for dealing with the public,” Girão said. “Now we make sure that we provide training and courses on assisting citizens, ethics, and training in delivering services. We try to provide the workers with the best possible environment to motivate them and reflect the quality that they need to provide in the services.” The coordinating unit also provided leadership and management training to supervisors and coordinators. The team worked with agencies to develop task-specific knowledge. It also brought employees from other parts of the state to Belo Horizonte for training specific to some agencies, such as the Polícia Civil de Minas Gerais (the “Civil Police”).

Flexibility and adaptability were hallmarks of the UAIs, with observation and analysis frequently fed back into implementation to improve these processes. Girão and her colleagues came up with the idea of a *balcão único*, that is, a single desk that which allowed citizens to receive any service at any window. Bruno Vidigal Coscarelli, a team member who focused on

strategic priorities, said: “We had cameras and saw a lot of people waiting for a specific service. For example, at a UAI, we would have 20 desks and attendants to provide services, divided by sections. You could see some folks with long lines, but two or three doing nothing because some services were more in demand than others. We did an analysis and changed the way of providing services at a UAI.”

For a time, the team decided that all UAI workers would be trained to provide every service, but most units could not sustain this support because of high turnover and training needs. By 2013, very few one-stop shops operated on the principle.

Employee motivation at UAIs remained an issue and an important obstacle. Alexandre Lima Cabral, in charge of human resources, noted: “The biggest challenge is to keep people motivated. They are working with sensitive information and performing important tasks, but the salary does not match the responsibility. And there are many young workers for whom this is their first job... unfortunately, there is not much opportunity for growth in the MGS model.” Staffers were paid about 1,100 reais per month (US\$540) under the MGS scale.

Developing a partnership to mitigate conflict between UAI coordinators and agency-employed supervisors. Not surprisingly, conflicts and other disagreements sometimes erupted between UAI coordinators, who were the secretariat employed to manage the shops, and the agency-employed supervisors who supervised specific agency operations. Santos offered an example: “When you tell a police officer that he is no longer the authority in that place, it doesn’t go down very well.” Henrique Lage Tomich, a core UAI team member who handled operations, said: “The biggest challenge we have today when installing new services is to make sure that the supervisors [civil servants from the agencies] accept the UAI. The heads of the agencies accept the UAI. But these frontline people have to get used to seeing the UAI as a partner. We want to demonstrate that there is a gain here for them. There is always a challenge in the beginning because there is no vision of a partnership.” Leticia Alessi Machado, a civil police chief and director of the state’s Institute of Identification, said: “Sometimes the people there don’t have the skills to deal with citizens and the workers. Some people might have the knowledge to occupy that position but they lack social skills to perform the task. We are there to please citizens. We have to do

our jobs in the best way.” Agency heads worked with supervisors to resolve issues. She continued: “We invite the person for an open and honest conversation, asking him to embrace the new model. If he keeps committing the same mistakes, we will transfer the person and replace him with someone else.”

In managing the agency supervisors, the UAI team would sometimes negotiate directly with agency heads. Erick Brazil de Vasconcelos, the team’s communications head, said “In general, the coordinator identifies a problem with the supervisor from an agency. They talk to us. We talk to the head of an agency. It would place the coordinators in an awkward position if they had to talk to an agency directly and they don’t have any direct authority over [the supervisor]. So Fernanda [Girão] and the agency head deals with these kinds of problems.”

Using management and monitoring tools to ensure quality service delivery at the UAIs. Participating agencies relinquished the task of monitoring to the UAI central team, which developed management and monitoring tools to help ensure quality service delivery. Within a unit, agency supervisors were responsible for making sure that workers followed all the procedures for delivering services. But agency supervisors had no authority to discipline workers; the UAI coordinator, who the secretariat employed, was the point person for approving vacation days and shift changes, working with employees to address customer complaints, and referring those who performed poorly back to MGS.

Initially, UAI coordinators were the primary monitors of service quality and employee performance. Most early monitoring was hands on and interpersonal, for instance, making sure that workers called out the next ticket number as soon as they were done providing service to a client.

Evidence of Citizen Outcomes: Citizen Surveys and Service Efficiency Measures

In 2013, Minas Gerais had 30 one-stop shops in operation, with 1,810 MGS state employees and 273 workers employed under the public-private partnership. The units provided 727 counters for services offered by 15 government agencies. For 2012, the one-stop shops handled more than 6.2 million citizen transactions,

nearly seven times the total transactions in 2009, and up from nearly 3.4 million in 2010 and more than 4.8 million in 2011 (see table 3) (Government of Minas Gerais 2007).

An increasing share of transactions took place at the UAIs as compared to the agency home offices. For example, the one-stop shops provided 52 percent of the civil police’s ID cards in Minas Gerais in 2011, 59 percent in 2012, and 64 percent during the first five months of 2013. For criminal background check documents, which citizens had to present as part of a job application for all public and most private jobs, one-stop shops issued 55 percent in 2011, 63 percent in 2012, and 62 percent in the first five months of 2013.

Citizen surveys give the UAIs high marks. In 2008, the UAI coordinating unit conducted a citizen satisfaction survey at two UAI units, one in the Barreiro municipality of Belo Horizonte and the other in the smaller city of São João del Rei, about 200 kilometers south. Both units ranked high in citizen satisfaction, with 97 percent of respondents satisfied with services at Barreiro and 95 percent at São João del Rei. (For each unit, 3 percent of respondents were neutral.) Figure 1 depicts the waiting time experienced by citizens at these UAI units.

