

## Annex I - Proposals, by contour, to revise the monitoring framework

This annex presents the seven contours (and one area of exploration) identified at the 21<sup>st</sup> Steering Committee meeting (July 2021). For each contour the annex summarises the key commitments that relate to the contour, what the previous framework measured about them, the suggested changes in terms of core evidence (see Table 4 in main document) as well as proposed complementary information and data points (Table 5 in main document). For some contours, it is also proposed to explore secondary data to capture areas that stakeholders asked to be measured through the monitoring exercise and that can provide useful contextual information, to complement and enrich interpretation of the monitoring results. As those data are already available elsewhere, and with the logic of not duplicating existing measurements, these secondary data points are suggested to be considered/reported on instead of collecting new data through the monitoring exercise.

### COLLECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY

#### Key commitments?

- Mutual accountability was a key principle of the Paris Declaration. In Paris, partner countries committed to reinforce the participation of a broad range of stakeholders in the formulation and assessment of progress in the implementation of national development strategies and budgets, as well as to strengthen the role of parliaments in national development strategies and/or budgets. Development partners and partner countries together committed to jointly assess, through existing and increasingly objective country-level mechanisms, mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness.
- In Busan, the principle of accountability was reaffirmed, and broadened as “accountability to each other” to include accountability to beneficiaries of co-operation, “as well as to respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders”. Partners also committed to enable civil society organisations (CSOs) to exercise their role as independent development actors, and to encourage CSOs to implement practices to strengthen their accountability and their contribution to development effectiveness, guided by the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness.
- With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda in 2015 and the adoption of the Nairobi Outcome Document (NOD) at the GPEDC’s 2<sup>nd</sup> High Level Meeting in 2016, the importance of a whole-of-society approach to development was reconfirmed and further articulated to include more specifically the role of CSOs, the private sector, philanthropic actors, parliaments and local governments.
- In the NOD, partner country governments committed to submit national aid or development co-operation policies and information to parliament for review; present regularly the progress reports on implementation; and share information with parliaments to support and promote their full participation in processes for developing and reviewing policies and modalities for development co-operation.

#### What do we currently track?

Based on these commitments, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) monitoring exercise tracks three broad areas of collective accountability:

(A) The participation of a broad range of stakeholders in the national development planning and implementation process, through four existing indicators/elements of the framework:

- i. Indicator 1a / Module 1 includes a question on which country-level stakeholders are engaged by development partners in the preparation of country strategies (options are partner country government, CSOs, private sector, other stakeholders). Module 2 of the same indicator asks which actors are implementing development co-operation projects (options include CSOs, private sector, development partners, and government, among others). This indicator is also addressed in other parts of this paper.

**Commented [1]: Global Partnership Monitoring:**  
Kindly refrain from making anonymous comments in this document. Thank you for using an identifiable profile when commenting or simply indicating your name and organisation as part of your comment.

**Commented [AM2]: Alessandro Motter:**  
General comment to the proposed framework:

1. The indicator framework ends up with roughly the same aid-centric indicators as before looking at how aid is spent and accounted for (good), but leaving out the whole dimension - since Busan and further consolidated in Nairobi - of “leveraging” aid to generate additional resources (taxes, private investments) or stem losses (illicit flows, poor return on extractive industry contracts etc.). IPU proposes that at least ONE NEW INDICATOR be considered to capture this leveraging function: e.g., the extent to which aid that is used as leverage or catalyst actually succeeds in generating results on the ground, with more domestic resources generated and in a fair way, PPP contracts that actually benefit the partner country, reduced losses due to illicit flows, etc.

2. The important dimension of climate change, also featured in the Nairobi document, is missing entirely. IPU proposes that a NEW INDICATOR is considered to assess commitments to quality climate finance.

3. IPU proposes refinements to INDICATORS 1,4, 6, 7,8, and 10 as discussed in the paper.

- ii. Indicator 1b looks at whether national development strategies are developed in an inclusive manner and whether progress reports on these strategies are made publicly available. This is also addressed in other parts of this paper, particularly under leaving no one behind (LNOB) in relation to inclusion of groups of the population in vulnerable and marginalised situations.
- iii. Assessment of enabling environment for CSOs and CSO development effectiveness (indicator 2 and its 4 modules), which looks at the extent to which partner country governments and development partners contribute to an enabling environment for CSOs and at the efforts of CSOs to improve their effectiveness. The three constituencies report on all modules of the assessment.
- iv. Assessment of public private dialogue (PPD), and the role of public and private sectors to create an environment conducive to maximising the private sector's contribution to development (indicator 3). This is dealt with elsewhere in this paper, in relation to monitoring the Kampala Principles (KPs) for Private Sector Engagement (PSE) in Development Co-operation.

(B) Parliamentary oversight, through indicator 6, which tracks development co-operation on budget and indirectly provides a measurement of parliamentary oversight. Indicator 6 is discussed in more detail in the section related to the pre-Busan commitments.

(C) Mutual accountability, through indicator 7, which looks at whether mutual assessment reviews of development co-operation commitments take place at country level.

#### Suggested change?

Related to (A), from existing indicators, it will be possible to pull out information on whether partner country governments engage national actors (parliament, civil society, private sector, subnational governments, development partners) in developing their national development plans and strategies, produce and make publicly available regular progress reports on their national development plans and strategies as well as whether they use those reports to inform dialogue with development partners on priority areas and results (existing elements of indicator 1b). This information on which country-level stakeholders the development partners engage in developing their country strategies and implementing their projects can be pulled from existing indicator 1a. [Agreed](#)

Commented [JST3]: Innocent Mugabe

Related to A and specifically on the assessment of enabling environment for CSOs:

- The data that the assessment provides are difficult to aggregate globally, as it is composed of modules looking at distinguished issues. Results are difficult to explain in a concise manner to a diverse global audience with limitations on absorbing very nuanced detail. Nevertheless, the differences in perception between the three constituencies reporting on this assessment are really valuable at country level, particularly to have a dialogue about these differences, why they exist and what can be changed.
- To retain the CSO enabling environment assessment as is, but at global level, provide key messages that can be easily understood and reflect in a snapshot a sense of the CSO enabling environment and CSOs' development effectiveness<sup>1</sup>. For example, there could be three 'headline' global messages reported, based on the data from the CSO enabling environment assessment. One would focus on partner country governments, one on CSOs, and the other on development partners. For initial thinking on what these headline messages could be, see Table 4 in the main document. In addition, there will be an indication of the share of countries – out of those reporting in a given monitoring round - that undertook an inclusive dialogue to report on CSO enabling environment (with all three stakeholders included in the reporting).
- With this approach, while evidence emerging from the modules that compose the assessment would still be aggregated globally, there would be less need to unpack in detail each single module and question. As in the past, a more detailed global-level analysis could also be picked up and reported by experts and engaged constituencies<sup>2</sup>. At country level, once this information is collected through a

Commented [4]: Jacqueline Wood:  
Submitting inputs as OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, participant in GPEDC AA 2.4:  
One of the GPEDC constituencies, the DAC, adopted in July 2021 the DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance (<https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5021>).  
The GPEDC monitoring will be one amongst other existing processes and data that will be drawn from for the Recommendation's monitoring (specifically to inform a five-year report) (see para 15: [https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DGD/DAC\(2021\)29&docLanguage=En](https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DGD/DAC(2021)29&docLanguage=En)).  
We would welcome an opportunity to have a look at Indicator 2 in 2022 to explore whether any simple, practical adjustments might be warranted in light of the Recommendation.

<sup>1</sup> Indicator 2 provides an important measurement of CSOs accountability within its module 2, which is based on the *Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness* and the *International Framework for CSO Development*.

<sup>2</sup> A detailed report on the findings from the assessment of the CSO enabling environment and CSOs' development effectiveness was undertaken by the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE).

dialogue with CSOs and development partners, it would be presented in more detail as part of the country results brief, for discussion at the Action Dialogue.

- In addition, it is proposed to have smaller/domestic foundations, which at country level face challenges with their enabling environment and are, in some countries, considered CSOs, report alongside CSOs on this indicator. The same could also be considered for trade unions. (The exact reporting format for these actors needs to be further explored.)

Related to (B), on parliamentary oversight:

- In addition to continuing to collect data through indicator 6 (which only deals with development co-operation recorded on budget and therefore submitted to parliamentary oversight), the proposal is to collect – through adjustments to indicator 4b - additional evidence about the efforts by partner country governments (executive branch) to provide information to parliaments from their information management systems that track all development co-operation resources, financial and non-financial, public and private. Partner country governments would also be asked whether they shared previous GPEDC monitoring results with parliament. This approach reflects the mutual accountability of development partners to provide that information to partner country governments, and the accountability of the executive branch of partner country governments to provide the information to parliaments. Within indicator 4b, there would be simple question(s) for partner countries to respond to around this (including an option to report on other approaches to provide this information if the country has no/weak information management systems for development co-operation).

Related to (C), the suggested changes to the former mutual accountability indicator are the following:

- A shift from 'mutual accountability' with a government-to-government focus, to a whole-of-society (WOS) approach and 'collective accountability'. This will include revising the indicator language to better account for the full range of stakeholders. And to the extent possible, the language of the indicator will be further clarified so that it is simpler and more easily understood.
- The focus on mutual accountability – and now collective accountability – has always been at the heart of the monitoring exercise, will remain central to the whole exercise. As mentioned in the proposed changes to the monitoring process, Action Dialogues will be an important part of this by strengthening the use of monitoring results through an inclusive, multi stakeholder dialogue that aims to discuss and agree on actions that various stakeholders will take going forward to improve how they partner. Where possible, this dialogue would be held within existing national mechanisms, including the country's collective accountability mechanism or relevant other parliamentary proceedings such as multi-stakeholder hearings within the budget or development committees, –in order to build on and strengthen existing mechanisms while also ensuring that there is a platform for regular, inclusive follow-up on any agreed actions to address the monitoring results.
- Furthermore, where possible, the information collected on collective accountability would be adjusted to account for elements that might be more relevant in conflict-affected situations (e.g. increasing emphasis on dialogue, existence of regular assessments, with appropriate counterparts).
- Another consideration as this indicator is refined will be to review the soon-to-be launched Mutual Accountability survey of the UN Development Co-operation Forum (DCF) - expected in the fall of 2021 - in order to see how this indicator could complement, or be aligned with, what that survey monitors. If the questions in this indicator are the same/similar as what is in the DCF survey, partner country governments could refer to their past survey response in order to answer some of the questions of this indicator<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Part of GPEDC monitoring and the DCF survey on mutual accountability provide complementary and reinforcing findings on mutual accountability in development co-operation. Findings from the DCF survey are made available at aggregate level, not at country level. However, partner countries that participated in the most recent DCF survey can request a copy of their responses from UN-DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) and use their results to report on this aspect of the GPEDC monitoring exercise, thereby minimising reporting efforts while adding granularity to the information and analyses. For partner countries that did not participate in the DCF survey, they can explore this issue through the GPEDC monitoring exercise.

**Commented [AM5]: Alessandro Motter:**

IPU suggests adding to the information governments need to provide to parliaments as part of Indicator 4:

- PPP contracts
- Extractive industry contracts
- Foreign loans agreements

These are often negotiated with no parliamentary input and sometimes not even disclosed to parliament even after the deal is done. The conditions set out in these contracts can be highly disadvantageous to the partner country.

**Commented [AM6]: Alessandro Motter:**

This otherwise good idea may have been super-ceded by the proposal in the main paper concerning the reconstituted Action Dialogues and Exit Survey. Those post-mortems should certainly include the parliament.

**Commented [AM7]: Alessandro Motter:**

For IPU, and in the "normal course of things", parliament itself should be seen as a primary locus for this collective accountability to be practiced. We should at least allow for the possibility that in some countries parliament itself acts as the convener of national accountability dialogues within its institutional setting (usually within committees). This would be an excellent way of building on existing national capacities and empowering the parliament at once.

### Complementary data points and information

- Development partners could be asked whether they use joint planning processes with other development partners (to be added under 1a/strategy level).
- As complementary information, under indicator 7, partner countries could be asked whether their development co-operation policies include effectiveness principles and medium-term effectiveness-related objectives.

### Secondary data to explore

- Contextual figures – from global sources – could be provided to give an indication of the number and size of development partners' operations in partner countries. This could be the basis for discussions on increased co-ordination and division of labour at country level. [Agreed](#)

Commented [JST8]: Innocent Mugabe

### Would data be comparable?

Related to (A), and specifically on the assessment on CSO enabling environment and CSO development effectiveness:

- Yes, the assessment methodology would not change, and any newly collected information on this would be comparable to previous rounds,
- In addition, the three proposed "headline global messages" provide relevant trends between rounds on the progress made by countries, development partners and CSOs.

Related to (B) on parliamentary oversight:

- The information collected under indicator 6 will remain comparable. The additional evidence to be collected under 4b will be new, so there would be no baseline data for that.

Related to (C) on indicator 7:

- Yes. While the language would be clarified and simplified, and have greater focus on all stakeholders rather than government-to-government, the data would be comparable.
- The methodology would remain the same in the calculation of the indicator (i.e. 4 out of 5 elements is a quality accountability mechanism). If the methodology is slightly amended to account for a revised response metric this would be explained in a technical note.

### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

The main benefit of the above approach (all components cumulatively) would be to demonstrate and communicate more clearly the various elements of collective accountability that the monitoring measures. The emphasis on an Action Dialogue as part of the exercise would also, in itself, demonstrate the collective accountability approach.

For the individual components discussed above there are various benefits and trade-offs. For indicator 2, the proposed approach would help to better communicate to global audiences the headline messages about CSO enabling environment and CSO development effectiveness, while still providing nuanced information to inform dialogue at country level. For the new proposed component on parliamentary oversight, the main drawback is that this would be additional (yet simple) reporting for partner country governments. The benefit would be to reflect the broader oversight role of parliament in development co-operation. On indicator 7, the revised indicator language and focus would reflect a more WOS approach, the results could be communicated better (including through simplifying the response metric), while still retaining comparability from previous rounds.

## TRANSPARENCY

### Key commitments?

Transparency, like collective accountability, is a commitment that everyone has a role to play to achieve. While in the Busan Partnership Agreement transparency is jointly presented with the principle of accountability, it is a cross-cutting issue that is interlinked with many areas of GPEDC monitoring. As elements of transparency feature across many of the contours in this paper, this contour specifically on transparency focuses on access to information and data related to development co-operation.

In Busan, partners committed to focus on transparent and responsible co-operation, including by:

- [development partners, and other actors] providing, and improving the availability and public accessibility, of timely, transparent and comprehensive information on development co-operation and other development resources; and,
- [partner countries] focusing, at the country level, on establishing transparent public financial management and aid information management systems, and strengthening the capacities of all relevant stakeholders to make better use of this information in decision-making and to promote accountability (BPD § 23b).

### What do we currently track?

- GPEDC monitoring tracks transparency by looking at availability and access to information on data related to development co-operation. More specifically, this includes secondary data on the timeliness, accessibility, comprehensiveness, and accuracy of provider reporting information on development co-operation through global systems and standards (indicator 4: OECD-CRS, OECD-FSS, and IATI<sup>4</sup>).
- Complementary information is collected at country level to measure whether partner countries have systems to report on development co-operation and whether development partners report to those systems.
- Furthermore, through other indicators, partner country governments provide information on whether:
  - they make the national development strategy (NDS) and progress reports publicly available (indicator 1b)
  - results of mutual assessments are made publicly available (indicator 7)

### Suggested change?

With regard to what is currently tracked by indicator 4, the following changes are proposed:

- Continue to report on the current (global level) indicator as a core data point of the GPEDC monitoring exercise. There will also be exploration of whether the three systems are still able to provide the same level of information as in past monitoring rounds. Furthermore, it will be explored whether it is feasible to present the results of the global indicator in a more intuitive way, such as by timeliness and completeness of reporting, rather than on the reporting of development partners' aggregate performances to each of the three standards.<sup>5</sup> *Sometimes it becomes harder for partner countries to report on this indicators using data that is generated from these global systems because we noticed there is always discrepancies between the data in these systems and what we have in the AIMS at country level and for some reasons we prefer what is in our systems because that's what we can be accountable of.*

<sup>4</sup> OECD-CRS stands for OECD Creditor Reporting System; OECD-FSS for OECD Forward Spending Survey; and IATI for International Aid Transparency Initiative.

<sup>5</sup> This idea is yet to be explored for feasibility, and will be dependent on discussions with the relevant custodians/secretariats of each of the three systems. It was explored in the past (2014) but no agreement was reached given that each standard measures reporting differently, but it will be worthwhile to explore again, in the context of the current reform.

**Commented [AM9]: Alessandro Motter:**  
Supreme auditors' reports or equivalent should be added to this list. Very relevant to the "expenditure vs. results" analysis alluded to in one of the bullet points on p. 13

**Commented [JST10]: Innocent Mugabe**

- Increase emphasis on country-level transparency, as suggested by stakeholders in the 2021 consultations. This would happen by making indicator 4b, which was previously “complementary”, become a central component for tracking transparency. This will involve strengthening the questions in 4b and removing those that did not previously provide useful results. The strengthening of this indicator could include adapting existing questions to reflect whether partner countries’ information management systems also capture information on development co-operation that development partners channel beyond the public sector. This information could feed into Action Dialogues to better identify the bottlenecks that partner countries face when trying to create and consolidate their information management systems.

No additional changes are proposed to tracking whether partner country ~~governments~~governments make publicly available information on the national development strategy (NDS) and its progress reports, and the results of mutual accountability assessments (areas noted above which are tracked through indicators 1b and 7).

#### Secondary data to explore

It is also proposed that the country results briefs could be complemented with an annex – based on global data such as from IATI database, OECD Aid at a Glance, and TOSSD<sup>6</sup> – that provides a snapshot of development co-operation resources coming into the country (such as by key providers, amounts, sectors). This will support discussion in the Action Dialogue, including on what is missing in the Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS), and how to strengthen/improve such information management systems. It will also respond to requests from partner country governments that the monitoring should support them in gaining a fuller picture of resources in their country. [I agree with the proposal, however the data sources you referenced to usually have data quality issues which i think would be a barrier.](#)

Commented [JST11]: Innocent Mugabe

#### Would data be comparable (specific to indicator 4)?

- [Global component]. Yes, as it is proposed to retain data on reporting to the three standards. Pending discussions with the relevant secretariats, if it proves feasible to report results differently, and hence there are changes in the calculation of the results, this would be explained in a technical note.
- [Country-level component]. As this was a complementary module in the past, and not part of the core indicator, the proposed changes do not formally affect comparability.

#### What are the trade-offs?

The proposed approach responds to the overall sentiment from stakeholders that the monitoring exercise should focus on the country level. The provision of additional information [using secondary data] on flows of resources to a given country, in the country results brief, also responds to partner country governments’ requests for more focus on this. There is however a risk of push back to the idea of emphasising the country-level reporting from development partners, alongside their global reporting, as the Busan Agreement does not clearly specify whether the commitment is related to country-level or global reporting.

## LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND (LNOB)

#### Key commitments?

- In the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, all UN Member States pledged to leave no one behind and recognised that “quality, accessible, timely and reliable disaggregated data will be needed to help with the measurement of progress and to ensure that no one is left behind”.
- In the NOD, partners reaffirmed the 2030 Agenda’s pledge to LNOB and recognised that “development co-operation must leave no-one behind to be effective”. The NOD affirms that “strong, dynamic and innovative partnerships are needed in the effort to leave no one behind” and indicated that - in delivering its mandate – “the Global Partnership will promote modalities of development co-operation that

<sup>6</sup> Total Official Support for Sustainable Development.

contribute to the universal objective of leaving no-one behind". Partners also pointed to LNOB as their "greatest challenge" and committed to "energise the implementation of all previous commitments<sup>7</sup> with a pledge to leave no one behind".

#### What do we currently track?

While not explicitly referred or associated to LNOB, there are four main areas of the current monitoring framework that provide evidence relevant to track the commitment of LNOB:

1. The development of partner country governments' NDS (indicator 1b) and development partners' country strategies (indicator 1a), and whether there was consultation with stakeholders (and if so, which ones) in the country on the development of those strategies.
2. Partner country governments report on whether they include the SDGs in their NDS/Country Results Framework (CRF) at goal, target and/or indicator level (indicator 1b). However, there is currently no distinction on *which* SDGs are included.
3. Gender-responsive budgeting (indicator 8/SDG 5.c.1).
4. Participation of stakeholders in the country's mutual accountability mechanism (indicator 7).

#### Suggested change?

- A standalone indicator on LNOB is not proposed. *I think the existing frameworks capture this in general and I agree that there shouldn't be a standalone indicator.*
- The proposed approach to capture this contour builds on the existing areas, which are embedded across the existing framework, and proposes one new area.
- More specifically, this includes expanding on the first two areas that are currently tracked to include the following:
  - Whether diverse stakeholders, vulnerable and marginalised groups have been consulted by partner country governments in the development of the NDS (indicator 1b), and by development partners in the development of their country strategies (indicator 1a). In fact, the current monitoring questions on this include a list of those consulted, which would be expanded to include representatives of women, youth, the poorest, and other key groups of the population<sup>8</sup>, and to include the possibility for countries to add groups relevant/applicable to their contexts.
  - Whether partner country governments have assessed which groups of the population are most at risk of being left behind, made this assessment publicly available and targeted vulnerable and marginalised groups in the NDS (indicator 1b); and for development partners, whether their country strategy targets them (indicator 1a).
  - Within the complementary module of indicator 1a, whether: development partners' country strategies target the most vulnerable and marginalised groups (by income quintile, gender, geography, age and disability [QGGAD] etc.); and whether the strategy includes support to increase the capacity of those furthest behind to organise and represent themselves.

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<sup>7</sup> Agreed at the High Level Fora for Aid Effectiveness in Paris (2005), Accra (2008), Busan (2011) and the GPEDC High Level Meeting in Mexico City (2014).

<sup>8</sup> Based on existing literature and practices, key groups have been identified as follows: poorest, women, people with disabilities, children and youth, elderly, internally displaced people, stateless people, asylum-seekers and refugees, ethnic *groups* *[suggested by Alejandro Guerrero]* and/or minorities, indigenous population, rural population, sexual and gender identity (LGBTIQ+). In addition, the country can define other groups as relevant to their context.

- Retaining the third area on gender responsive budgeting as is with no changes.
- Introducing one additional question to partner country governments and development partners on the availability of disaggregated data (by age, sex, location, etc.).
- Ask whether partner countries' development co-operation policies (indicator 7) and country strategies of development partners (indicator 1a) articulate the role of the private sector in LNOB. This suggestion is explained in more detail under the Kampala Principles contour below.

**Commented [AM13]: Alessandro Motter:**

IPU proposes complementing Indicator 8 with data on women in parliaments (expressed as a percentage). Gender sensitive budgeting is partly a function of the extent of gender parity within the parliament. Countries need to realize that they can't improve budgeting from a gender perspective unless they also work on getting more women in parliament. IPU data on women in parliaments is recognized as official data by the UN.

### Complementary data points and information

- It is suggested to expand the current question within indicator 1b that asks whether the SDGs are incorporated in the CRF to ask more specifically which among the 17 SDGs partner country governments have included in their NDS/CRF at goal, target and indicator level. This is because, in particular, Goals 1 (poverty), 5 (gender) and 10 (inequality) have strong links to LNOB.
- Within the fourth area on participation in mutual accountability mechanisms, now proposed as 'collective accountability', it will be considered whether it is possible to add elements to current indicator 7 to measure the inclusiveness of vulnerable and marginalised groups in accountability mechanisms.

**Commented [14]: Alejandro Guerrero:**

Great idea. Note that this exercise may be tricky as it requires a level of expertise on the SDG framework which may not be available for all "national co-ordinators". If the Monitoring Rounds move to a "wave" model, you may think on a mechanism where the JST reviews the NDP submitted by the government and provides a quick assessment of SDG alignment, which the partner country government validates. This won't be feasible, however, if the monitoring rounds continue to encompass 80 or more participating countries at the same time.

### Would data be comparable?

Partially. For the elements that were previously tracked on consultation of the NDS and country strategies, as well as gender-responsive budgeting, these will remain consistent and comparable. Methodological adjustments could be needed in the calculation of the scoring system for the indicator on the quality of national development planning (1b) in case new data points specific to LNOB are asked as an expansion of that assessment rather than as separate assessment.

New questions will be added to elaborate on the types of vulnerable and marginalised groups that have been consulted, which will add new data and insights to the monitoring exercise on the pledge to leave no one behind.

### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

- The benefit of adding these questions is that the monitoring would be able to report new global data that is not available elsewhere on how partner country governments and development partners are living up to the pledge to leave no one behind. It would also aim to spark dialogue at country level on the most vulnerable and marginalised groups and how development co-operation can be better targeted to reach those furthest behind first.
- The proposed approach adds reporting for partner country governments and development partners. However, these extra questions should not create an excessive burden as they are relatively few and are simple to answer.
- An additional benefit to the proposed approach is that no changes are proposed to indicator 8 (equivalent to SDG 5.c.1), so this would not put custodianship of this indicator at risk.

### Generating evidence on youth through the monitoring exercise

The revised framework will generate various data points specific to youth that can be used to hold governments accountable for their commitments. For example, this includes information on engagement and participation of youth in development by looking at whether:

- Partner country governments have consulted youth in the development of the national development strategy;
- The national development strategy identifies youth as a target group;
- Youth-disaggregated indicators are included in CRFs;
- Development partners consulted youth in the development of their country strategy and whether that strategy targets them.

In line with the overall approach of the reform where indicators are now looked at as a system and provide evidence that is relevant for multiple focus areas, these data points on youth will be generated by the assessments foreseen across various focus areas indicated in Table 4 in the main proposal (mainly LNOB and the collective accountability focus areas, building on and adjusting existing indicators). Therefore a standalone indicator\* on youth is not suggested.

*\*At the consultation, civil society representatives suggested to improve reporting on child-focused ODA and domestic spending for improved monitoring of progress on commitments. The first point related to ODA reporting is something pertinent to development partners' reporting to other global systems (e.g. to the OECD systems/IATI) which include broader and more detailed information on ODA funding (this type of information cannot be generated through the GPEDC monitoring). The second point on reporting domestic spending on youth in partner countries cannot be tracked through the GPEDC as the monitoring does not look at amounts of domestic spending. Furthermore, it was suggested to explore a "Youth and Children Indicator" as a tool to measure youth development. It is important to note that there is ongoing work that aims at [measuring youth development through the SDG indicators<sup>1</sup> and the World Programme of Action for Youth \(WPAY\)](#); it would therefore be duplicative and beyond the scope of the monitoring to look into this.*

<sup>1</sup>. According to this preliminary work, 68 SDG indicators already provide information, directly and clearly relevant to youth development, while a further 18 provide information that may be highly relevant to youth.

## DATA AND STATISTICAL SYSTEMS

### Key commitments?

- In the Paris Declaration, development partners committed to harmonise monitoring and reporting requirements in order to use partner countries' statistical monitoring and evaluation systems.
- In Accra, development partners committed to strengthen partner country governments' national statistical capacity and information systems.
- In the NOD, partner countries committed to intensify efforts to strengthen national statistical capacities
- In the NOD, development partners committed to use CRFs and national statistical systems, support strengthening statistical capacities to enhance data quality, including the availability of disaggregated data.

### What do we currently track?

The monitoring framework currently tracks three elements related to the quality and use of national statistical systems. This includes whether:

- Development partners use partner country government statistics to monitor progress on their interventions (indicator 1a)
- Partner country governments' monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and statistical systems are adequate to track the CRF indicators (indicator 1b)
- Sex-disaggregated data are used to inform budget-related policy decisions (indicator 8)

#### Suggested change?

The proposed approach to capture this contour is to: continue monitoring the same information that is currently collected (indicators 1a<sup>9</sup>, 1b, and 8); make this information more prominent in how the monitoring results are communicated; raise this issue of quality and use of national statistical systems in the Action Dialogue and encourage that representatives from the National Statistical Office (NSO) are involved in this discussion; and, address the issue of availability of disaggregated data within the LNOB contour for which this is particularly relevant (see above). Additional details on these proposals:

- Increase the prominence of development partner use of national statistical systems by more clearly communicating that this is monitored.
- Improve the focus on the issue of data and statistical systems in the Action Dialogue:
  - Capturing development partner use of national statistical systems and partner country governments reporting on the adequacy of their statistical systems is a useful entry point for further discussion in the Action Dialogue among partner country governments (including representatives from the NSO) and development partners on:
    - The quality of the national statistical system (Paris21 data may be used to inform discussion)
    - What needs to be improved
    - The amount of domestic resources dedicated to the national statistical system
    - How development partners can support strengthening national statistical capacities
  - And with respect to the national statistical systems and all country stakeholders on:
    - How open and accessible national statistics and data are for all stakeholders to access and use (the [ODIN overall data openness score](#) may be used to inform discussion)
    - Level of data disaggregation in order to assess, target and track progress on the pledge to leave no one behind

#### Would data be comparable?

Yes. Data collection on this topic would remain consistent, however, in communicating the results more prominence will be given to this topic.

#### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

In the 2021 consultations, there were comments that it would be useful to track development partners' support to strengthen country systems in addition to their use of country systems. This is already tracked by other organisations and replicating this would add reporting burden, while the crux of the issue is in using country (statistical) systems (i.e. strengthening is the means to the end - which is using country systems).

<sup>9</sup> Whether development partners use partner country governments' statistics to monitor progress is currently tracked for progress on both their country strategies and their project interventions. It is suggested to explore retaining only the tracking of this at intervention level, in the interest of simplification. As the module on development partners' use of CRFs at *strategy level* was complementary information in the last round (the core indicator and the calculation of 17.15.1 is based only on the intervention level), this would not equate to dropping a core element of the indicator.

#### Commented [15]: Alejandro Guerrero:

If it makes sense, consider referring to indicator 7 and whether accountability happens around results (for which data is needed). This creates a collective need for development data in the ambit of development co-operation co-ordination at country level.

#### Commented [16]: Jonas Wikström:

There is a need for more coordination support mechanism between donors and national statistical systems. There is a need to emphasize that even though there are sectoral priorities the dialogue with NSO:s is key to ensure harmonization.

#### Commented [17]: Jonas Wikström:

With regards to making National Statistical Systems fit for purpose, one of the important element to emphasize is advocating for the data use and making its effects visible, while focusing on data literacy and data use in policy making.

#### Commented [18]: Jonas Wikström:

One thing is openness and accessibility, another is quality and whether the data ecosystems are equipped with the right information for decision making. Important to emphasize on connecting producers and users of information together.

Therefore, the proposal is to continue tracking use of national statistical systems, and for this to start a conversation at country level on quality and strengthening of national statistical capacities and systems.

## REVITALISING AND UPHOLDING PRE-BUSAN COMMITMENTS – Alignment to partner countries strategies and priorities

### Key commitments?

Partner countries have committed to:

- Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies through broad consultative processes (Paris).
- Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programs as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets (Paris).

Development partners have committed to:

- Align their support to partners' national development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these strategies (Paris).
- Draw conditions, whenever possible, from a partner's national development strategy or its annual review of progress in implementing this strategy (Paris).
- Link funding to a single framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from the national development strategy (Paris).
- Minimise their use of additional frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with countries' national development strategies. (Busan)

### What do we currently track?

The monitoring exercise tracks whether:

- Partner country governments have quality national development strategies, including the existence of a CRF (indicator 1b).
- Development partners align to those strategies and CRFs at intervention level (indicator 1a module 2). Contextual elements on development partners' strategies (module 1) were also collected for the first time in the 2018 monitoring round.

### Suggested change?

- To increase the relevance of the current assessment of the quality of national development strategies (1b) to conflict-affected situations, partner countries would be also able to indicate whether their national development strategies respond to issues raised in a national conflict assessment or whether they have undertaken such an assessment.
- Similarly, under the current indicator on development partners' use of CRFs (1a), and when applicable depending on country context, it will also be possible to indicate alignment to objectives drawn from the national conflict assessment.
- Furthermore on indicator 1a a proposed change is to streamline the questions asked under the current development partner strategy level module (complementary information) to remove questions that did not produce relevant information in the past rounds. At the intervention level, another proposed change is to remove the fourth sub-indicator on involving the government in final evaluations. While this is interesting information, there are several reasons for this proposal:
  - While involving partner country governments in the final evaluation of an intervention is good practice, there is no explicit, agreed commitment on this.
  - For some projects, it may not be relevant for the government to be involved in the final evaluation.

**Commented [19]: Alejandro Guerrero:**  
"Results" for greater clarity, maybe? Performance indicators would be organisational measures referred to efficiency/disbursement speed/etc .

**Commented [20]: Alejandro Guerrero:**  
You may need, then, an alternative approach to cover the following dilemma: how partner countries learn about the development outcomes of individual development co-operation programmes and projects.

The second aspect that will be lost is related to the effectiveness criterion in evaluation, which is central to development effectiveness. While not all projects need to be evaluated, if most (e.g. large) projects are not evaluated at all, or assessed even at a basic level at project closing, then there is no sense of whether they are being effective, and whether a learning mechanism is in place not to repeat errors elsewhere. This is an area of weakness for many development partners, which, while the country-focused GPEDC monitoring may not need to address as a primary concern, it may want to look at whether evidence on effectiveness is being produced (and shared with the partner country).

An alternative: asking the development partner for the number of evaluations carried out in the reporting year (as a total), and how many are carried out together with country level actors and/or shared with the government, other dev partners and/or country level stakeholders. Transparency around project closing reports or evaluation results is still another big weakness.

- The calculation for SDG 17.15.1 is comprised of sub-indicators 1, 2 and 3. Not 4. So these results – the result of GPEDC indicator 1a and SDG indicator 17.15.1 - differ and need to be explained. It would be simpler if this fourth element wasn't part of the GPEDC indicator so that the results of the GPEDC indicator and the SDG indicator are the same.
- In consultation with Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support (WINGS), the possibility of having larger/funding foundations which work directly with government report on their alignment is also being explored.

#### Complementary data points and information

- At the strategy level, development partners could be assessed on whether their planning timeframes and processes are aligned to those of the partner country (either through information available through existing questions or as additional information).
- At intervention level, it is suggested that for each intervention, development partners have the possibility to indicate the reason/s for not aligning to/not using the CRF. This would be a pre-defined list to include various reasons, such as related to lack of CRF/no indicators, or due to concerns around whether the CRF reflects a whole-of-society approach, political legitimacy, human rights issues, etc. This approach would allow reflection in the analysis of factors influencing the behaviour of development partners based on country contexts and other challenges (especially in fragile and conflict-affected situations [FCAS] where alignment may be more challenging).

#### Would data be comparable?

- For the strategy module of indicator 1a, as this was complementary/contextual information not included in the calculation of an indicator, the proposed changes do not formally affect comparability.
- Within the intervention module of indicator 1a, data for SDG indicator 17.15.1 would be comparable as well as the individual sub-elements that compose it.

#### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

A key benefit of the proposed changes is that reporting to 17.15.1 would not be at risk; this is in line with the ambition of the reform to maintain custodianship. There would also be comparability for the core indicator, which is at the intervention level. While different information would be captured under the strategy module, this was not part of the core indicator, and this is done in service of other objectives of the reform as related to prominence of other contours.

Trade-offs to the proposal include not meeting the request by one development partner to focus on alignment at strategy level; however, it must be recalled that partner country governments in the Post-Busan Interim Group were clear that alignment is not meaningful unless it is at the intervention level as alignment at the level of strategies tends to be easier and risks to portray a better picture compared to when data is based on interventions. Furthermore, such a change would have implications on SDG 17.15.1 reporting and could compromise custodianship of the indicator. Finally, such a change would not allow comparability with past rounds. There was also a request from development partners to broaden this indicator to consider alignment beyond the partner country government, particularly because in some contexts alignment to government's priorities is not always possible/desirable. This expectation cannot be met as the commitments are founded on development partner support based on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures (Paris) and the scope of this reform is limited to existing commitments. Furthermore, this would not be technically feasible as it will not be clear to what other strategies/plans from other actors can be considered representative of the needs of the country, and inclusive of all of society. The complementary information (see above) on the main reasons for development partners not using CRFs will however provide insights on different behaviour of development partners based on country contexts which may influence use of CRFs.

## REVITALISING AND UPHOLDING PRE-BUSAN COMMITMENTS – Predictability of development co-operation

### Key commitments?

Development partners have committed to:

- Provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules (Paris).
- Provide full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements so that developing countries are in a position to accurately record all aid flows in their budget estimates and their accounting systems (Accra).
- Provide partner countries with regular and timely information on their rolling three to five-year forward expenditure and/or implementation plans, with at least indicative resource allocations that partner countries can integrate in their medium-term planning and macroeconomic frameworks. And to address any constraints to providing such information. (Accra). Reconfirmed in Busan.

Partner countries have committed to:

- Strengthen budget planning processes for managing domestic and external resources and improve the linkages between expenditures and results over the medium term.

What do we currently track?

Indicator 5a tracks annual predictability by measuring, for the reporting year of reference, the proportion of development co-operation disbursed as development partners had scheduled at the beginning of the year. The indicator is calculated by dividing the amount of development co-operation flows [for the public sector] disbursed by the amount of development co-operation flows scheduled for disbursement to a given country in the reporting year of reference. Results show the share of disbursements on schedule and also beyond schedule.

Indicator 5b tracks medium-term predictability by assessing whether development partners have shared forward-looking spending plans with the partner government. For each development partner operating in the country, the National Co-ordinator records whether the government has received information on the partner's planned financial support for example for 2019, 2020 and 2021 (i.e. up to three years ahead). The overall indicator is the average of the binary response for the three years.

Suggested change?