In 2009, the team contracted the Instituto Olhar Pesquisa e Informação Estratégica, a research institute, to conduct citizen perception surveys. The institute conducted 4,349 interviews across 12 UAI units over a two-week period, targeting people being served at the units. The survey indicated that of those citizens who used the one-stop shops, a higher proportion came from lower income groups than from higher income groups (see figure 2 for more information on the income and educational profile of UAI users). Although 60 percent used computers, 63 percent did not have access to a computer at home.


Most citizens told the surveyors that they had visited the one-stop shops to use employment or ID services. A survey ranking agencies and services, indicating which one they deemed most important, confirmed

Table 3 Citizen Transactions Handled by UAIs, 2009–12

Year	Number
2009	881,796
2010	3,395,480
2011	4,819,341
2012	6,245,739


Note: UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistant unit).

Figure 1 Wait Times for Citizen Services at the Barreiro and São João del Rei UAIs



Note: UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistant unit).

Figure 2 Income and Education of UAI Users



Note: Equivalent 2007 dollar amounts: 465 reais (US\$198.77); 466-930 reais (US\$199.2-397.55); 931-1,860 reais (US\$397.98-795.1); 1,861-3,255 reais (US\$795.5-1,391.4); and 5,116 reais (US\$3,052.01). UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistant unit).

the preponderant importance of these services, but also revealed a range of services being sought by citizens at the UAIs (see table 4).

The survey assessed service effectiveness and identified reasons for not receiving services. There were 60 percent of the respondents who were able to receive and complete a service on their first visit, while 8 percent had to make two visits and 6 percent more than two visits. The survey identified several reasons such as the citizens had provided incomplete or wrong documents; the document issuance required a waiting period; the state job placement service lacked job openings; the applicant did not meet job requirements; or the applicant had to wait for response from employer. Twenty-six percent of respondents indicated that they had not yet received the service they came for. The survey did not elaborate on these instances.

The survey also measured wait time (see figure 3). Most UAI users waited less than one hour. In measuring the time it took for a requested service to be completed, 60 percent of the respondents said their service request was completed in a “very short” or “short” time. Twenty-two percent said it was completed in a “regular” amount of time, while 5 percent and 2 percent said it took “long” or “very long,” respectively. Ten percent said that they “did not know.” On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest, citizens’ rating of the 12 UAIs sampled ranged from 8.6 to 9.6. Overall rating for the units stood at 9.2.

On a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest score, citizens rated most services between 4.2 and 4.9. Ease of assistance was rated highly at 4.9; clarity of information, 4.2; politeness, 4.4; respect accorded by attendants, 4.5;

cleanliness of UAIs, 4.9; comfort, location of desk, and attendants who helped new arrivals, 4.8; and organization, 4.7 (see figure 4).

The UAI brand became stronger over time. Girão said, “In 2007, when we opened the UAI, some agencies had left the PSIU. We had to knock on their doors. Now it is them knocking on our door to join the UAI.”

Other government agencies learned from the UAI model, and the process led to the development of a citizen assistance policy. Unrelated to the UAIs, 12 special one-stop shops that served 400,000 teachers and other civil servants, as well as 300,000 retirees, borrowed the model. The Minas Fácil one-stop shops, which had informed the creation of the UAIs, also learned from the experience and created a single desk for all services. In 2011, Governor Anastasia institutionalized learning from the UAI experience into a citizen assistance policy. The decree established general rules to protect the basic rights of citizens, provide them with adequate information on public services, and protect them from illegal practices.


Service efficiency measures provided useful metrics. A specially designed measure—a “coefficient of efficiency”—provided useful efficiency data across the units, compared performance of the traditional UAIs with the public-private partnerships, and helped calibrate the performance-based payments to the private firms operating some one-stop shops. The coefficient of efficiency measured each UAI’s daily performance. Ranging from 0 to 100, the number

Table 4 Most Important Services for UAI Users


<i>Principle service sought</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Documents from the National Employment System of the Ministry of Labor and Employment	42.30
IDs at the civil police’s Institute of Identification	40
Driver’s licenses and other services at the civil police’s State Department of Transit	5.50
Minas Fácil for business registration	2.60
Secretariat of Planning and Management’s payroll and benefit services for state employees	2.50
Military police services	1.80
Consumer protection information	1
Other agencies and services	4.30

Note: UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistant unit).

Figure 3 Wait Time by UAI Users



Note: UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistant unit).



was calculated using a formula that took into account the following:

- Citizens’ evaluation of the service they received (captured through the keypad and assigned a 50 percent weight);
- Average wait times for service (preferably eight minutes or less, assigned a 40 percent weight); and
- The degree of assistance (the number of tickets issued per day minus the number of canceled tickets, assigned a 10 percent weight).


The weighting assigned to each component was based on the assumed degree of importance to citizen-customers. The UAI coordinating unit set a target for each unit to achieve a coefficient of 95 percent or greater. In 2012, of the 22 UAIs, 14 had an coefficient of efficiency of over 95 percent, including four that achieved 100 percent. The efficiency of two units stood at 92 percent, two at 91 percent, and one at 90 percent. The remaining three had rates of 88 percent, 86 percent, and 82 percent, respectively (see figure 5). Of the six privately managed units, one had a 100 percent coefficient of efficiency; two operated at 99 percent, one at 97 percent, and one at 91 percent; the sixth unit in Uberlândia, the state’s second largest city with a population of over 600,000, performed at 80 percent efficiency.

During the first five months of 2013, two public-private units performed at 100 percent efficiency; two

were at 90 percent and 92 percent, while two fell to 86 percent and 79 percent, respectively. Management problems were one reason for low efficiency, and the private company replaced the manager in one of the low-performing units. By comparison, seven UAIs performed at 100 percent efficiency, four at 98 percent, two at 95 percent, two more at 92 percent and 93 percent respectively, and three at 90 percent. The four units that fell below 90 percent had efficiency levels of 88 percent, 85 percent, 84 percent, and 80 percent, respectively.