Indicator 5a:

- The indicator would remain largely the same.
- A slight amendment would be considered to the calculation of the indicator to allow for a small range around which funds would be considered predictable. E.g. this could be 2% above or below what was scheduled. *Unfortunately I am unable to understand what this proposal means!*

Commented [JST21]: Innocent Mugabe

Indicator 5b:

- Rather than a binary 'yes' or 'no' response as to whether the partner country government received information on development partners' forward-looking spending plans one, two and three years in the future, the indicator would request governments to define in a dollar amount on how much development partners have communicated will be scheduled for disbursement one, two and three years in advance. The difficulty in analysing this information lies in how to assess the amount of the forward spending plans. However, the current year and/or previous year's disbursement could be used as a point of reference to indicate whether a reasonable proportion of funds have been communicated. This information could also be used to assess predictability in subsequent monitoring rounds (looking back at how accurate the previous monitoring rounds figures were for multi-year predictability). *There is a bit of confusion here because what partner countries ask the development partners is the projections of all their interventions for the next three years and for example for the case of Rwanda, the only DP that is considered to have provided MTEF projection is the one that has provided budgets of all of his/her on-going projects and for all three years in question! but if for example a DP has provided projections for their interventions and some have projections for one, two and others three years, then they are treated as someone who has not provided MTEF projection and hence assessed negatively, and i don't know how this is considered for the case of GPEDC?*

Commented [JST22]: Innocent Mugabe

#### Complementary information (indicator 5a)

- To inform discussion at the Action Dialogue, each development partner would also have the possibility to indicate the key reason for under-disbursement of funds when reporting to indicator 5a.
- In consultation with WINGS, the possibility of having larger/funding foundations which work directly with government report on their predictability is also being explored.

#### Would data be comparable?

Yes, for both indicator 5a and 5b. However, for 5b, greater detail would be available which would allow for richer reporting and follow-up in subsequent years and monitoring rounds.

#### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

As a key element of effective development co-operation, the benefit of retaining the predictability indicators with minimal changes allows these to continue to be tracked and provide comparable data. This also reflects views expressed in the consultations on the monitoring framework where constituencies agreed that the revised monitoring framework should continue to track the predictability of development co-operation. [Agreed](#)

Commented [JST23]: Innocent Mugabe

### REVITALISING AND UPHOLDING PRE-BUSAN COMMITMENTS – Development co-operation on budget

#### Key commitments?

- Development partners committed to provide full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements so that developing countries are in a position to accurately record all aid flows in their budget estimates and their accounting systems (Accra).

#### What do we currently track?

Two component structure of indicator 6 – share of development co-operation recorded on budgets and subject to parliamentary scrutiny:

- **6.1** - Where the funds recorded in the partner country's budget are smaller than the disbursements planned by its development partners at the outset of the reporting year of reference, the indicator is calculated by dividing the funds recorded in the budget by the funds scheduled for disbursement.
- **6.2** - Where the funds recorded in the budget are larger than the scheduled disbursements, the indicator is calculated by dividing the difference between recorded and scheduled by the funds recorded in the budget. This value represents what is beyond schedule.

#### Suggested change?

- [No changes to indicator 6 are proposed.](#)
- To increase the aspect of parliamentary oversight on development co-operation resources - which is currently only indirectly and partially represented through indicator 6 - there are proposals under the contour on collective accountability (see above) to provide additional information related to the role of parliaments.

Commented [AM24]: Alessandro Motter:  
IPU proposes a refinement to Indicator 6 that would look at the share of total aid provided through direct budget support. The latter aid is most directly subject to parliamentary oversight and remains a most effective modality of aid utilization.

#### Would data be comparable?

Yes.

#### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

The main benefit would be that we would have consistency with indicator 6 through the continued tracking of the underlying core commitment. [Agreed](#)

Commented [JST25]: Innocent Mugabe

## REVITALISING AND UPHOLDING PRE-BUSAN COMMITMENTS – Use of country PFM systems (UCS)

### Key commitments?

- Development partners have consistently committed to use country systems for aid managed by the public sector. There has been a progressive focus on public financial management (PFM) and procurement systems, although there is acknowledgement of broader definition of country systems including statistics, monitoring and evaluation and so on. Other relevant commitments include development partner commitment to: state reasons for non-use of country systems; strengthen such systems; and, have dialogue on reasons for non-use/measures for strengthening.
- Partner country governments have consistently committed to strengthen such systems.

### Quality of Countries PFM Systems (indicator 9a)

#### What do we currently track?

Quality of country PFM systems based on selected dimensions of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment from the last two PEFA assessments.<sup>10</sup> Based on scores, countries are categorised as positive/negative/no change. No primary data collected by GPEDC on this.

#### Suggested change?

- No fundamental changes proposed to the core indicator and measurement.
- But proposals to improve reporting include:
  - At global level, the approach to analysing the PEFA scores would be somewhat reoriented, focusing on two elements:
    - number (or proportion) of partner countries that have improved the quality of their PFM systems (e.g. this includes countries where they may have improved from a very low score to a moderately low score, but nevertheless have seen improvement) – *unchanged from previous analysis approach (so therefore directly comparable data/analysis)*
    - number (or proportion) of partner countries that have good quality PFM systems (e.g. this could be partner country governments that have a score of “B” or above for example on all 9 or 7 of 9, but have seen ‘no change’ between their last 2 PEFA’s; also perhaps a recognition of countries who may have seen a modest decrease but starting from a high level, so arguably still have reasonable quality systems)
  - Focus on discussing the PEFA scores in the Action Dialogue, which would provide opportunity for development partners to comment on the PEFA scores and raise any concerns that they might have regarding the country’s PFM systems.

#### Would data be comparable?

Yes. In the global data presentation and analysis, the trends could still be provided using the “old” way of showing the progress in strengthening. This could be complemented by additional and more nuanced analysis which shows information on the countries who may not have made progress but still have reasonable quality systems in place.

#### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

Reporting results on indicator 9a would remain as a core data point as it is indeed a commitment of partner countries to improve their PFM systems.

<sup>10</sup> Of the 86 countries that participated in the 2018 monitoring round, 51 had completed two PEFA assessments. At present, of these same 86 countries, there are now 72 which have completed two assessments. 38 of the 86 have completed a new assessment since 2018, of which 17 are publicly accessible.

### *Development Partners' Use of Country PFM Systems (indicator 9b)*

#### What do we currently track?

- Per development partner: Shows the proportion of development co-operation disbursed by each development partner (to all reporting partner countries) that is managed using national PFM systems.
- Per partner country: Shows the proportion of development co-operation received by each partner country (from all its development partners) that uses national PFM systems.

#### Suggested change?

- The core indicator and measurement will follow the same methodology as in the past - focused on use of country governments' PFM systems. However, the reporting will allow for complementary information (see below) to better contextualise the results (including in FCAS) and to understand main barriers and challenges in the use of country PFM systems. In detail, it is suggested to:
  - Clarify the language in the indicator and the guidance to respond to the four questions. For example, in the last monitoring round, there were detailed definitions in the monitoring guide on what it means to use countries' budget execution procedures, financial reporting procedures and so on. However, this guidance may have been overlooked.
  - In consultation with WINGS, the possibility of having larger/funding foundations which work directly with government report on their use of PFM systems is also being explored.

#### Complementary information

- Continue to report, but with greater emphasis, on the amount to the public sector (consistent with the FCAS approach) as an overall proportion of ODA/Country Programmable Aid (CPA). This could include reporting in the global analysis the proportion of ODA to the public sector, which given it is declining provides an interesting story.
- Add a question for development partners to report on reasons for not using PFM systems. This could be in the form of a drop-down list that includes an "other" option. The response to this question could be addressed in the Action Dialogue, and could also provide useful results at global level on the main reasons for non-use. To provide contextual information for development partners as they are answering this question, an option could be explored to pre-populate the reporting tool with the results of the country governments' most recent PEFA assessments.
- Add a question for development partners to report on whether they are providing support to strengthen PFM systems – similarly could be a drop-down, not just a yes/no (for example, they provide support by contributing financially to a multi-donor PFM program; they have own technical co-operation project(s), etc. – options to be defined). This would be supplementary information, not contributing to a data point, but rather as an input to the Action Dialogue, so this would help avoid impression that support to strengthening is just as important as the actual use.
- Add (to indicator 1a – at strategy level) question on whether, especially if development partner strategy is signed off by government, it includes agreement on co-operation modalities and if so on the use of PFM systems – this would be useful contextual information for the Action Dialogue.
- Add – to indicator 7 but not in calculation of that indicator – one question about whether the development co-operation policy of the partner country includes preferences for modality (e.g. budget support, public sector support, use of PFM systems). This would be an input for the Action Dialogue.

#### Would data be comparable?

Yes.

#### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

The primary benefit is that this approach will retain the comparability of the data and the integrity of the commitment, which will be appreciated by some stakeholders. The opportunity for development partners to provide information about why they do not use country systems would hopefully be welcomed by them.

Same for the opportunity to report on efforts to strengthen PFM systems. The main drawbacks are that the approach will not satisfy the development partner request (by some) that country systems be defined to go beyond government systems. The reason for this is that the corresponding commitments are clear and consistent from Paris onwards that country systems refer to government systems; specifically, national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring.

## REVITALISING AND UPHOLDING PRE-BUSAN COMMITMENTS – Untied aid

### Key commitments?

Development partners (Development Assistance Committee - DAC) have committed to:

- Untie aid, and promote the use of local and regional procurement by ensuring that their procurement procedures are transparent and allow local and regional firms to compete.
- Elaborate individual plans to further untie their aid to the maximum extent, in particular to the least developed countries.
- Improve the quality, consistency and transparency of reporting on the tying status of aid, and ensure that procurement procedures are transparent and allow local and regional firms to compete.
- Respect international agreements on corporate social responsibility.