Continuing challenges include a lack of publicity. The UAI page on the state government’s website was not user friendly, and the UAIs did not have a separate website. “Publicity is a weakness for the government,” Santos said. “We publicize in radio and newspapers with wide circulation. We also go to the TV channels to inform citizens. We also put flyers around the city. But it doesn’t work as well as we would like it to. The citizens are usually surprised when they find out about the UAIs.”

To use technology to better provide information to the public, team members planned to create mobile applications that would allow citizens to access information about the nearest unit, wait times, and appointments. Labanca noted the benefits: “Scheduling is one of the best solutions because you distribute demand and use full capacity [of a unit]. The downside is that there might be a longer wait. For example, it could take several days to get an appointment for a service in high demand.”

Figure 5 Coefficients of Efficiency for Publicly Run UAIs

Note: UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistant unit).

*This figure includes four UAIs that achieved a coefficient of efficiency of 100 percent.

Information about the UAI came from a variety of channels. Citizens surveyed in 2009 said that they learned about the UAI through friends, family, or work colleagues. Others said that they were familiar with the old PSIU and had merely returned to the revamped UAI. The website, radio, and local newspapers also informed some. Finally, some citizens had learned of the UAI by walking past a unit. Eighty-nine percent of the people surveyed did not know of Minas Online, the go-to government portal for citizens, 8 percent knew of it but had not used it, and 2 percent knew about the portal and had used it. (One percent did not answer.)

Complex Challenges of Implementing a Multiagency One-Stop Shop

The measurable service delivery at the Minas Gerais one-stop shops required little decision making on the part of employees and the number of delivery points—the one-stop shops—was relatively small. Both of those conditions theoretically made monitoring and supervision easier than for other high-demand services, such as healthcare or education.

But reformers faced complex issues such as cross-agency collaboration, a challenging organizational culture, and impediments to joining the process. The Minas Gerais

one-stop shops required cross-agency collaboration, which made the process more difficult. Further, the reform team had to contend with work rules and norms that created a challenging organizational culture. In addition, the team had to find ways to offer incentives that made it attractive for the agencies to join, that improved processes, and that agencies continued to house services at a one-stop shop.

Reforms arose from a political commitment to serve citizens better. Improving services was an important plank in Governor Aécio Neves da Cunha's second phase of reforms and a way to enhance citizen outreach at a time when budget cuts and retrenchment had long dominated the news. Fernanda Valadares Couto Girão, who took over as head of the UAI coordinating unit, led a skilled reform team, making it possible to plan and implement the new one-stop shops. She expanded the team to include architects and engineers, business process managers, and technology specialists to revamp the PSiUs, improve the delivery chain, and monitor the units effectively.

For the reform team, one of the first steps was to trace the delivery chain to find out what was not working in the original one-stop shops and address the deficiencies. Reform team members observed and timed activities first-hand and diagnosed problems. The reformers then met with the different agencies housed in the one-stop shops to try to streamline business processes. They

created standard operating procedures and developed metrics and methods to assess results continuously, so that they could spot and solve problems.

In 2013, with the looming conversion of the remaining one-stop shops into public-private units, the team prepared to take on an increased managerial and monitoring role. The UAI team placed special emphasis on training employees at the one-stop shops. Institutional training emphasized high-quality customer service. The team also ensured that UAI coordinators were properly trained in managing attendants and catering to citizens. In addition, each agency provided its own training at regular intervals.

Top decision makers provided a supportive environment for team members to develop solutions to the problems they observed. For example, Vilhena and Girão backed the technical team when it came up with a technological solution to monitor service delivery. The innovations saved time and money. Andrey Moraes Labanca, part of the UAI technical team, said: “Everything became more efficient. We didn’t have to call a manager to ask about problems or wait for them to report. And with the time available, we were able to focus on other areas and improve service.” Team members were especially skilled at finding simple solutions to recurrent problems. For example, Erick Vasconcelos, in charge of communications, said: “One of our greatest successes was the scheduling of appointments for two services: Employment insurance and work permit cards. All over Brazil you would see people forming lines early morning, every day. We made these services, which are more complex, require more documents, and take longer to complete, by appointment only. And since we have installed these, we no longer see people sleeping at the door and waiting for the door to open.”

Governor Antonio Augusto Junho Anastasia’s 2011 citizen assistance policy further helped institutionalize citizen rights and gave the team additional tools to enhance services for the public. “The decree deals with the quality of citizen assistance for services that the state provides,” Girão said. “It also details standards, such as wait times. The procedures are so detailed and exacting that the agencies find it better to join a UAI, rather than investing in their own citizen center.”

One of the most interesting aspects of the reforms was the phased manner in which the team remodeled the PSIUs into UAIs, experimenting with changes along the way to be more adaptive. For instance, the team experimented with a new public-private partnership model for cost savings before applying it to other units

(see below). Although it was difficult to evaluate the success of the private-public model in 2013, the team learned from previous generations of one-stop shops to inform service delivery at the new units.

By 2013, the UAI team remained committed to further improving services. “We spend a lot of time discussing how to innovate and improve the delivery of services,” said Renata Maria Paes de Vilhena, the secretary of planning and management. “The UAIs have great positive feedback because we are providing an important service for society.”

Addressing Rising Costs of the One-Stop Shops

Although the new one-stop shops functioned well, the costs were high, which represented something of a pain point for this effort. The annual operating cost rose from 4.3 million reais (US\$2 million) for 26 PSIUs in 2007 to about 68 million reais (US\$29.1 million) for 29 one-stop shops in 2010.¹ By comparison, the overall state budget stood at 30.5 billion reais (US\$14.2 billion) in 2007 and 41.1 billion reais (US\$23.4 billion) in 2010.² In 2007, the average cost per service at a PSIU was 2.31 reais (Government of Minas Gerais 2007), but in 2010, the average cost per service at a UAI rose to 16.8 reais (US\$9.23).³ (See table 5 for state budget and budget authorized for the PSIUs and UAIs.)

In relation to the rising costs and representing an additional pain point, was the time it took the MGS to furnish needed staff and supplies. Coscarelli recounted one instance in which “we waited three months for MGS to change a light bulb in a room.” The centers required more agility than MGS was able to muster.

Drawing employees from MGS imposed other constraints. The MGS worker contracts did not allow the coordinating unit to award people who performed their jobs especially well or to sponsor programs, such as a “UAI of the month.”

1 The 2007 budget for the 26 units exceeded the allocated 3.13 million reais budget by more than 1 million reais.

2 For more information, see the Government of Minas Gerais at <http://www.planejamento.mg.gov.br/planejamento-e-orcamento/orcamento-do-estado-de-minas-gerais>.

3 Brazil’s annual average inflation rate was 5.678 percent in 2008, 4.888 percent in 2009, and 5.039 percent in 2010 (International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013).

Table 5 State Budget and Authorized PSIUs/UAI Budget

<i>Year</i>	<i>State budget</i>	<i>Authorized budget for PSIUs/UAI</i>
2007	R\$30,553,704,363 (US\$14,287,400,000)	R\$3,129,207 (US\$1,463,270)
2008	R\$35,590,405,599 (US\$19,609,000,000)	R\$16,450,000 (US\$9,063,360)
2009	R\$38,978,230,513 (US\$16,662,100,000)	R\$39,410,000 (US\$16,846,600)
2010	R\$41,113,937,207 (US\$23,389,000,000)	R\$39,410,000 (US\$25,742,000)
2011	R\$44,998,615,907 (US\$26,844,500,000)	R\$72,936,719 (US\$43,511,300)
2012	R\$50,272,318,708 (US\$26,954,900,000)	R\$71,000,000 (US\$38,068,700)

Source: Government of Minas Gerais (<http://www.planejamento.mg.gov.br/planejamento-e-orcamento/orcamento-doestado-de-minas-gerais>).

Note: For numbers that represent the authorized annual budget for PSIUs/UAI, the actual amount spent may vary. PSIU = posto de serviço integrado urbano (integrated urban service unit); UAI = unidade de atendimento integrado (integrated citizen assistant unit).

Public-private partnership to address rising costs, budget limitations, and staff constraints. In 2009, the governor directed the planning secretariat to consider adopting a public-private partnership model to address the problems noted earlier. Under this model, the state would run the one-stop shops through a management contract negotiated with a private firm. The private company would manage the UAIs, and the state would reimburse expenses according to the number of services provided and the service quality. Minas Gerais had succeeded in implementing such partnerships in other policy areas, such as infrastructure development and state prisons. The question was whether this approach would work in the direct provision of citizen services.

In 2009 and 2010, Secretary Vilhena worked with Girão and Coscarelli to analyze the adaptations this approach would require as well as the pros and cons of each new proposal. Girão noted: “It is not necessarily a huge reduction in cost but it is focused on the better use of the money we spend. The private sector does a better job because of its flexibility.” The private company could use its own recruiting procedures to find workers with the appropriate skills and aptitudes, while MGS had to take people based on exam scores that might not bear much relationship to job performance. A partnership also would allow greater operational flexibility. A private company could ask an employee to replace a broken light bulb quickly, while the existing system restricted UAI coordinators from fulfilling this kind of request easily because of the state’s strict procurement guidelines.

When first presented with the partnership idea, private companies were skeptical, and an initial 2009 call for bids for the management contract failed. There were company complaints about the remuneration level and the lack of guarantees regarding service demand, which the firms thought likely to fluctuate.

After further discussions, a new 2010 tender guaranteed that the government would pay 70 percent of the estimated demand to the winning bidder, establishing a floor compensation level. (The estimate included only in-person services and did not count those delivered online or via the automated service desk.) Any additional payment would be based on performance, measured by the coefficient of efficiency. In practice, the firms’ concerns did not play out; demand was always higher than projected, so the government did not have to pay out funds for services that were not provided. The 20-year contract also introduced technical requirements related to the bidding companies’ experience in managing infrastructure and services. When the secretariat put the management of additional units out for a second bid in 2013, it reduced the contract term to 17 years. It also agreed to review the reliability and validity of the coefficient of efficiency, the main performance metric, every five years.

The team focused on the service price and quality when selecting the winning bid. Under the MGS model, the average cost for a service was 16.80 reais (US\$9.23). In the bidding process, the team stipulated that the cost per service could not exceed 13 reais (US\$7.14). Minas Cidade, the company that won the bid to run the first six units, offered to process a service for 11.60 reais (US\$6.37), reducing costs by 31 percent compared to the other UAIs.

In getting the new units up and running, Minas Cidade staffed the new units with private sector workers and the PSIU civil servants returned to their parent agencies. (For the second bid, the secretariat planned to encourage the winning company to retain the MGS workers. The team was still working out the final bid details in 2013.)

Testing the new public-private partnership is an ongoing process. The UAI coordinating team adapted

its systems to monitor service delivery under this new arrangement. The situation room would continue to operate, and the coordinating unit would continue to calculate coefficients of efficiency. Based on experience, the team kept close tabs on certain aspects of the operations. For example, the UAI team paid special attention to the ticketing systems because the number of tickets given out affected the coefficient of efficiency, which, in turn, determined the amount that the private company would be paid. A person could receive a ticket but leave without obtaining a service or simply lose the ticket. Because the company was paid on the basis of the coefficient, which put a 40 percent weight on average wait time for service, a long wait time because of a lost or unused ticket counted against the company and it lost revenues. Getting the system right was still on the agenda in 2013.