### What do we currently track?

Indicator 10 on untied aid is calculated by dividing the amount of untied ODA commitments by the total amount of ODA commitments. It uses the most recent information available at the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which is self-reported by the members of the DAC. Results are only available for DAC members that report on untied ODA status. In addition, in the 2018 round, National Co-ordinators could also share their views about untied aid figures for their country.

### Suggested change?

No fundamental changes to the indicator are proposed. This indicator would be retained as a core data point and would continue to be reported at global level, and country-specific results provided in the country results brief and/or for the Action Dialogue. [I agree, however sometimes the untied or tied nature of Aid differs in respect to the understanding between partner countries and development partners which makes it difficult in the assessment of the indicator.](#)

Commented [JST26]: Innocent Mugabe

### Complementary information

It is also proposed to offer an opportunity for development partners to provide supplementary information around initiatives or policies supporting the private sector in partner countries. This information could be provided in the context of an Action Dialogue, for example.

### Secondary data to explore

To support the Action Dialogue and/or feed into the country results brief and development partner profiles, country-specific *de facto* untied aid data could supplement overall untied aid figures. *De facto* untied aid data would show (i) to what extent development partners working in the country are contracting partner country national companies in their ODA-related procurement processes (by development partner – development partner profiles) and (ii) to what extent partner country national companies are successful in ODA-related procurement processes (by partner country – country results brief).<sup>11</sup>

Commented [AM27]: Alessandro Motter:  
IPU suggests adding a third element to this de fact data to be collected: extent to which procurement bids and contracts (at least those above a certain amount, to be determined) are made public within the partner country and submitted for information to the relevant parliamentary committee.

### Would data be comparable?

<sup>11</sup> The data would come from the *OECD Contract Awards Database (not publicly available)* and could present the share of ODA-related procurement contracts awarded by each development partner to partner country-based companies, development partner-based or companies based in third countries.

Yes.

#### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

The main benefit will be the comparability of reporting. The additional country-specific information (if feasible – see footnote) to be provided in the country results brief and/or development partner profiles and/or for the Action Dialogue will also address some of the concerns and requests from partner country governments, as well as provide a basis for useful dialogue with other actors that have a stake in this issue: civil society, trade unions, private sector. Giving development partners a chance to provide qualitative/contextual information to explain why they may tie their aid for “positive” reasons can partially address some development partners’ concerns about this indicator. However, due to the fact that the methodology for this indicator is under the custodianship of the *OECD DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (WP-STAT)*, and not GPEDC, methodological changes are beyond the scope of the GPEDC monitoring reform. Therefore, this proposal may not address concerns by some development partners and non-executive stakeholders to make core changes to the measurement.

### SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATION

[This approach is being developed in parallel, under the leadership of Colombia, as part of Action Area 2.3]

### KAMPALA PRINCIPLES

(For additional technical detail please refer to [this document](#))

#### Key commitments?

- In the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Member States called upon “all businesses to apply their creativity and innovation to solving sustainable development challenges”.
- The NOD called for “unleashing the potential of development co-operation to attract inclusive private investment [by setting] clear effectiveness commitments as the development community engages in partnerships between governments, civil society and the business sector that generate shared benefit for business strategies and development goals”. It also mandates the GPEDC to “promote a mutually-agreed framework to monitor public-private partnerships”.

**Additional context:** In response, and through an inclusive process under the leadership of Germany, a multi-stakeholder working group informed by a Business Leaders Caucus (BLC) has engaged a broad range of actors and developed the [Kampala Principles on Effective Private Sector Engagement in Development Co-operation](#), launched at the GPEDC Senior Level Meeting in 2019. At their 21<sup>st</sup> SC meeting, the Co-chairs and Committee members agreed to go ahead with developing a more specific proposal to monitor the implementation of the Kampala Principles (KPs) as part of a revised monitoring framework.

#### What do we currently track?

Indicator 3 on the quality of public-private dialogue (PPD) was introduced as part of the monitoring framework for the 2016 round, and then refined for the 2018 round. PPD is defined broadly as formal dialogue platforms or informal events, national or subnational, country wide or sector-specific, permanent or temporary. The thematic areas covered in PPD are generally directly linked to different SDGs or sectoral and thematic issues for which public-private dialogue is typically needed.

Indicator 3 is structured around two thematic modules:

- The first module invites the National Co-ordinators to identify thematic areas that have been addressed as part of PPD initiatives in the country, during the three years prior to the monitoring.
- The second module assesses the quality of these recent PPD experiences by looking at i) the enablers of public-private dialogue, ii) the relevance of issues addressed and participation and iii) results and action yielded. Data collection on these quality elements was so far encouraged to take place through a multi-stakeholder dialogue at the country level, including a representative from the participating national government as well as a focal point from a large firm, a small or medium-sized enterprise

**Commented [AM28]: Alessandro Motter:**  
Refer to IPU suggestion that all PPP contracts be submitted to the parliament for review (preferably before they are signed). Parliament needs to know of potential liabilities, as well as of results to be expected and accounted for. Among many potential pitfalls of infrastructure/service PPPs is that they end up leaving entire communities under-served (LNOB)

(SME) and a trade union. The dialogue did not require the participation of development partners or civil society, nor a focus on *development co-operation* issues more narrowly.

Closed-ended responses to these questions, which were based on stakeholders' perceptions, were captured on an ordinal four-point scale and aggregated to an overall qualitative score for each country. In 2018, 47 out of the 86 participating countries reported on indicator 3.

To date, the monitoring exercise has not monitored the Kampala Principles, given their launch in 2019.

#### Suggested change?

The proposal is to develop a new *KPs/PSE assessment*, which will become part of the GPEDC monitoring exercise. Indicator 3 will no longer be monitored. The new KPs assessment is envisioned to have several key characteristics and objectives, including:

- **Focusing on the engagement of the private sector in development co-operation activities** as opposed to assessing the more general engagement of the private sector in PPD, which is done elsewhere, and the quality of PPD. This will ensure greater concentration on promoting regular and ongoing dialogue that builds trust around specific partnerships and programs at country level that involve the private sector with other development co-operation actors, as reflected in KP 3 on inclusive partnerships, dialogue and consultation. [Indicator 3 did not focus on the development co-operation niche, as the KPs were not yet developed.]
- **Promoting the multi-stakeholder nature of the KPs by engaging development partners and civil society organisations more systematically in tracking progress.** This responds to findings from consultations held in the design phase of the KPs that suggested that the multi-stakeholder nature of the KPs and their openness and inclusiveness to all actors involved in private sector partnerships would be their main value added. [Indicator 3 did not involve these actors actively in the assessment.]
- **Monitoring the essence of all five interrelated KPs by prioritising a small number of metrics that are considered most relevant and that are not tracked elsewhere, including:**
  - **The prevalence of PSE at the country level** (including data points such as percentage of development partners that engage the private sector in their development co-operation, the type of private sector engaged, and modalities used)
  - **The state of the policy framework** (e.g. whether development partners and partner country governments use policies/strategies/results frameworks to articulate objectives and goals for PSE)
  - **The contribution of PSE to sustainable development results** and whether it is geared towards benefitting those furthest behind (e.g. data points on sectors and populations that stakeholders target with PSE)
  - **The transparency and accountability arrangements in place** (e.g. what type of information stakeholders make available/have access to, what type of accountability mechanisms are in place, such as whether development partners have established complaint/grievances mechanisms)
  - **The degree to which the private sector considers it easy to partner with other stakeholders at country level** (e.g. data points on what the private sector considers critical for effective partnering with development partners and partner country governments; their awareness of engagement opportunities)
  - **The uptake of the KPs**, i.e. whether stakeholders assess their engagement in PSE against the KPs

Data for the KPs assessment will be collected in two ways, which will together produce the [provisional/draft] headline metrics listed above:

1. **Through a dedicated KPs assessment module** [similar to indicator 2 in the 2018 round]. This module will involve reporting by all stakeholders that the KPs apply to [development partners,

partner country governments, private sector and trade unions, CSOs] and will contribute the majority of data points, with a deep-dive approach, on KPs implementation.

2. **Through data collection on elements of the KPs mainstreamed into other areas of the monitoring framework.** Data points on a select number of core elements of the KPs will be collected through reporting on other indicators, where feasible and logical. *Provisionally*, the following KP elements have been identified for mainstreaming:

Whether partner countries:

- Have a policy framework (national development strategy) that articulates the envisaged role of the private sector in contributing to the SDGs and sustainable development; whether such NDSs include priorities, targets and indicators for PSE in development co-operation (linked to indicator 1b)
- Have a development co-operation policy which articulates how the private sector should be engaged in development co-operation, and whether it refers explicitly to the ambition of focusing on poor/vulnerable/marginalised populations (linked to explorations under indicator 7)
- Collect and make public, through their management information system(s) information on projects that involve the private sector (linked to indicator 4)

Whether development partners:

- Have a country strategy which articulates PSE objectives (linked to indicator 1a/strategy)
- Have a PSE policy/PSE projects which explicitly target beneficiaries who are at risk of being left behind (linked to indicator 1a/strategy)
- Have complaint/grievance mechanisms in place related to the potential negative effects of PSE through development co-operation (linked to indicator 1a/strategy)

With this reporting approach, basic information on PSE and the KPs would also be available for all countries reporting on other core areas of the monitoring (see #2 above), while being realistic about the fact that the deep dive nature of the new KPs assessment *module*, as well as the fact that PSE is of differing relevance to partner countries based on their own context, may mean not all choose to do the KPs assessment module (see #1 above). In such cases, only partial information –which is collected through the mainstreamed data collection on KPs – would be available on the metrics listed above. In addition to the data collected through the monitoring exercise, there will be an effort to include relevant complementary data/analysis, in global reporting and the country results briefs, related to PSE. It will also be explored to draw on relevant secondary data related to untying, as it relates to ease of partnering/PSE opportunities. This could include use of data from the PEFA indicator on procurement (use of local and regional procurement) and OECD-CRS data/percentages on untying as part of the context for looking at PSE.