The UAI coordinating unit had to clear the new partnership procedures with the participating federal, state, and local agencies, and a few agencies resisted the move. Machado of the civil police said: “The greatest challenge is the high turnover, and we have no control over the people who get the training. I think this is the biggest challenge. The private sector controls the qualifications of the people. The only thing we receive is the names. And we do a background check. And we don’t have any other control.”

Girão acknowledged occasional difficulties in navigating the public-private partnership. “The main objective of the state is to provide quality services to the citizens,” she said. “But for the private company, it is profit. Our effort is to maintain profit but also to provide quality service to the citizen....It has to keep in mind our objective: To provide quality service, not just provide any service.” Some worried that the lower salaries the private company paid might influence service quality. In 2013, most workers supplied by MGS received about 1,100 reais per month (US\$536), compared to a public-private employee wage of about 670 reais per month (US\$327) at the public-private units. (Employee wages at the public-private units were about four times Brazil’s poverty line.) However, the UAI team members noted that public-private units provided upgraded working conditions and motivated workers through awards and recognition. Further, the UAI coordinating team had to teach the private partner and assist more than they had anticipated, at least in the initial start-up period.

For its part, Minas Cidade continued to complain that the coefficient of efficiency was not the best measure for basing payments. In particular, the company complained that the UAI ticketing system was yielding inaccurate data. Minas Cidade also complained that the delays due to agency procedures should not be used against it when calculating its efficiency.

Overall, however, the secretariat viewed the pilot partnership as a success. The team worked with Minas Cidade to convert five of the seven remaining PSIUs into public-private units and added a new one. All six units became fully operational by the end of 2011. Vilhena compared the pilot units to the others: “We have 95 percent approval among citizens, and it cost 31 percent less” (than the others). At the time of writing, the secretariat planned to transfer the remaining one-stop shops to a public-private partnership in 2014.

The public-private model for the UAIs was not ideal for all, however, and it raised employee concerns. Employees at the units that would be transferred to a public-private model did not know if they would keep their jobs and expressed concern. In response, the UAI team opened up a special hotline to answer questions and provide information. The secretariat also planned to urge whichever private company won the second bid to retain workers. Santos said: “With the new bid, we are encouraging the private partner financially to absorb the workforce. It is also of interest to the company, which will not have to spend [money] on training. But we know that it is not possible to save everyone’s job.”

In 2013, newspapers reported issues at some public-private units in operation. For instance, in Uberlândia, the state’s second largest city, citizens complained about the long wait time at their public-private unit, with some reporting that they had been waiting for ID cards for more than eight hours. The unit coordinator reported that the managing company had taken measures to meet demand, including hiring 10 new employees (Santos 2013).

Study Limitations Include Time and Resource Conditions

The pilot case study was conducted under highly constrained time and resource conditions. These conditions led to limited field access to the desired variety of sources of evidence, including minimal availability for scheduling interviews with key officials

or for obtaining permissions to analyze relevant agency archival and documentary data. The main field informants also did not have a chance to provide thorough feedback on the draft or early versions of the case study. As a result, although the resulting case study provides an accurate rendition of the main events and actions, differing perspectives about the implementation process, including rival renditions of the process, have not necessarily been represented.

Lessons Learned: How Organizational Change Occurs When Services Are Revamped

The implementation of the revamped one-stop shops provides some insights into how organizational change can occur when existing services are overhauled, but not replaced. These insights are shown as responses to the case study questions presented at the outset of this case study.

Question 1: How did the conversion process gain the needed interagency support?

Trading resource support for cooperation and high service standards. The reform team crafted incentives to induce the agencies to cooperate. Under the old system, participating agencies paid for the civil servants that provided their services, leaving the units' maintenance costs—estimated at 3.13 million reais (US\$1.46 million) in 2007—to the secretariat. Vilhena, who took over as planning secretary in 2007, agreed that the secretariat would build or upgrade the one-stop shops, provide equipment, and continue to cover maintenance expenses. In addition, it would hire and manage personnel, and pay their salaries, and monitor service delivery quality.

The creation of these incentives and the agreement turned out to be an important inflection point for the program. In exchange, the agencies would agree to accept new service standards and abide by UAI rules. Santos explained that, “The deal was that SEPLAG would bear the cost, and the agencies, in return, would adhere to standard quality and processes for providing the services.”

As an added incentive for organizational and behavior change, the UAI coordinating team offered agencies expertise in improving business processes if they agreed to participate. For each service, the team worked with agencies to create flowcharts, hone procedures, and

define relationships between the people who were part of each delivery chain.

Creating “win-win” conditions to encourage partnerships and cooperation. Oliveira Santiago Maciel, head of the State Department of Transit, said the decision to join the UAI effort was easy for him because it did not add to the department's expenses. “On the contrary, the partnership allowed us to take our services to more locations, increasing our points of service,” he said. “In addition, the measure allowed us to improve the quality of services delivered as well citizen satisfaction.” Because the secretariat would provide personnel, outsourcing services to UAIs allowed agencies to recall their own staff and assign them to other tasks at a time when budgets were tight.

Civil police chief and the state's Institute of Identification director, Leticia Machado, said she also viewed the UAI conversion as a win for her agency. The planning secretariat “helped us with the renovation of the space and equipment,” she said. “They provide us with employees and we provide the training. We make no financial contribution to our services at the UAIs. The only thing that we offer to the UAI is the specific material to produce the ID—paper, ink The UAIs offered a lot of improvements. The location is much more appropriate. There is more space. There are enough seats.”

Broaching legal and procedural obstacles. There were often legal and procedural obstacles to overcome, and Girão's unit broached these issues in their negotiations. In some instances, the secretariat merely had to win clearance from department heads to have the UAI workers perform some functions that department staff had done before. Offering his office as an example, Maciel of the State Transit Department explained: “Our activities are regulated by federal law, specifically the Brazilian Transit Code and resolutions issued by Contran (National Transit Council). They often say that we are transferring competencies and services to a third party. We have to demonstrate to them that we are not doing so.”

Several federal agencies agreed to offer services through the UAIs after Girão negotiated with them on rules that would allow contract workers to provide their services. The secretariat worked out an agreement with the Ministry of Labor and Employment to host work permit services and access to the national employment database at the UAIs. Eager to increase locations that offered passport services in Belo Horizonte, the Federal

Police agreed to join UAI units in the city and ultimately, the Federal Police expanded its partnership with the secretariat to allow UAI locations in other parts of Minas Gerais to issue passports as well.

Although many agencies continued to offer services at their main offices in addition to the UAIs, they gradually began to view the UAIs as the best place to serve the citizenry. With time, the UAIs' leverage increased. "Whenever an agency comes to us nowadays for being a partner, we make clear that the UAI adds value for the agency's business and process," Girão said.

Summary of citizen services provided. By 2013, 15 federal, state, and municipal agencies provided citizen services at the UAIs,⁴ as follows:

- The Civil Police provided ID cards and criminal background checks.
- The Ministry of Labor and Employment helped citizens secure work permits and job placement through a national employment database.
- The Secretariat of Labor and Employment assisted with unemployment insurance.
- The Secretariat of Planning and Management helped state employees with payroll and benefits such as retirement and pension.
- The State of Minas Gerais housing company, COHAB, worked with citizens to renegotiate debt agreements and make payments on loans, and an ombudsman counter logged public complaints.
- The Consumer Protection Agency also offered support to citizens.
- Other popular services provided by various agencies included vehicle tax and fine payments, tax ID registration, and business registration. (Minas Fácil counters were present at 12 UAIs.) (See table 6.)

Question 2: How were the implementers able to create a new organizational culture for the one-stop shops?

Changing culture in the agencies that operated at a UAI was not easy, but it was a barrier that had to be surmounted for the UAIs to function. "Change of culture is related to power and authority," Girão said. "Some

agencies did not understand the agreement with us clearly and thought that they would lose power. But they had to follow our rules."

One of the most difficult challenges was to ensure that, even after the doors of a UAI closed at the end of the day, everyone inside would be served. Girão said: "We had to work with the agencies to resolve such issues."

Other procedures limited favoritism. The team worked with coordinators to enforce the UAIs' ticketing system policy of first come, first served. Machado commented: "Through UAIs, we are offering equality and want to treat all citizens equally."

The planning secretariat wanted the UAI coordinators to focus on personnel management and organizational culture, so they managed maintenance teams centrally. Building support teams ensured that UAI coordinators were not caught up in maintaining equipment. "We make sure that the materials are there, the infrastructure is there, that the units have the necessary materials to operate," Girão explained. "The coordinators of the units now had to focus on the length of time and wait time for services. We want them to be focused on improving the quality of services."

To strengthen the attention paid to citizens and to create stronger feedback loops from users, the secretariat team monitored citizen complaints through an ombudsman desk at each UAI, a hotline, and the state government website. There was swift turnaround in resolving issues. Team members had 2 working days to resolve complaints citizens submitted through the website and 10 for complaints people lodged with the ombudsman. Common complaints included unavailability of appointment or service delays. Felipe Moreira de Oliveira, a business process analyst and manager of the UAI's citizen relationship department, said that he typically received about 7 complaints a day but the number could go up to 16 or 17. Although the numbers were not high, some issues were time-consuming and difficult to resolve quickly. Oliveira said: "Sometimes it is hard to resolve issues in two days. For instance, a citizen went to a UAI to renew an ID number she had had for 40 years, only to discover that she would have to change it. She didn't want to do so. The complaint should have gone to the ID institute, but instead came to us. Now we are trying to contact the institute." The team escalated complex issues to Girão or Vilhena, who would work with agency heads to find solutions.

Apart from complaints, the team also passed on positive feedback to the individual one-stop shops. Oliveira

⁴ Agencies at the UAIs included the following: the Bank of Brazil, the civil police's State Department of Transit and the Institute of Identification; the Commercial Board; Energy Company of Minas Gerais; the Federal Revenue Agency; the federal police; State of Minas Gerais housing company, COHAB; the Institute of Social Welfare of Public Servants of Minas Gerais; the Ministry of Labor and Employment; the ombudsman; the Secretariat of Labor and Employment; the Secretariat of Planning and Management; the Secretariat of Science, Technology, and Higher Education; and the Tribunal of Justice.