#### Would data be comparable?

No data comparability with indicator 3, with the exception of very few elements, where some indirect/indicative comparisons could potentially be drawn – e.g. the inclusiveness of PPD, as measured previously in indicator 3, could be compared with the inclusiveness of PSE in development co-operation and related dialogue, as proposed to be measured under the new KPs assessment.

#### What are the benefits and trade-offs?

- With the integration of the KPs and a shift away from monitoring the effectiveness of broadly defined PPD, more emphasis is put on the GPEDC niche of effectiveness of PSE in *development co-operation* specifically. While some basic elements of the KPs would be mainstreamed across other parts of the monitoring framework (see #2 above) [where the response rate can be expected to be higher], the new KPs assessment module (see #1 above) would provide sufficient space for those committed to undertake a deep dive into PSE and the implementation of the KPs. With data collected from the participating partner country government, development partners, as well as from representatives from a large firm, a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME), trade unions and civil society, the new KPs assessment would reflect the multi-stakeholder nature of the KPs that have been developed by

and for all these actors. This means however, that it is particularly important in this case that National Co-ordinators are supported in the identification of these different representatives (e.g. by SC Members such as ITUC, CPDE, ICC/CIPE).

- The KPs apply to a broad array of PSE modalities<sup>12</sup> and monitoring the essence of all five KPs that apply to all these modalities will thus naturally have to remain focused at the macro level. Monitoring the effectiveness of PSE in development co-operation and the KPs is new territory and has not been attempted elsewhere at comparable level of scope and ambition<sup>13</sup>. As a result, the further development of this new KPs assessment will require special emphasis on testing and consulting with practitioners/experts (that GPEDC members need to help identify and mobilise within their respective organisations), which in turn, might require a more flexible timeline to finalise the KPs assessment.
- Technical work on the assessment will be pursued in tandem with ongoing work by Action Area 2.1 on the development of a toolkit on the implementation of the KPs for all of the above-mentioned stakeholders. While this again might have implications for the timeline, the main benefit will be that those countries and stakeholders, who report on the new KPs assessment, can be supported with and informed in their subsequent Action Dialogue by this detailed toolkit. The toolkit will provide them with very practical guidance that helps contextualise their monitoring results and suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of PSE.

## EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL DONORSHIP

### Key commitments?

In the Busan Partnership Agreement, partners agreed to improve the coherence of their policies on multilateral institutions, global funds and programs and to make effective use of existing multilateral channels, focusing on those that are performing well.

### What do we currently track?

The current monitoring assesses how effectively multilateral organisations (MLOs) themselves deliver their funding at the partner country level but does not assess the effectiveness of bilateral development partners' engagement/support to the multilateral system. Contributions from bilateral partners to partner countries provided through MLOs are therefore not captured under the bilateral results but only reported by MLOs as the last point of disbursement (to avoid double counting).

### Suggested approach?

To respond to the challenges of the current monitoring framework pointed out by a number of bilateral partners<sup>14</sup>, it is suggested to complement the presentation of monitoring results for bilateral partners in the GPEDC monitoring online dashboard by providing contextual information about [available] characteristics of how the individual development partner funds the multilateral system (e.g. amount and share of funding to the systems, core vs. earmarked funding). The information would come from existing data (e.g. OECD-CRS database/ provider profiles of the Development Co-operation Report and/or evidence from DAC Peer Reviews, Global Compact, and [potentially] MOPAN). This information would be further complemented by

<sup>12</sup> In 2016, the OECD defined PSE in development co-operation as "an activity that aims to engage the private sector for development results, which involves the active participation of the private sector". The definition is deliberately broad and includes all modalities (finance, policy dialogue, capacity development, technical assistance, knowledge sharing and research for engaging the private sector in development co-operation) from informal collaborations to more formalised and encompasses all sectors (e.g. health, education, private sector development, renewable energy, governance, etc.).

<sup>13</sup> E.g. Center for Global Development's (CGD) QuAID framework concludes that "there is as yet insufficient consensus and evidence to underpin new indicators of effectiveness relating to the amount or mode of aid via private channels".

<sup>14</sup> Some DAC members voiced concerns that their good performance in terms of effectiveness of multilateral organisations they support is not captured/reflected under their own effectiveness results (issue of attribution). In the consultations about the monitoring framework (2021), some DAC members indicated an interest to capture how bilateral partners engage with and fund multilateral organisations in a way that contributes to enhance their effectiveness, for example by looking at core and earmarked contributions, predictability and reliability of their funding. They also strongly indicated that any measurement should link with existing measurements to avoid duplication.

presenting key monitoring results of the top MLOs funded by the bilateral partner under analysis by presenting this information in the online dashboard and/or profiles of development partners (if produced based on resource availability). There would also be a commitment to enhance the depth of analysis of how MLOs perform in the GPEDC monitoring in the global monitoring reporting. Hopefully this would be done at global level not at country level because of how most AIMS are designed.

Commented [JST29]: Innocent Mugabe

**Would data be comparable?**

N/A

**What are the benefits and trade-offs?**

The main potential benefit of the suggested approach is that this could satisfy the request by some bilateral [DAC] partners to provide further context (a more complete picture) to their monitoring results. In this case, middling or poor performance on GPEDC indicators which focus on bilateral co-operation with the government sector, could be presented alongside evidence of [presumably] good practice of supporting the multilateral system. The proposed additional analysis at global level could also demonstrate that GPEDC does understand the underlying concern and is investing in enhanced analysis of, and attention on, the piece of the picture which is bilateral support to the multilateral system. There are trade-offs as well. Namely, this approach would not fully address the concern of some bilateral partners, as country-level results may still be considered partially representative of their development co-operation as they will continue to reflect mainly flows disbursed to the government.

## Annex II – Overview of preliminary proposed changes to the former monitoring framework

This table illustrates the changes to the former indicator framework, and helps stakeholders to map the former indicators within the new organisation of the framework and across the focus areas. More details on the previous framework can be found in the [2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators](#).

Indicator	Changes (+ additions / - removals)	Responsibility for data collection	Comparability	Focus areas
<p><b>1b.</b> Quality of national development strategies and results frameworks</p> <p>Made up of 11 criteria</p>	<p>+ adding LNOB related questions</p> <p>+ adding question on which SDGs included in NDS/CRF</p> <p>+ adding question on data/statistics</p> <p>+ adding element on whether NDS articulates the envisaged role of the private sector</p>	Partner country governments	Yes (may need to adjust scoring system for indicator 1b)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Collective accountability and whole-of-society (WOS) approach</li> <li>● Quality and Use of Country Systems</li> <li>● Transparency</li> <li>● LNOB</li> </ul>
<b>1a.</b> Development partners use national planning	- removing sub-indicator 1a.4 on evaluation as it is	Development partners	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Collective accountability</li> </ul>

tools and results frameworks	not part of/relevant for SDG 17.15.1				y and WoS approach
Made up of four sub-indicators:	- removing complementary questions not producing relevant evidence				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality and Use of Country Systems</li> </ul>
1a.1. Project objectives drawn from country plans and strategies	+ adding LNOB questions to strategy level				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LNOB</li> </ul>
1a.2. Results from CRFs	+ adding complementary questions (reason for not using CRFs; existence of joint planning/co-ordination; alignment to timeframes and processes of partner country governments; strategy includes UCS agreement; strategy articulates PSE objective)				
1a.3. Results indicators monitored using government data and statistics					
1a.4. Final evaluation involves the government	+ possibility for large foundations to report				
2. CSOs effectiveness and enabling environment	+ adding small domestic foundations and trade unions as reporting stakeholders within the CSOs group (tbd)	Partner country governments in consultation with development partners, CSOs	Yes		Collective accountability and WoS approach
Made up of 4 modules					
1. Government consultation with CSOs					
2. Adequate legal and regulatory environment					
3. CSOs' development effectiveness					
4. Effectiveness of development partners' work with CSOs					
3. Quality of public-private dialogue	Discontinued. To be Replaced	tbd	tbd		Collective accountability

**Commented [30]: Alejandro Guerrero:**  
A call to retain the question on SDG alignment, as SDG 17.16.1 is supposed to tell a story of whether development co-operation is providing a multistakeholder platform to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, and that is a key substantive linkage to that story.