Table 6 Agencies and Popular Services

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Popular services</i>
Bank of Brazil Civil Police State Department of Transit Institute of Identification (IIMG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accepting payment of bills, fees, and taxes for government services • Driver's license • Vehicle registration • Payment of motor vehicle fines • Payment of motor vehicle taxes and fees • Payment of transit insurance • Criminal background check services (IIMG) • ID cards (IIMG)
Commercial Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business closing • Business registration (In one-shop shops with Minas Fácil services)
Consumer Protection Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assistance on consumer grievances • Consumer protection information
Energy Company of Minas Gerais	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issuance of payment delay document • Payment of bills
Federal Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criminal records • Passports
Federal Revenue Agency State of Minas Gerais Housing Company (COHAB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tax ID number • Installment payments of loans • Issuance of payment delay documents • Property registration • Property tax • Renegotiation and debt agreements
Institute of Social Welfare of Public Servants of Minas Gerais (IPSEMG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPSEMG card • IPSEMG refund
Ministry of Labor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Employment System • Work permit
Ombudsman Secretariat of Labor and Employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receipt and action on citizen complaints • Job placement services • Unemployment insurance • Unemployment insurance refund
Secretariat of Planning and Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benefit services for state employees • Payroll services for state employees • Pension and retirement services for state employees
Secretariat of Science, Technology and Higher Education Tribunal of Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not applicable (no public service) • Negotiating reconciliation between parties

added: “When a member of the public voices praise of an employee at the ombudsman’s desk or on the ‘Talk to Us’ channel, we always forward it to the person who provided the assistance.”

The team focused on making information on services and required documents easily available to citizens. Citizens could go online to the government portal, call a telephone hotline or a local UAI, send an email to a UAI unit, send a direct request to the UAI coordinating unit at Fale Conosco (Talk to Us—a channel for citizen feedback), or contact the ombudsman. Inside the units, clear signs and instructions helped orient visitors and enabled them to proceed to the correct service area. Computer screens provided information on the ticket

numbers being processed, the type of service, and the status.

Question 3: How did the implementers create an evidence-based system for monitoring the performance of the one-stop shops?

Revamping the database to track performance and service. In 2008, the team developed a management database to replace the simple spreadsheets that the one-stop shop managers had been using. The database made it possible for the UAI team to track the number of customers served, the number waiting, and wait times both at individual units and across the whole system. Each UAI unit had a system that collected

information on the total number of entry tickets; the number issued for each service; the number unaccounted for because of a left or lost ticket; and wait times. The system also recorded customer satisfaction through a small, easy-to-use keypad at each service window that enabled citizens to log their satisfaction level with UAI. All the information from the individual units came together in a central hub, but they lacked the capacity and resources to effectively manage and analyze the data.

Creating the situation room, a real-time reporting system. In 2011 and 2012, Andrey Moraes Labanca and others on the coordinating unit's technical team improved the tracking system to present the data in a more useful format and in nearly real time (with a 30-second delay). At the UAI coordination unit in the Planning Secretariat, a bank of computer screens showed the average wait at 28 units, the number of customers being served, the number waiting, and the number of attendants on duty and providing assistance. The situation room also calculated the average of the total time for all services and the average service time per agency and type of service. The UAI coordinating unit purchased tablet computers so that team members could monitor each unit's performance even when they were away from the central office. Labanca said he created the first iteration of the situation room using only the basic version of Microsoft's Excel spreadsheet program, and as resources increased, he was able to fine-tune it and add functionality. The first version cost the team about 8,000 reais (US\$4,770). The secretariat invested in the second version of the situation room, which cost nearly 1.8 million reais (US\$965,122), and allocated an additional 1.5 million reais (US\$804,268) for software licensing.

"With the situation room, we started acting preventively instead of just correcting the issues that we encountered," Labanca said. "Another important point was that we wanted to provide the right information at the right time. In the past, we would receive phone calls from a UAI and the problem had already passed. The coordinator would only let us know later by email. But, with the situation room, we could anticipate the problem even before the coordinator would pick up the phone."

Using the monitoring system to manage demand. Girão said: "If we see through the situation room that a long

line is developing, it helps us take actions to correct it, reconfiguring additional desks to attend to that demand. If we see that the line is diminishing, then we are able to switch new desks and act upon that demand."

But the situation room did not resolve all bottlenecks. "Some problems are very difficult to solve, like the high demand we have during the first two months of the year," Labanca said. "The waiting time in the first two months is longer than we would like it to be. In the bigger units we can't help it. So we recommend that people go to other units around Belo Horizonte. We also try to find alternatives, like scheduling appointments." Although hard to measure because demand and the number of available services constantly increased during vacations periods (in December, January, July, and August), demand for documents could go up anywhere from 10 percent to 30 percent.

To meet the high demand, UAI team members adapted by staggering employees' lunch hours and helped to schedule appointments. Vasconcelos noted: "Making appointments distributes demands. If you don't get an appointment in one unit, you get it in another unit that same day. This is another area where we have had to raise awareness among agencies about the ease and benefits of using scheduled appointments." In the future, the team plans to upgrade the technology so that each unit would have display screens near the entrance with the wait time of both that unit and that of the nearest one. "We want to make the citizen aware of the time he will spend at the unit, and distribute demand," Labanca said.

In a similar manner, the coordinating unit monitored the coefficient of efficiency on a daily basis and took appropriate action when it fell below 95 percent. Oliveira, in charge of citizen complaints, said: "We monitor day-to-day operations, so we know problems like lack of training, offline systems, lack of personnel, or high waiting time. So if the coefficient falls from 95 percent, we often know or can anticipate the reason. We escalate it to Fernanda (Girão) or, depending on the problem, to the (planning) secretary."

If the coefficient fell below 95 percent, coordinators worked with attendants to reduce wait times. Eliel Benetes Goncalves, coordinator of the Praça Sete UAI in Belo Horizonte, said: "People may lose it [the ticket] or forget their number. This change allowed us to bring up our coefficient....especially on Mondays and Tuesdays when we have the greatest demand." Managers also kept

an eye on other aspects of service. “We monitor idle time of each attendant,” Goncalves said. “If the person finishes a service and takes too long to call the next ticket number, or if they don’t pause the system when they go to the bathroom, then it is counted as idle time. By law, they have a 15-minute break, and we keep track of the break.”