**Commented [32]: Jacqueline Wood:**  
Submitting inputs as OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, participant in GPEDC AA 2.4:  
Add LNOB? Given that CSOs often work on the frontlines of poverty and inequality, with people living in the most marginalised situations. See OECD Development Co-operation Report 2018 chapter 6 "Putting the last first? Civil society's role in LNOB"

**Commented [33R32]: Jacqueline Wood:**  
Link to the 2018 DCR: [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-report-2018\\_dcr-2018-en;jsessionid=3h0ZqDdLjCKnODs340K7Lun-1p-10-240-5-37](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-report-2018_dcr-2018-en;jsessionid=3h0ZqDdLjCKnODs340K7Lun-1p-10-240-5-37)

**Commented [31]: Jacqueline Wood:**  
Submitting inputs as OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, participant in GPEDC AA 2.4:  
As per previous comment at bottom of pg. 2 - One of the GPEDC constituencies, the DAC, adopted in July 2021 the DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance (<https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5021>).  
The GPEDC monitoring will be one amongst other existing processes and data that will be drawn from for the Recommendation's monitoring (specifically to inform a five-year report) (see para 15: [https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC\(2021\)29&docLanguage=En](https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC(2021)29&docLanguage=En)).  
We would welcome an opportunity to have a look at Indicator 2 in 2022 to explore whether any simple, practical adjustments might be warranted in light of the Recommendation

	measurement of PSE/Kampala Principles			and WoS approach
<b>4.</b> Transparency of development co-operation (global)	= same (OECD-CRS, OECD-FSS, IATI)	Information collected by JST	Yes	Transparency
<b>4b.</b> Transparency of development co-operation (country-level module)	Indicator becomes central (no longer complementary) - removing questions not producing relevant evidence + adding question about off-budget	Partner country governments	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transparency</li> <li>• Collective accountability and WoS approach</li> </ul>
<b>5a.</b> Annual predictability	= same + complementary question for development partners to provide reason for under disbursement + possibility for large foundations to report - removing complementary question not producing relevant evidence	Development partners	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems
<b>5b.</b> Medium term predictability	+ respondents will need to provide amounts instead of yes/no answers	Partner country governments	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems
<b>6.</b> Development co-operation on budget	= same	Partner country governments; development partners	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quality and Use of Country Systems</li> <li>• Collective accountability and WoS approach</li> </ul>
<b>7.</b> Quality of mutual accountability mechanisms	~ revising language of questions + adding LNOB elements (tbc)	Partner country governments	Yes (will depend on response metric changes),	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collective accountability and WoS approach</li> <li>• LNOB</li> </ul>

	+ complementary questions (preferences for modality and UCS; PSE; whether policies include effectiveness objectives; efforts by partner country governments to inform parliaments)		except new questions	
<b>8/SDG5.c.1.</b> Countries have systems in place to track and make public allocations for GEWE	= same	Partner country governments	Yes	LNOB
<b>9a.</b> Quality of PFM systems	= same (PEFA)	info collected by JST	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems
<b>9b.</b> Use of PFM systems	= same  + complementary questions (reason for development partners not to use PFM systems; support to strengthen partner country systems)  + possibility for large foundations to report	Development Partners	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems
<b>10.</b> Untied ODA (OECD)	= same (OECD CRS)	info collected by JST	Yes	Quality and Use of Country Systems

## Annex III - Annotated List of Monitoring-Related Documents

### Steering Committee documents related to GPEDC Monitoring

- [21<sup>st</sup> Steering Committee Meeting – Background document for monitoring reform session \(2021\)](#)

At the 21<sup>st</sup> SC Meeting, the Committee agreed on: the contours to revise the monitoring framework; and the way forward for the issues identified in relation to the monitoring process. The meeting also included discussion on the roadmap for the reform.

- [Analytical paper: Linkages between monitoring process and SDG reporting \(2021\)](#)

This paper assesses linkages between Global Partnership monitoring and SDG reporting, follow-up and review, to provide guidance on how these linkages could be maintained and further strengthened as part of the reform the Global Partnership's monitoring exercise.

- [Analytical paper: Occurrence of the monitoring exercise \(2021\)](#)

This paper assesses the challenges linked to the occurrence of the monitoring exercise, looking at its timing (when it takes place), frequency (how often it takes place) and duration (how long it lasts).

- [What should we measure, and how? - Consolidated Summary of 2021 Consultations on Global Partnership Monitoring Reform \(2021\)](#)

This document summarises findings from the series of virtual stakeholder consultations that were focused on the monitoring framework, and initiated in the lead up to the 21<sup>st</sup> SC Meeting. This consolidated summary was a key input to the Co-Chair's proposal on the monitoring reform at the 21<sup>st</sup> SC Meeting.

- [20<sup>th</sup> Steering Committee Meeting – Background document for monitoring reform session \(2020\)](#)

At the 20<sup>th</sup> SC Meeting, the Committee discussed - progress made on improving the monitoring process; a proposal for the review of the indicator framework; and the envisioned role of Steering Committee members in the reform consultations.

- [Listening Up: 2020 Consultations on Global Partnership Monitoring Reform \(2020\)](#)

This document presents findings from the series of virtual stakeholder consultations that were focused on the monitoring process, and initiated in the lead up to the 20<sup>th</sup> SC Meeting. It informed the 20<sup>th</sup> SC Meeting discussions in charting out the next phase of the reform, concerning both the process and the framework.

- [Virtual Survey Report: Improving the GPEDC Monitoring process \(2020\)](#)

This presents findings of the virtual survey, conducted in early 2020, and highlights which process-related considerations most influence stakeholders' decisions to participate in the monitoring.

- [19<sup>th</sup> Steering Committee Meeting – Background document for monitoring reform session \(2020\)](#)

At the 19<sup>th</sup> SC Meeting, the Committee gave guidance on the level of ambition of the reform, including its scope and how it should be implemented. It was also in this meeting that the 2020-2022 GPEDC work program was launched; therefore at this time the details of the monitoring reform were available in the SP3 [Strategic Priority 3 of the work program] project document (linked below).

- [Strategic Priority 3: Proposal document](#)

Alongside key details and structure of the monitoring reform, this project document also includes a brief history of the Global Partnership's monitoring exercise in Annex A.

- [18<sup>th</sup> Steering Committee Meeting – Co-Chair's Proposal for GPEDC Strategic Priorities \(2019\)](#)

At the 18<sup>th</sup> SC Meeting, the Committee agreed on the broad frame of the 2020-2022 GPEDC work program's strategic priorities. This included the key elements and structure of Strategic Priority 3, which is focused on leveraging monitoring for action, including the monitoring reform.

- [2016 Monitoring Advisory Group Report](#)

This report, presented to the SC and Co-Chairs, outlines the suggestions and findings of the Monitoring Advisory Group towards the reform of the Global Partnership monitoring framework.

#### **Third Monitoring Round (2018) related documents**

- [Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2019 GPEDC Progress Report](#) (OECD/UNDP (2019), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2019 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/26f2638f-en>.)

- [Country Profiles: 2018 Monitoring Round](#)

Each profile provides a snapshot of a country or territory's progress in achieving more effective development cooperation, based on data collected from governments, development partners and other actors in the 2018 monitoring round.

- [Post-monitoring survey among National Co-ordinators \(2018 Round\)](#)

This report presents findings from the post-monitoring survey of the 2018 monitoring round that collected feedback on National Co-ordinators' experiences throughout the monitoring exercise.

**Other key documents referenced in this proposal**

- [Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 2020-2022 Work Programme \(2020\)](#)
- [GPEDC Virtual Workshop summary report \(2020\)](#)

This report summarises the outcomes of a virtual meeting that GPEDC Co-chairs convened, as part of the design process of the new GPEDC work program, to inform and shape a common ambition and set of action areas for behaviour change at the country level.

- [Work Programme of AA 2.3: Country-led development effectiveness of South-South co-operation \(2020\)](#)
- [Effective South-South Co-operation \(2019\)](#)

Led by Mexico, the Global Partnership supported this pilot approach to monitor the effectiveness of South-South Co-operation from the provider's perspective.

- [Tailored monitoring approach for fragile and conflict affected situations \(2019\)](#)

Presented at the 17<sup>th</sup> SC Meeting, this proposal outlines a tailored approach to monitoring effective development cooperation in fragile and conflict-affect situations (FCAS). An open working group convened over 2018 and 2019 developed this approach.

- [Kampala Principles on Effective Private Sector Engagement in Development Co-operation \(2019\)](#)

Following extensive multi-stakeholder consultations, and drawing on the advice of a Business Leaders Caucus, the GPEDC developed a set of principles to guide collective work on making private sector partnerships for development co-operation more effective. The principles were endorsed at the 17<sup>th</sup> SC Meeting.

**Key outcome documents**

- [First High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness: Outcome Document \(Rome, 2002\)](#)

The First High Level Forum marked the first occasion at which the principles for aid effectiveness were outlined in a concrete declaration.

- [Second High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness: Outcome Document \(Paris, 2005\)](#)

At the Second High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the Paris Declaration was endorsed in order to base development efforts on first-hand experience of what works and does not work with aid. It is formulated around five central pillars: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, and Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability.

- [Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness: Outcome Document \(Accra, 2008\)](#)

At the Third High Level Forum, an alliance of development partners – developing and donor countries, emerging economies, UN and multilateral institutions, global funds and civil society organisations - participated in discussions, broadening the stakeholders in the aid effectiveness agenda. The forum emphasised the need to deepen implementation towards the goals set in 2005 in the Paris Declaration, along with a set of priority areas for improvement.

- [Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness: Outcome Document \(Busan, 2011\)](#)

The Fourth High Level Forum, on Aid Effectiveness, marked a turning point in international discussions on aid and development. The forum culminated in the signing of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation by ministers of developed and developing nations, emerging economies, providers of South-South and triangular co-operation and civil society.

- [First High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Outcome Document \(Mexico, 2014\)](#)

At the First High Level Meeting of the GPEDC, emphasis was placed on building towards and inclusive post-2015 development agenda, while assessing progress made on the Busan principles and the way forward.

- [Second High Level Meeting of the GPEDC: Outcome Document \(Nairobi, 2016\)](#)

At the Second High Level Meeting of the GPEDC, stakeholders reaffirmed the spirit of the partnership and their shared vision for effective development co-operation in the Nairobi Outcome document. To deliver on this vision, stakeholders reiterated the urgency to take action in line with the Busan Principles.

- [2019 Senior Level Meeting – Co-Chairs' Statement](#)

The 2019 GPEDC SLM was convened in the margins of the HLPF for Sustainable Development in the UN, with over 600 senior-level representatives among various GPEDC stakeholder groups. Stakeholders reviewed progress and charted a course on how to advance effective development co-operation.