How This Case Study Informs the Science of Delivery

The science of delivery is the collective and cumulative knowledge base of delivery know-how that helps practitioners make more informed decisions and produce consistent results on the ground. This knowledge base focuses on understanding not just what to deliver, but also how to deliver. This knowledge base emerging framework identifies five approaches that represent part of the delivery know-how that practitioners use on the ground to achieve results. The present case study speaks to these approaches and their relevance to the delivery challenges faced by implementers, as follows:

Relentless focus on citizen outcomes. From 2009 to 2012, the transactions handled by the one-stop shops increased nearly seven-fold, and surveys showed that citizens gave high marks to the service units. The shops also used a coefficient of efficiency that took into account citizens’ evaluations and wait times as well as the degree of assistance offered; most of the shops scored over 95 percent on this measure.

Multidimensional response. Fifteen federal, state, and municipal agencies participated in the one-stop

shops, covering a multisectoral variety of services. Successful implementation meant overcoming legal and procedural obstacles to coordination. A later effort involved a new public-private partnership to improve staff recruitment and accountability as well as service efficiency. By the end of the case study in 2013, the work on this partnership was still being refined.

Evidence to achieve results. In redesigning the one-stop shops, the implementation team looked to the experiences in other states in Brazil. The team also observed its own shops, talked to staff, and recorded the procedures and time taken to provide services. Later, the team designed and installed a formal online system to measure the ongoing services at each shop, helping to redeploy resources in real time.

Leadership for change. The broader reform effort began with a new governor who was elected in 2003 and reelected in 2006. Reorganizing government agencies was a high priority, which included reassigning the one-stop shops to a new secretariat and appointing a high-quality management team to review and reform the shops. However, the case study does not discuss how learning from practitioners might also have taken place.

Adaptive implementation. Besides adapting each shop’s operations to improve services and efficiency, the management team also took into account the need to change the culture of the one-stop shops, identifying them with new branding considerations, including a new name. The public-private partnership to improve staff recruitment and accountability also represented a flexible and iterative approach to implementation.

ANNEX A Timeline: Minas Gerais One-Stop Shops

<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>
1996	Governor of Minas Gerais, Eduardo Brandão Azeredo, issued a decree mandating the creation of one-stop shops or PSIUs.
1998	Most PSIUs opened by 1998.
1998–99	Brazil faces a currency crisis; there are high levels of deficits both in the budget and in the current account.
1999	The State of Minas Gerais temporarily suspends service on US\$13.5 billion of debt to the federal government.
2003	Aécio Neves da Cunha is elected governor of the State of Minas Gerais. Antônio Augusto Junho Anastasia is appointed secretary of state for planning and management. Renata Maria Paes de Vilhena is appointed deputy secretary of state for planning and management. The new Secretary of State for Planning and Management team initiated the “management shock” to fix the state’s finances and launch strategic projects. The new team launched the Programa Empresa Mineira Competitiva project to encourage businesses and offer a solution to the state’s fiscal crisis.
December 2004	Resolution No. 93 passed and created a central portal to access information on services.
September 2005	The first unit of Minas Fácil for business permits is inaugurated (see Box 1).
2006	Minas Fácil units expand across the state.
December 2006	Neves is reelected governor of the State of Minas Gerais for a second term. Anastasia is elected deputy governor of State of Minas Gerais. Vilhena is appointed secretary of state for planning and management.
2007–10	Second stage reform “State for Results” for results-based management is implemented; Competitive Minas is reviewed and revised.
2007	Projeto Estruturador Descomplicar is launched (see Box 2). Neves eliminated the State Secretariat for Regional and Urban Policy and reassigned responsibility of state’s 26 PSIUs to the secretary of state for planning and management.
December 2007	First two PSIUs are restructured as UAIs.
2008	Six more PSIUs are converted to UAIs and 2 new UAIs are created. The UAI team installs a new management database (SIGA Web).
2009	Eight more PSIUs are converted to UAIs.
December 2010	Anastasia is elected governor of the State of Minas Gerais.
2010	Three more PSIUs are converted to UAIs; a new UAI is created.
2011	Five PSIUs are transformed into UAI public-private partnership (PPP) units; a new PPP UAI unit is created.
2011–12	The UAI team creates and implements a new monitoring system (situation room).
2011–14	The third-stage reform, “management for citizenship,” for improving citizen services is launched.
2013	A plan is in progress to convert the 22 UAIs and 2 PSIUs into public-private one-stop shops.

ANNEX B Key Case Study Decision Makers and Team Members Case Study

<i>Key decision maker or team member</i>	<i>Title</i>
Aécio Neves da Cunha	Governor of Minas Gerais (2003–10)
Alexandre Lima Cabral	UAI Coordinating Team Member (Human Resources, Operations)
Andrey Moraes Labanca	UAI Coordinating Team Member (IT Infrastructure and Systems)
Antônio Augusto Junho Anastasia	Secretary of State for Planning and Management (2003–06); Deputy Governor (2007–10)
Breno Eduardo Elias Dos Santos	UAI Coordinating Team Member (Business Process Manager)
Erick Brazil de Vasconcelos	UAI Coordinating Team Member (Communications)
Felipe Moreira de Oliveira	UAI Coordinating Team Member (Business Processes, Citizen Relationship)
Fernanda Valadares Couto Girão	Assistant Secretary of Management
Henrique Lage Tomich	UAI Coordinating Team Member (Operations, UAI Services)
Renata Maria Paes de Vilhena	Deputy Secretary of State for Planning and Management (2003–06); Secretary of State for Planning and Management (2007–present)
Rodrigo Gitirana Lyrio Do Nascimento	UAI Coordinating Team Member (Architecture, Infrastructure)

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